SERIES 500 HOMICIDE
F 580 NOTES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
F 580 Note 1 Involuntary Manslaughter: Lesser Included Offense—CALCRIM Cross References And Research Notes
F 580 Note 2 Involuntary Manslaughter Based Upon Non-Inherently Dangerous Felony (PC 192(b))
F 580 Note 3 Unreasonable Self-Defense With No Intent To Kill Is Voluntary Manslaughter (PC 192(b))
F 580 Note 4 Aider And Abettor Must Intend To Aid And Abet The Act Committed By The Perpetrator (PC 192(b))
F 580 Note 5 Involuntary Manslaughter As LIO Of Murder Based On Assault Or Battery Without Malice
F 580 Note 6 Involuntary Manslaughter As LIO Of Murder Based On Heat Of Passion
F 580 Note 7 Involuntary Manslaughter: Instruction On Target Offense
F 580 Note 8 Involuntary Manslaughter: Misdemeanor Battery
F 580 Note 9 Involuntary Manslaughter: Effect Of Treatment By Spiritual Means (PC 192(b))
F 580 Note 10 Expanded Instruction On Criminal Negligence Should Be Given For All Predicate Acts
Return to Series 500 Table of Contents.
F 580 Note 1 Involuntary Manslaughter: Lesser Included Offense—CALCRIM Cross-References And Research Notes
CALCRIM Cross-References:
CALCRIM 581 [Involuntary Manslaughter: Murder Not Charged]
Research Notes:
See CLARAWEB Forum, Homicide—Series 500-700.
F 580 Note 2 Involuntary Manslaughter Based Upon Non-Inherently Dangerous Felony (PC 192(b))
Involuntary manslaughter may be predicated upon the commission of an inherently dangerous misdemeanor (see CJ 8.45) and second degree murder may be predicated upon the commission of an inherently dangerous felony. Hence, a death which is proximately caused by the commission of an “undangerous felony” is involuntary manslaughter. (People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 C3d 824, 834-36.)
(See also FORECITE F 8.45b.)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 8.45 n2.
F 580 Note 3 Unreasonable Self-Defense With No Intent To Kill Is Voluntary Manslaughter (PC 192(b))
See People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 C4th 82, 87 [imperfect self-defense with no intent to kill is voluntary, not involuntary manslaughter].
Retroactivity Note: See FORECITE F 8.40 n15.
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 8.45 n3.
F 580 Note 4 Aider And Abettor Must Intend To Aid And Abet The Act Committed By The Perpetrator (PC 192(b))
“Attempted“ involuntary manslaughter is a legal impossibility, since involuntary manslaughter has no “intent to kill” element. (See People v. Broussard (1977) 76 CA3d 193, 197.) Hence, involuntary manslaughter is not an offense that one may directly aid and abet because aiding and abetting requires that one know and share the intent of the perpetrator. (See People v. Beeman (1984) 35 C3d 547, 560-61.) Since it is a legal impossibility for the perpetrator to intend to commit involuntary manslaughter, the liability of an aider and abetter must flow, if at all, from a known and shared intent to commit the act upon which the involuntary manslaughter charge is predicated. (See generally, FORECITE F 3.02.)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 8.45 n4.
F 580 Note 5 Involuntary Manslaughter As LIO Of Murder Based On Assault Or Battery Without Malice
It is established that involuntary manslaughter may be based upon the commission of a non-inherently dangerous felony. (See FORECITE F 8.45 n2.) However, involuntary manslaughter may also be based upon the inherently dangerous felonies of assault or battery. Such a result is based upon the following analysis: 1) a second-degree felony murder conviction may not be sustained based on a killing which occurs during the commission of a felony which is an integral part of the homicide such as assault or battery (People v. Ireland (1969) 70 C2d 522, 539); 2) if there was no intent to kill, the defendant may not be convicted of voluntary manslaughter (see People v. Coad (1986) 181 CA3d 1094, 1106; see also People v. Rhodes (1989) 215 CA3d 470, 476, fn 3); 3) in light of the above and to avoid absurd results, the defendant who commits an unintentional killing without malice during the commission of an assault or battery, should be liable for conviction of involuntary manslaughter. (People v. Cameron (1994) 30 CA4th 591, 603 [disapproving People v. Rhodes (1989) 215 CA3d 470, 476, fn 3.) Accordingly, the jury should be instructed that if the killing occurred during the commission of an assault or battery, and was unintentional and was committed without malice, the homicide is involuntary manslaughter. [See Brief Bank # B-719for additional briefing on this issue.]
