Category Archives: Blog

Claim of Right: Lack of Concealment

Caveat: Intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property taken is an essential element of larceny. (See CC 1600.) Accordingly, the jury cannot convict, if in light of all the evidence, including the defendant’s alleged claim of right, the intent to permanently deprive element has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Fenderson (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 625, 644, upheld giving CC 863 over an objection that the bracketed language, that concealment renders it inapplicable, should only be given in embezzlement cases. “Lack of concealment is evidence that a defendant has a good faith belief in his or her right to the property at issue.” (Ibid.)

Threatening A Public Official: Intent To Carry Out the Threat

 

People v. Barrios (2008) 163 Cal. App. 4th 270, upheld this instruction, rejecting an argument that improperly stated the law. The defendant argued that CC 2650 was incorrect because “it tells the jury that the defendant need not have the intent to carry out the threat, only the intent that the statement be taken as a threat. He argued that the language of PC 76(c)(5). . .required an intent to carry out the threat in order to convict under the statute. According to defendant, the language ‘made with the intent. . .to carry out the threat’ requires the People to prove not only that he intended his comments and conduct in the holding cell to be taken as a threat, but also that he intended to carry out the threat.” (Id. at 275-76.)

 

The Court of Appeal held, however, that PC 76 required only one intent: as stated by CC 2650, the intent that the defendant’s statement be taken as a threat. “It is unreasonable to posit the need to prove an actual intent to execute the threat when the ability to do so can be attenuated by months, even years, before the release of the incarcerated threatener.” (Id. at 277.)

Lawful Performance: Custodial Officer- -Use Of “Reasonable” Force

 

 

People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 515, identified the following problem with CC 2671:

 

Read literally, [CC 2671] authorizes a custodial officer to use reasonable force in four situations- -“to restrain a person, to overcome resistance, to prevent escape, or in self-defense”- -but erroneously limits to the first situation alone not only the prohibition against the defendant’s use of force or any weapon to  resist reasonable force but also the authorization of the defendant’s use of reasonable force to defend against unreasonable or excessive force.

 

The CJ instruction itself does not contain a provision dealing with the defendant using reasonable force to defend, but a separate CJ instruction does contain a self-defense provision. The CJ self-defense provision, unlike the version of CC 2671 disapproved in Gutierrez, does state that a defendant is allowed to use reasonable force to defend in every situation where an officer is using unreasonable force. (CJ 9.28.)

Resisting Executive Officer

 

 

PC 69 sets forth two separate ways in which the offense of resisting an executive officer may be committed: (1) by attempting to prevent an executive officer from performing his duty by use of threats or violence; and (2) by resisting by use of force or violence an officer in the performance of his or her duty. The second type of resisting an executive officer is a general intent crime and CC 2652 properly sets forth the elements of that crime. (People v. Rasmussen (2010)189 Cal. App. 4th 1411, 1418.)

Manufacturing Chemical That Is Not Controlled Substance: Limited To Methamphetamine

 

People v. Bergen (2008) 166 Cal.App. 4th 161, observed that language in CC 2330 stating that an element of manufacturing under H&S § 11379.6(a) is that the “defendant engaged in the synthesis, processing, or preparation of a chemical that is not itself a controlled substance” is only appropriate in prosecutions for manufacturing methamphetamine.

 

In light of Bergen, such should only be used in methamphetamine cases. It should not be used in cases such as Bergen, which involved beginning the manufacturing process with a controlled substance such as marijuana.

Transporting Marijuana: Compassionate Use Act (CUA) Defense

 

CC 2361 sets forth criteria that must be satisfied for the defense to apply, including whether “the method, timing and distance of the transportation were reasonably related to the patient’s current medical needs. These criteria are derived from a test developed by the Court of Appeal in People v. Trippet (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 1550-1551, to determine whether the defense applies in transportation cases. The California Supreme Court has held that the test constitutes “a useful analytic tool.” (People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal. 4th 81, 92.) People v. Wayman (2010)189 Cal. App. 4th 215, subsequently refused to expand the defense to cover transportation of marijuana in excess of a defendant’s current medical needs, holding that it was unlawful for the defendant to store and drive around in his car with amounts of marijuana he planned to use on future occasions.

