SERIES 1700 BURGLARY AND RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
F 1750 Notes
TABLE OF CONTENTS
F 1750 Note 1 Receiving Stolen Property—CALCRIM Cross-References And Research Notes
F 1750 Note 2 Thief May Be Convicted Of Receiving Stolen Property But May Not Be Convicted Of Both Theft And Receiving Stolen Property (PC 496)
F 1750 Note 3 Identity Of Thief Not Relevant When Defendant Only Charged With Receiving (PC 496)
F 1750 Note 4 Taking And Receiving The Same Vehicle (PC 496)
F 1750 Note 5 Conviction For Receiving Stolen Property And/Or Burglary As To The Same Property
F 1750 Note 6 Receiving Stolen Property: Negation Of Knowledge Element By Intoxication Or Mental Impairment
F 1750 Note 7 Possession Of Stolen Property
F 1750 Note 8 Receiving Stolen Property: Applicability Of Temporary Safety Rule
Return to Series 1700 Table of Contents.
F 1750 Note 1 Receiving Stolen Property—CALCRIM Cross-References And Research Notes
CALCRIM Cross-References:
CALCRIM 1751 [Defense To Receiving Stolen Property: Innocent Intent]
CALCRIM 1752 [Owning Or Operating A Chop Shop]
Research Notes:
See CLARAWEB Forum, Burglary And Receiving Stolen Property—Series 1700.
Annotation, Participation in larceny or theft as precluding conviction for receiving or concealing the stolen property, 29 ALR5th 59 and Later Case Service.
Annotation, Possession Of Stolen Property As Continuing Offense, 24 ALR 5th 132, and Later Case Service.
F 1750 Note 2 Thief May Be Convicted Of Receiving Stolen Property But May Not Be Convicted Of Both Theft And Receiving Stolen Property (PC 496)
Whether Thief May Be Convicted Of Both Crimes—Prior to 1992, courts relied on People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 C3d 752, 756-59, which held that, absent certain exceptions, a thief could not be convicted of both receiving the property and theft. This rule was reaffirmed by the 1992 amendment to PC 496(a) which expressly stated “…no person may be convicted both pursuant to this section and of the theft of the same property.” (See People v. Allen (1999) 21 C4th 846.)
Whether Thief May Be Separately Convicted Of Violating PC 496(a)—Prior to 1992, under the authority of Jaramillo, a thief could not be convicted of receiving or concealing the stolen property even if he or she was not prosecuted as the thief. However, there was a split of authority as to whether a thief may be separately convicted of selling the property which he or she had stolen. (People v. Jackson (1978) 78 CA3d 533, 538-39 — no; People v. Tabarez (1988) 206 CA3d 551, 553-56 — yes.)
In 1992, the legislature added the following language to PC 496(a): “A principal in the actual theft of the property may be convicted pursuant to this section.” The plain meaning of the statute is that a thief can be convicted of violating either PC 496(a) or theft. However, a separate statement of legislative intent provided as follows: “It is the intent of the Legislature to provide for the prosecution of principals in the actual theft of the property who continue to possess that property after the statute of limitations has run on the theft of the property.” (Stats., 192, ch. 1146, §2. Emphasis added.) Due to this difference between the plain meaning of the statute and the stated legislative intent, there have been conflicts in interpreting the 1992 amendment.
In re Kali D. (1995) 37 CA4th 381, 386 (First District), interpreted the statute to mean that a defendant could be convicted of PC 496(a) if he or she was a principal in the actual theft only when the statute of limitations has run on the underlying theft.
However, other cases have interpreted the statute to mean that the thief could be convicted of either theft or receiving. People v. Strong (1994) 30 CA4th 366, 373, interpreted the language to mean “the fact that the defendant stole the property no longer bars a conviction for receiving, concealing or withholding the same property. The thief may be convicted either of the theft (upon a suitable showing) or receiving, but not both.” (See also People v. Hinks (1997) 58 CA4th 1157 (Second District) and People v. Reyes (1997) 52 CA4th 975 (Fourth District) same conclusion].)
In People v. Allen (1999) 21 C4th 846, the Supreme Court resolved these conflicts. A thief may not be convicted both of theft (PC 484, PC 487) and receiving or concealing stolen property under PC 496. However, based on the 1992 amendment to PC 496, the court disapproved a line of cases that held that the thief could not be convicted of receiving even though there was no conviction for the theft. The court held that as long as the defendant is not convicted of the theft, even if the statute of limitations on that charge has not run, he or she may be convicted of receiving.
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.65 n1.
F 1750 Note 3 Identity Of Thief Not Relevant When Defendant Only Charged With Receiving (PC 496)
If defendant is only charged with receiving, the prosecution doesn’t have to prove someone else was the thief. (People v. Price (1991) 1 C4th 324, 464.)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.65 n2.
F 1750 Note 4 Taking And Receiving The Same Vehicle (PC 496)
(See FORECITE F 1750 Note 1 and FORECITE F 1820 Note 2.)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.65 n3.
F 1750 Note 5 Conviction For Receiving Stolen Property And/Or Burglary As To The Same Property
People v. Landis (1996) 51 CA4th 1247, held that dual conviction for burglary and receiving stolen property is permissible. In so doing, Landis disagreed with People v. Lawrence (1980) 111 CA3d 630, 639 and People v. Perez (1974) 40 CA3d 795, 800, which interpreted People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 C3d 752, to preclude conviction for both burglary and receiving stolen goods. Landis concluded that it would be inconsistent to permit dual convictions for burglary and theft but bar dual convictions for burglary and receiving stolen goods. (Landis, 51 CA4th at 1255.)
People v. Carr (1998) 66 CA4th 109 held that a defendant may be convicted both of burglary and receiving property stolen in the burglary.
(See FORECITE F 1750 Note 2.)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.65 n5.
F 1750 Note 6 Receiving Stolen Property: Negation Of Knowledge Element By Intoxication Or Mental Impairment
(See People v. Reyes (1997) 52 CA4th 975; see also CC 3426; FORECITE F 3426 [4.21 n4].)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.65 n6.
F 1750 Note 7 Possession Of Stolen Property
RESEARCH NOTE: See Annotation, Possession Of Stolen Property As Continuing Offense, 24 ALR 5th 132, and Later Case Service.
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.65 n7.
F 1750 Note 8 Receiving Stolen Property: Applicability Of Temporary Safety Rule
See FORECITE F 8.21.1 n5.
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.65 n4.