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 8.45 n5.
F 580 Note 6 Involuntary Manslaughter As LIO Of Murder Based On Heat Of Passion
People v. Shannon (1996) 46 CA4th 1365 held that voluntary manslaughter is not a lesser included of implied malice murder based on heat of passion. (But see FORECITE F 8.40 n11.) Shannon’s conclusion was based, in part, upon the fact that voluntary manslaughter requires an intent to kill and a killing occurring with implied malice does not involve intent to kill. (But see FORECITE F 5.17d [Imperfect Self-Defense Applies to Implied Malice].) [An article addressing heat of passion and the lesser offenses of involuntary and voluntary manslaughter is available to FORECITE subscribers, Article Bank # A-67.] However, Shannon did not consider and resolve the question of whether a non-intentional killing committed in the heat of passion may be reduced to involuntary manslaughter. The impediment of a required intent to kill—which Shannon held precluded reduction of the killing to voluntary manslaughter— is not present in involuntary manslaughter and, hence, there is, perhaps, a stronger argument for reduction of such an offense to involuntary manslaughter. [See Brief Bank # B-720 for additional briefing on this issue, including a discussion on out-of-state authorities.]
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 8.45 n6.
F 580 Note 7 Involuntary Manslaughter: Instruction On Target Offense
People v. Huynh (2002) 99 CA4th 662 held that there is no sua sponte duty to instruct on target offenses which are the predicate for an involuntary manslaughter conviction. (See also FORECITE F 3.02 n16.) However, if the prosecutor requests that the jury consider a specific target offense, then sua sponte instruction on that target offense may be required. (Huynh, 99 CA4th at 678.)
However, this holding would not preclude the instruction upon target offenses if requested by defense counsel. (Ibid.)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 8.45 n8.
F 580 Note 8 Involuntary Manslaughter: Misdemeanor Battery
See People v. Benavides (2005) 34 C4th 69, 103 [listing examples of involuntary manslaughter based on misdemeanor assault or battery].
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 8.45 n9.
F 580 Note 9 Involuntary Manslaughter: Effect Of Treatment By Spiritual Means (PC 192(b))
For purposes of the crime of abandonment and neglect of children, PC 270 specifically excludes parents who provide medical treatment for their child by “spiritual means.” The appropriate section of PC 270 provides as follows:
“If a parent provides a minor with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination, by a duly accredited practitioner thereof, such treatment shall constitute ‘other remedial care,’ as used in this section.”
In Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 C3d 112, 123-26, the court held that PC 270 does not provide a complete exemption from felony prosecution for involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment. (See also People v. Rippberger (1991) 231 CA3d 1667, 1687-88.) [RESEARCH NOTE: See “Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due Process and Effect of Faith Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents.” J.L.R. 29 U.S.F.L. REB. 43-119, Fall 1994.]
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 8.45 n1.
F 580 Note 10 Expanded Instruction On Criminal Negligence Should Be Given For All Predicate Acts
See People v. Butler (2010) 187 CA4th 998 [No error to omit expanded definition of criminal negligence in absence of evidence of lawful predicate act. However, “because the mens rea for involuntary manslaughter is criminal negligence regardless of the nature of the predicate act underlying the offense, expanded instructions on criminal negligence for all three types of predicate acts would be preferable.” (Id. at 1016.)].