 

The Medical Marijuana Program, H&S § 11362.7, provides a defense for patients who participate collectively or cooperatively cultivating marijuana. The defense “requires that a defendant show that members of the collective or cooperative: (1) are qualified patients who have been prescribed marijuana for medicinal purposes, (2) collectively associate to cultivate marijuana, and (3) are not engaged in a profit-making enterprise.” (People v. Jackson (2012) 210 Cal. App. 4th 525, 529.) The Court of Appeal has interpreted the Medical Marijuana Program so that “the collective or cooperative association required by the act need not include active participation by all members in the cultivation process but may be limited to financial support by way of marijuana purchases from the organization.” (Ibid., see also People v. Colvin (2012) 203 Cal. App. 4th 1029, 1037; People v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 747, 785.) Hence, even if the collective has a large membership where very few members participate in the actual cultivation process, this does not prevent a member from asserting a defense based on the Medical Marijuana Program. (People v. Jackson, supra, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 529-530.) Nonetheless, in determining whether a “defense has been established, a trier of fact must consider whether the organization operates as a for profit enterprise or is a nonprofit enterprise operated for the benefit of its members In resolving that question, an organization’s large membership and governance processes, if any, are relevant.” (Ibid.)

In cases involving collectives or cooperatives, “in addition to an instruction that an enterprise must be nonprofit, the People are entitled to an instruction that in considering whether a collective or cooperative is nonprofit, a jury may consider the testimony of the operators of the enterprise, its formal establishment as a nonprofit organization, the presence or absence of any financial records, the presence or absence of processes by which the enterprise is accountable to its members, the size of the enterprise’s membership and the volume of business it conducts. Of course, the jury should also be instructed that a defendant is only required to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the elements of the defense, including the nonprofit element, have been proven.” (Ibid.)

Reckless Driving: Specified Injury Enhancement Instruction By CC Committee

 

The CC Committee explained the addition of CC 3223 in August 2013: “The committee convened a working group consisting of a law professor and two trial judges to determine appropriate new instructions to add to CC. Although CC already has a misdemeanor reckless driving instruction, [CC 2200], working group members concluded from both personal experience as well as from polling colleagues that the felony enhancement for this instruction is charged quite often. The committee drafted the proposed new instruction to fill that need.” (Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions Report (July 15, 2013), at p. 4.)

 

CC 1400 and 1401 Cases Interpreting Gang Instruction

 

People v. Salcido (2007) 149 Cal. App. 4th 356, 369, noted a flaw in CC 1400, which prompted a modification of the instruction by the CC Committee. People v. Martinez (2008) 158 Cal. App. 4th 1324, approved the unmodified version of CC 1400.

 

People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal. App. 4th 587, rejected the defense argument that instructing the jury with CC 1401 incorrectly stated the law because the gang enhancement requires a specific intent to promote the charged offense to which the enhancement is attached, and the trial court’s instruction permitted the jury to base the gang enhancement on speculative, uncharged criminal conduct.

Gangs: CC 1400 Revised In Light Of People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal. 4th 1125

 

CC 1400 is used to explain to the jury the crime of active participation in a criminal street gang under PC 186.22(a).

 

CC 1400, along with the related instructions in CC 1401 and 2542, were revised in August, 2013, due to the California Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal. 4th 1125.

In People v. Rodriguez, [] The Supreme Court clarified that a violation of Penal Code section 186.22(a) requires that a defendant willfully assist, further, or promote felonious criminal conduct by acting together with at least one other member of a criminal street gang. Because a total of at least two gang members must participate in that conduct and the defendant may, but need not, be a gang member, the committee proposes adding the following explanation to each of these instructions:

“At least two gang members must have participated in committing the felony offense. The defendant may count as one of those members if you find that the defendant was a member of the gang.” (Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions Report (July 15, 2013) at p. 4.)