All posts by Julie Anne Ines

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Watson Standard of Prejudice on Appeal Requires “Merely a Reasonable Chance” of a More Favorable Result

In People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394 the CSC reversed the lying in wait special circumstance because the trial judge failed to sua sponte instruct, per CJ 8.83 or CJ 8,83.1 that between two reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, the jury must choose the inference pointing to innocence: “We … conclude that the prosecution’s case for the lying-in-wait special circumstance substantially relied on that circumstantial evidence, and that CALJIC No. 8.83 or No. 8.83.1, or its equivalent, should have been given sua sponte.” (Id. at 421.)

In deciding whether this error required reversal the court concluded that it should be “judged as state law error that is prejudicial only where there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. [Citation omitted].” (Id. at 422.) However, the court emphasized that in this context “probability” does not mean “more likely than not … but merely a “reasonable chance….” [Citing and quoting People v Wilkins (2013) 56 C4th 333, 351; emphasis in Sandoval and Wilkins opinions.)

For additional discussion of the Watson standard and how to meet it see Forecite PG(X)(B)(9) [Article Bank # A-84 “A Primer On Prejudicial Error: The Applicable Tests And How To Satisfy Them,” by Dallas Sacher, Section VII.

 

In particular note the following passages from the above article:

“The Watson test applies to errors arising under the state Constitution as well as statutory law. (People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 493.) However, the California Supreme Court has cautioned that some errors arising under the state Constitution remain reversible per se. (Ibid.) These errors include the denial of counsel, the denial of conflict free counsel, the denial of a jury trial and improper discrimination in the selection of the jury. (Ibid.) Moreover, even if Watson review is permitted for a state constitutional violation, a California court is still bound to apply the Chapman test if the same error also arises under the federal Constitution. (Id., at pp. 509-510.)”

“In applying the Watson test, it is important to note that an evenly balanced case is one which the defendant is entitled to win. (See cases cited in 6 Witkin and Epstein, California Criminal Law (2nd ed. 1989) section 3297, pp. 4077-4078.) Indeed, Watson makes this point crystal clear: “But the fact that there exists at least such an equal balance of reasonable probabilities necessarily means that the court is of the opinion `that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837.)”

“As a corollary to the last point, it should be noted that some courts have employed a “divergence” from the Watson standard in a close case. (People v. Hickman (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 365, 373.) Under this test, a close case mandates reversal whenever there is “`”`any substantial error tending to discredit the defense . . .’”‘” (Ibid.) Thus, in Hickman, reversal was ordered since the jury improperly learned of the defendant’s status as an ex-con. (Id., at pp. 373-374.)”

Note: It is not necessarily settled that the failure to instruct on a defense theory is only state law error. (See,
Chapman or Watson: What is the Standard of Prejudice For Misinstruction on Defense Theory?) 

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Lying in Wait Special Circumstance: Judge Was Required to Sua Sponte Instruct on Circumstantial Evidence

In People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394 the CSC reversed the lying in wait special circumstance because the trial judge failed to sua sponte instruct, per CJ 8.83 or CJ 8,83.1 that between two reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, the jury must choose the inference pointing to innocence: “We … conclude that the prosecution’s case for the lying-in-wait special circumstance substantially relied on that circumstantial evidence, and that CALJIC No. 8.83 or No. 8.83.1, or its equivalent, should have been given sua sponte.” (Id. at 421.)

The Court held that the error was reversible because there was “a reasonable chance the jury would have found the lying-in-wait special circumstance not true” if the proper circumstantial evidence instruction had been given. (Id. at 422.)

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Does receipt of a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d) fall within the scope of Proposition 47 even if the value of the vehicle is less than $950?

