SERIES 1500 ARSON
F 1515 NOTES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
F 1515 Note 1 Arson—CALCRIM Cross-References And Research Notes
F 1515 Note 2 What Is The Intent Requirement For Arson? (PC 451(c))
F 1515 Note 3 Voluntary Intoxication Does Not Negate The Mental State Required For Arson (PC 451(c))
F 1515 Note 4 Voluntary Intoxication May Negate The Mental State Required For Arson (PC 451(c))
F 1515 Note 5 Arson: Definition Of “Structure” (PC 451(c))
F 1515 Note 6 Arson: Burning Defined—Any Consumption By Fire Sufficient (PC 451)
F 1515 Note 7 Multiple Counts: Arson—Individual Apartments Damaged By Fire Are Not Separate Structures Per PC 451.5(a)(3)
Return to Series 1500 Table of Contents.
F 1515 Note 1 Arson—CALCRIM Cross-References And Research Notes
CALCRIM Cross-References:
CALCRIM 1500 [Aggravated Arson]
CALCRIM 1501 [Arson: Great Bodily Injury]
CALCRIM 1502 [Arson: Inhabited Structure]
CALCRIM 1520 [Attempted Arson]
Research Notes:
See CLARAWEB Forum, Arson—Series 1500.
F 1515 Note 2 What Is The Intent Requirement For Arson? (PC 451(c))
ALERT: See People v. Atkins (2001) 25 C4th 76, 89 [evidence of voluntary intoxication does not negate intent required to prove mental state for arson; arson a general intent crime; voluntary intoxication not a defense].
“A person is guilty of arson when he or she willfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels, or procures the burning of, any structure, forest land, or property. (PC 451.) Felony arson is divided into the following four categories, each of which carries different prison term limits: 1) arson that causes great bodily injury (PC 451(a)); 2) arson that causes an inhabited structure or inhabited property to burn (PC 451(b)); 3) arson of a structure or forest land (PC 451(c)); 4) arson of property (PC 451(d)). On the other hand, if the fire is “recklessly” set, the crime is misdemeanor arson (PC 452).
A common sense interpretation of these statutes would require an intent to burn a structure, forest land, or property for felony arson. In fact, in People v. Tanner (1979) 95 CA3d 948, 956, the court held that it was error to instruct the jury that the intent with which the act is committed is immaterial to guilt. “The effect of the instruction was to remove from the jury the question of the existence of a critical element of the offense of arson—the general intent to set fire to a building.” (Ibid; see also In re Stonewall F. (1989) 208 CA3d 1054, 1062-68 [reckless burning of a structure is misdemeanor arson (PC 452) not felony arson (PC 451)]; People v. Swartz (1992) 2 CA4th 1319, 1324-25 [burning of a car within a garage with no intent to burn the structure does not give rise to arson liability for burning an inhabited structure even though the structure did burn].)
In People v. Fabris (1995) 31 CA4th 685, 698-99, the court held that In re Stonewall F. (1989) 208 CA3d 1054, 1062-68 directly held that PC 451 requires an intent to set fire to or cause a structure to burn. However, the court noted that the addition of the terms “general” or “specific” to the intent required for arson would “add nothing to the elements of the offense. [fn omitted.]”
The intent necessary for conviction of arson under PC 451 was also addressed in People v. Lopez (1993) 13 CA4th 1840, 1844-46.) Lopez relied upon People v. Glover (1991) 233 CA3d 1476 to conclude that to violate PC 451(b), the defendant need only have the general intent to start a fire and need not have any intent to burn a structure. However, in light of the discussion above, Lopez and Glover should not be read to require only a general intent to start a fire which burned a structure. Regardless of whether it is characterized as general or specific intent, PC 451 unquestionably requires that the defendant intended to burn the structure, property or forest land which was burned. CJ 14.80 fails to convey this requirement to the jury and should be modified to do so.
In People v. Fry (1993) 19 CA4th 1334, 1339, the Court of Appeal, in agreement with Glover and disagreement with Stonewall, held that arson does not require the specific intent to burn a particular piece of property. Rather, to convict a defendant of arson, the trier of fact must find only that the defendant acted willfully and maliciously in setting fire to, burning, or causing to be burned a structure, forest land, or property. Consequently, whether the defendant committed arson of a structure, as opposed to unlawful burning, depends only on whether the defendant willfully and maliciously performed the acts that caused the structure to burn. If the burning was willful and malicious, then it is arson (PC 451); if it was reckless, then it is an unlawful burning (PC 452).
In People v. Lee (1994) 28 CA4th 659, 664, the court noted the recent split of authority on the intent required for arson. But the court held that arson is a general intent crime and that the terms “willfully” and “maliciously” conveyed no more than an intent to do a wrongful act. (See also People v. Bolden (1996) 44 CA4th 707, 717 [arson does not require an intent to burn the structure].) However, this analysis fails to recognize that willfulness and criminal intent—even if general—require the defendant to knowingly commit the act which the statute prohibits. (See FORECITE F 1.20a and F 3.30a.) Since the act prohibited by PC 451 is “the burning of, any structure, forest land, or property” the defendant must knowingly commit such an act.
See also, FORECITE F 1.20aregarding requirement of knowledge included in “willfulness” element.
[Research Note: See FORECITE BIBLIO 14.80.]
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.80 n2.
F 1515 Note 3 Voluntary Intoxication Does Not Negate The Mental State Required For Arson (PC 451(c))
ALERT: People v. Atkins (2001) 25 C4th 76, 89, held that evidence of voluntary intoxication does not negate requisite intent required to prove mental state for arson because arson is a general intent crime to which voluntary intoxication not a defense.
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.80 n4.
F 1515 Note 4Voluntary Intoxication May Negate The Mental State Required For Arson (PC 451(c))
See FORECITE F 1500 Note 3.
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.80 n7.
F 1515 Note 5Arson: Definition Of “Structure” (PC 451(c))
(See People v. Labaer (2001) 88 CA4th 289, 293 [stripped-down mobile home is a “structure” within the meaning of the arson statute].)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.80 n8.
F 1515 Note 6Arson: Burning Defined—Any Consumption By Fire Sufficient (PC 451)
The crime of arson requires that the building structure be burned. “If the wood is blackened but no fibers are wasted, there is no burning. . . .” (People v. Haggerty (1873) 46 C 354, 355, quoting Bishop on Criminal Law, § 325.) However, even a minor charring of any portion of the building structure is sufficient. (In re Jesse L. (1990) 221 CA3d 161, 166.)
Moreover, burning for the purposes of arson means consumed by fire. That phrase includes fire caused destruction by means other than literal combustion: e.g., melting of lighting fixtures. (In re Jesse L., 221 CA3d at 166-67.)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 14.91 n1.
F 1515 Note 7Multiple Counts: Arson—Individual Apartments Damaged By Fire Are Not Separate Structures Per PC 451.5(a)(3)
See People v. Muszynski (2002) 100 CA4th 672, 683.
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 17.02 n23.