In People v, Bussey (2018) 24 CA5th 1056 the defendant contended that his conviction for receipt of a stolen vehicle should be reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 because the provisions of Penal Code section 496 for misdemeanor sentencing apply as a matter of law to the more specific section 496d. The Court of Appeal disagreed. A “person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen,” knowing that the property has been stolen, violates section 496. Proposition 47 amended section 496 to provide that the offense is a misdemeanor if the value of the stolen property is $950 or less. But it did not amend section 496d, which provides that every person who buys or receives a stolen vehicle may be charged with a felony. Section 496 does not include a “sweeping phrase” regarding the entire subject of knowing receipt of stolen property, similar to Penal Code section 490.2 and the definition of grand theft, which is “a strong signal” section 496 is not intended to operate in the same fashion. It is not a violation of equal protection principles to treat the theft of a car valued at $950 and less different than receiving a stolen car at the same value. “The difference in treatment between petty thieves and receivers of stolen property is easily rationalized.” The Penal Code section “496 series” is intended to dismantle the market for stolen goods, which is more dangerous and detrimental than a mere thief. As for the difference in treatment between receipt of a stolen car (Pen. Code, § 496d) and general receipt of stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496) “it is plausible that the drafters elected to proceed in an incremental way, gauging the effects of the proposition’s sea change in penal law, and—in light of the small number of functioning vehicles worth under $950 at present values—did not consider it an injustice to fail to include them and instead leave the matter to the charging discretion of prosecutors.”

 

However, on 9/12/2018, the California Supreme Court granted review in this case and deferred briefing pending decision in People v. Orozco (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 667, review granted 8/15/2018 (S249495/D067313), which presents the following issue: Can a felony conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 496d be reclassified as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 in light of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a), which provides that receiving other stolen property is a misdemeanor when the value of the property does not exceed $950?

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California Law Violates USSC Precedents Including Hurst v. Florida (2016) _U.S._ 136 S. Ct. 616

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments require any fact other than a prior conviction be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt if the existence of that fact serves to increase the statutory maximum penalty for the crime. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 281-82, 127 S.Ct. 856, 864 (2007); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 124S.Ct. 2536-37 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63.

 

In capital cases, this constitutional mandate has been applied to the finding of aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the death penalty. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002); see also Hurst v. Florida,_U.S._ 136 S.Ct. 616, 619, 621 (2016).

 

Despite the clarity of this Court’s decisions in this area of the  la w, the California Supreme Court has  repeatedly  held  that  California’s  death  penalty scheme permits the trier of fact — the jury — to impose a sentence of death without finding the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and without finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors beyond  a  reasonable doubt – two factual findings necessary to imposition of a death sentence under California’s death penalty statute. (See, e.g., People v. Jones (2017); 3 Cal.5th 583, 618-619.

In Hurst v. Florida, the Court applied the mandate of Apprendi and Ring to invalidate Florida’s death penalty statute. In Florida, a defendant convicted of capital murder is punished by either life imprisonment or death.

 

Hurst, 136 S.Ct. at 620, citing Fla. Stat. §§ 782.04(1)(a), 775.082(1). Under the statute at issue in Hurst, after returning its verdict of conviction, the jury rendered an advisory verdict at the sentencing proceeding, but the judge made the ultimate sentencing determinations. 136 S.Ct. at p. 620. The judge was responsible for finding that “sufficient aggravating circumstances exist” and “that there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh aggravating circumstances,” which were prerequisites for imposing a death sentence. 136 S.Ct. at 622, citing Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3). The Court found that these determinations were part of the “necessary factual finding that Ring requires” and held that Florida’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional under Apprendi and Ring, because the sentencing judge, not the jury, made a factual finding, the existence of an aggravating circumstance, that is required before the death penalty can be imposed. 136 S.Ct. at 622, 624. In so holding, this Court restated the core Sixth Amendment principle as it applies to capital sentencing statutes: “The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death.” 136 S.Ct. at 619.

 

Therefore, trial and appellate counsel should continue to challenge the constitutionality of the California death penalty statute.

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Unconstitutional Vagueness Challenge to Aggravated Kidnapping Charge (PC 209) based on Johnson v. United State (2015) 135 S.Ct. 2551 [Johnson]

This post discussed the applicability of Johnson to inherently dangerous second degree felony murder. The same analysis could be applied to aggravated kidnapping per PC 209 which defines the required movement in terms of “risk of harm to the victim.”

The Authority section of CC 1203 also states “Movement Must Substantially Increase Risk of Harm to Victim,” citing People v. Dominguez (2009) 39 Cal. 4th 1141.

However, the Legislature in 1997 rewrote the aggravated kidnapping statute to delete the requirement that the movement must substantially increase the risk of injury to the victim over and above the risk inherent in the commission of the underlying crime. (People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 965, 980-82.)

The current version of the aggravated kidnapping statute, PC § 209(b)(2), requires that the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s movement of the victim “increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that which is inherent in the sexual offense itself. [But], section 209, subdivision (b)(2) does not require proof that the movement substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim.” (Ibid.)

The bottom line is that by defining aggravated kidnapping in terms of “risk of harm or injury” the statute may be unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.

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SUMMARY OF NEW AND REVISED CALCRIM INSTRUCTIONS EFFECTIVE MARCH 24, 2017

Full Judicial Council Report:  http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/rupro-20170224-materials.pdf

 

The Judicial Council, formally approved revisions to the following CALCRIM instructions to be effective March 24, 2017:

 

252, 361, 370, 522, 523, 729, 801, 830, 850, 902, 904, 937, 947, 960, 1082, 1124, 1125, 1126, 1202, 1301, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1355, 1502, 1600, 1650, 2130, 2131, 2500, 2722, 2723,

3428, 3472, 3477.

 

Also, CC 852, CC 853, and CC 1191 were replaced with new instructions: CC CC 852A, CC 852B, CC 853A, CC 853B, CC 1191A, CC 1191B.

 

Below is an overview of some of the proposed changes.

 

Additional Admonitions About Giving CC 370 On Motive

 

In September 2016 CALCRIM the judicial council approved revisions based on People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1165. In that case, the Court of Appeal reversed a sexual offense conviction as to  which motive was an element because the court gave an unmodified version of CC 370, which stated that the prosecution need not prove motive. As a result, admonitions in the bench notes of CALCRIM Nos. 1121–1126 about when not to give CALCRIM CC 370 were supplemented or made more prominent since all of those crimes have motive as an element.

 

In the March 2017 revisions similar admonitions were added to the hate crimes jury instructions for both substantive crimes and sentencing enhancements—CALCRIM Nos. 523, 729, 902, 904, 947, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1354, 1355—which also can have motive as an element. CC 370 was also revised for use as to both substantive crimes and sentencing enhancements.

 

 

CC 852A & B, 853A & B, and 1191A & B on Using Evidence of Uncharged Crimes

 

People v. Cruz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1185–1186, held that

CALJIC No. 2.50.01 improperly suggested that evidence of charged sexual offenses to show propensity could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Because CC 852 and CC 853 instruct on evidence of uncharged domestic violence and elder or dependent person abuse and could raise the same issues two different versions of each of these evidentiary instructions were added: one for uncharged crimes and the other for charged crimes.

 

  1. 3428, Mental Impairment: Defense to Specific Intent or Mental State

 

People v. Ocegueda (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1407, held that it was error to insert “intent to kill” instead of “express malice” as the required intent in paragraph two of CC 3428. To help prevent the “user error” identified in Ocegueda, the case cite along with a cautionary bench note was added.

 

People v. McGehee (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1205, concluded that giving CC 3428 and CC 362, Consciousness of Guilt: False Statements, could erroneously preclude the jury from considering evidence of a defendant’s mental illness or impairment as to whether he knowingly made false statements. Therefore, a cautionary bench note was added to alert users to this potential problem.

 

FORECITE COMMENT: Calcrim does not include a suggested modification to prevent this problem. If this is a defense theory a pinpoint defense requested instruction would be appropriate, e.g., —

 

Before considering the defendant’s statements, you must find, in light of all the evidence including evidence of defendant’s intoxication and/or mental impairment that:

  1. The defendant made [a] alleged false statement[s]; AND
  2. The defendant did so willfully and with the intent to avoid being charged with or accused of the crime; AND
  3. The defendant did so because (he/she) [thought (he/she) had done something wrong] [had feelings of guilt]; AND
  4. If and when the defendant [thought (he/she) had done something wrong] [had feelings of guilt] such [thought] [feelings] related to the charged crime.

Unless you find these preliminary facts to exist, you must disregard the statements.

See FORECITE discussion of CC 362, CC 3426, CC 3427, 3428 for related briefing and sample instructions.

 

 

Refusal Instructions

A motorist’s silence following the mandatory implied consent admonition about taking or completing a chemical test may be a “refusal.” New optional language was added to CC 2130 and CC 2131 and an entry in the authority section of the bench notes was added to these instructions.

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SUMMARY OF NEW AND REVISED CALCRIM INSTRUCTIONS EFFECTIVE AUGUST 21, 2015

http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/rupro-20150730-materials.pdf

 

The Judicial Council approved revisions to the following CALCRIM instructions effective August 21, 2015:

 

Proposition 47

Revisions were made to the following CALCRIM instructions affected by Proposition 47, which raised threshold amounts for felony prosecution of many theft crimes and reduced other theft crimes to misdemeanors:

1700, 1750, 1801, 1802, 1850, 1900, 1957, 1970, 1971, 2304, 2377.

 

The committee promulgated one new instruction required by proposition 47: CC 1703. It also deleted CC 2411.

 

Non-Proposition 47 Revisions

 

The following CALCRIM instructions were revised for reasons revisions unrelated to

Proposition 47:

 

219, 221, 358, 521, 570, 603, 800, 1017, 1018, 1170, 1180, 1252, 1500, 1863,

2100, 2101, 2110, 2111, 2113, 2410, 2902, 2980, 3413, 3450, 3453.

 

Overview of Selected Instructions

 

New Shoplifting instruction (CC 1703)

 

Proposition 47 created Penal Code section 495.5, which defines a new crime, shoplifting. The committee drafted a new instruction for this crime.

 

 

Cross-References required to CC 3100 and CC 3101 on prior convictions (CALCRIM Nos. 1700, 1703, 1750, 1801, 1802, 1850, 1900, 1957, 1970, 2304, and 2377)

 

To implement the provisions of Proposition 47, CALCRIM added an appropriate version of the following cross-reference to the bench notes of many instructions because disqualifying prior convictions are likely to be an issue for the jury:

 

When the People allege the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense listed in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv) or for an offense requiring registration pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 290, give CALCRIM No. 3100, Prior Conviction: Nonbifurcated Trial or CALCRIM No. 3101, Prior Conviction: Bifurcated Trial.

 

Instruction on threshold amounts per Proposition 47 (CALCRIM Nos. 1750, 1900, 1957,1970 )

 

[If you find the defendant guilty of receiving stolen property, you must then decide whether the value of the property received was more than $950.]

 

FORECITE COMMENT: Informing the jurors that they “must decide” this or any other factual question is undeniably an erroneous statement of the jury’s duty under the law.

 

Proposition 47 revisions to the Burglary instruction (CALCRIM No. 1700)

The committee added new language to the Burglary instruction for use when factual overlap between burglary and the new shoplifting offense is possible.

 

Repeal of the instruction on possession of needles or syringes (CC 2411)

The legislature repealed Business and Professions Code section 4140 regarding illegal possession of hypodermic needles. Therefore CALCRIM No. 2411, Possession of Hypodermic Needle or Syringe, is no longer needed and the committee deleted it.

 

Revision of PC 192 (CC 570 and CC 603)

The Legislature added sections 192(f)(1) and (f)(2) to the statute, which state that provocation is not objectively reasonable if it resulted from discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s gender identity and gender-related appearance and behavior. The committee revised the bench notes of the voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter instructions to advise of this change.

 

Note: CALCRIM did does not include specific instructional language because “the court and parties are likely to need and prefer an instruction tailored to the individual circumstances of a given case.”

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SUMMARY OF NEW AND REVISED CALCRIM INSTRUCTIONS EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 19, 2015

The following CALCRIM instructions were addressed by the judicial council effective February 19, 2015:

 

Instruction Number Instruction Title
New 2024 False Personation
New 3412, 3413 Compassionate Use and Cooperative Collective/Marijuana
359 Corpus Delicti
402, 403, 3426 Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine Series, Voluntary Intoxication: Effects on Homicide Cases
460, 1300 Attempt Other Than Attempted Murder, Criminal Threat
521, 601 First Degree Murder, Attempted Murder
540B Felony Murder: First Degree—Cooparticipant Allegedly Committed Fatal Act
571, 627 Voluntary Manslaughter: Imperfect Self-Defense or Imperfect Defense of Another—Lesser Included Offense, Hallucination: Effect on Premeditation
592 Gross Vehicular Manslaughter
840 Inflicting Injury on Spouse, Cohabitant, or Fellow Parent Resulting in Traumatic Condition
1005, 1021, 1036, 1051 Sex Crime by Fraud Series
1128 Engaging in Oral Copulation or Sexual Penetration With Child 10 Years of Age or Younger
1140 Showing or Sending Harmful Material to Seduce a Minor
1151 Pandering
1202 Kidnapping: For Ransom, Reward, or Extortion
1602 Robbery: Degrees
2350, 2351, 2352, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2370, 2375, 2376, 2377 Marijuana Series
2500 Illegal Possession, etc., of Weapon

 

2652 Resisting an Executive Officer in Performance of Duty
3160 Great Bodily Injury Enhancement
3517, 3518,

3519

 Lesser Included Offense Instructions

 

 

The specific revisions, deletions and new instructions appear  in this judicial council report: http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/rupro-20150126-materials.pdf.

 

Here are summaries of the most significant changes:

 

New False Personation instruction (CC 2024)

Drafted to fill an “apparent need.”

 

First Degree Murder; Attempted Murder: Premeditation and Deliberation (CC. 521 and 601)

Definitions of premeditation in both of these instructions revised to “make them more consistent.” Also added People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 443–444, regarding the requirement that premeditation must been formed before the defendant acted.

 

Series of sex crimes by fraud (CALCRIM Nos. 1005, 1021, 1036, 1051)

Per People v. Morales (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 583—revised sections 261, 286, 288a, and 289 of the Penal Code expanded the potential victims to this crime. It now includes anyone deceived into believing that the person committing the act “is someone known to the victim other than the accused.” Previously, the perpetrator had to have been impersonating the victim’s spouse.

 

Showing or Sending Harmful Material to Seduce a Minor (CC 1140)

The state Legislature completely redrafted and amended Penal Code section 288.2. CC 1140 was thoroughly revised to “conform to the changes.”

 

Compassionate Use and cooperative collective marijuana instructions (CALCRIM Nos. 3412 and 3413)

Marijuana defense instruction for cooperative collectives created.

 

The language for the compassionate use defense was previously embedded in the relevant marijuana instructions. Because that wording is lengthy and the committee decided to create two stand- alone marijuana defense instructions instead of adding significant bulk to each relevant instruction in the marijuana series.

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SUMMARY OF NEW AND REVISED CALCRIM INSTRUCTIONS EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 26, 2016

Full Judicial Council Report: http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/rupro-20160202-materials.pdf

 

The Judicial Council, formally approved revisions to the following CALCRIM instructions effective February 26, 2016:

 

207, 334, 335, 336, 361, 375, 548, 625, 703, 736, 840, 841, 935, 938, 985, 1300, 1400, 1401, 1863, 2300, 2302, 2352, 2542, and 3472.

 

Citation updates to CC 207, 334, 335, 336, 361, 736, 1300, 1400, 1401, 1863, and 2542

 

Eleven of these 24 instructions in this proposal simply had the citations of newly decided cases added to the notes. These revisions were not specifically identified in the Council’s report because they “tend to be uncontroversial” and did not do not change the language of the instructions.

 

Overview of some of the proposed changes.

 

 

CC 548, Murder: Alternative Theories

To avoid potential confusion between different theories vs. different degrees of murder, the optional underlined text was added to CC 548:

 

You may not find the defendant guilty of murder unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed murder under at least one of these theories. You do not all need to agree on the same theory[, but you must unanimously agree whether the murder is in the first or second degree].

 

The brackets around the new language indicate that it is optional, to be given in the court’s discretion.

 

CC 703, Special Circumstances: Intent Requirement for Accomplice After June 5, 1990—Felony Murder

 

In response to People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 807–809

this instruction was revised to include the factors relevant to whether the defendant was a “major participant” in a special circumstances felony murder in which he or she was not the actual killer.

 

CALCRIM Sexual Battery series, Nos. 935, 938

 

People v. Andrews (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 590, 602, held that the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of actual and reasonable but mistaken belief in the victim’s consent in sexual battery cases. That defense was added to the sexual battery instructions.

 

CALCRIM Possession for Sale instructions, Nos. 2302, 2352

In response to a comment from a deputy district attorney, the committee revised these instructions to make clear that the defendant need not have possessed the controlled substance with the intent to sell it personally. The requisite intent may include intending that someone else actually sell it.

 

Comments, Alternatives Considered, and Policy Implications

The proposed additions and revisions to CALCRIM circulated for comment from November 9 to December 28, 2015. One comment was received and then withdrawn. Therefore no comment chart is provided. The current proposal is uncontroversial, so the dearth of comments is not surprising.

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SUMMARY OF NEW AND REVISED CALCRIM INSTRUCTIONS EFFECTIVE SEPTEMBER 15, 2017

http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/rupro-20170822-materials.pdf

 

The Judicial Council approved revisions to the following CALCRIM instructions effective September 15, 2017:

 

301, 358, 359, 520, 521, 627, 3450, 938, 965, 985, 1060, 1127, 1128, 1161, 2100, 2110, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2748, 2306, 3145, 3183, 3404, 3414, 3456, and 3457.

The council also approved the following two new instructions: CALCRIM Nos. 2306, 3414.

 

Below is an overview of some of the proposed changes.

 

CC 301, Single Witness’s Testimony

Optional language about accomplice testimony in CC 301 deleted in light of CC 334 and CC 335 which the CALCRIM committee deemed to be sufficient.

 

FORECITE COMMENT:

This change unnecessarily puts the burden on the jurors to find and apply other instructions which conflict with the one witness rule stated in CC 301. Since it will be known at the time the instructions are given whether or not the accomplice instructions (CC 334 and CC 335) will also be given, the better practice would be to specifically cross reference them in CC 301. E.g.,

 

“Except as provided in the accomplice corroboration instructions (CC 334 and CC 335) the testimony of a single witness ….”

 

CC 627 On Hallucination And Its Effect On Premeditation

Bench notes revised to delete references to sua sponte duty to give this instruction. Added reference to People v. McCarrick (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 227, 243 which concluded that CC 627 is a pinpoint instruction to be given only on request when the evidence supports the defense theory. Also added note regarding need to modify this instruction if there is evidence of delusions as opposed to hallucinations per People v. Gana (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 598, 605–606.

 

CC 3404, Accident

Deleted language from the instructional duty section of the bench notes and added instructional language regarding when to give either of the two paragraphs provided in the instruction.

 

New CC 2306, Possession of Controlled Substance With Intent to Commit Sexual Assault

 

Instruction for this new felony per Health and Safety Code, section 11377.5, — possession of “date rape” drugs.

 

New CC 3414, Coercion

Instructions for new provision of PC 236.23 making coercion to commit an offense as a direct result of being a human trafficking victim an affirmative defense.