SERIES 900 ASSAULTIVE AND BATTERY CRIMES
F 915 NOTES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
F 915 Note 1 Simple Assault: CALCRIM Cross-References And Research Notes
F 915 Note 2 Simple Assault: Nature Of The Injury (PC 240)
F 915 Note 3 Simple Assault: No Intent Required As To A Particular Victim
F 915 Note 4 Simple Assault: Multiple Victims
F 915 Note 5 Simple Assault: Requirement Of Overt Act
F 915 Note 6 Simple Assault: Knowledge Of The Act’s Potential For Injury
F 915 Note 7 Transferred Intent Not Applicable To Assault
F 915 Note 8 Simple Assault: Intoxication Not A Defense (PC 240)
Return to Series 900 Table of Contents.
F 915 Note 1 Simple Assault: CALCRIM Cross-References And Research Notes
CALCRIM Cross References:
CALCRIM 861 [Assault On Firefighter Or Peace Officer With Stun Gun Or Taser®]
CALCRIM 862 [Assault On Custodial Officer With Deadly Weapon Or Force Likely To Produce Great Bodily Injury]
CALCRIM 863 [Assault On Transportation Personnel Or Passenger With Deadly Weapon Or Force Likely To Produce Great Bodily Injury]
CALCRIM 875 [Assault With Deadly Weapon Or Force Likely To Produce Great Bodily Injury]
CALCRIM 876 [Assault With Stun Gun Or Taser®]
CALCRIM 877 [Assault With Caustic Chemicals]
CALCRIM 890 [Assault With Intent To Commit Sex Offense]
CALCRIM 891 [Assault With Intent To Commit Mayhem]
CALCRIM 900 [Assault On Firefighter Or Peace Officer]
CALCRIM 901 [Assault On Custodial Officer]
CALCRIM 902 [Assault On Military Personnel]
CALCRIM 903 [Assault On School District Peace Officer]
CALCRIM 904 [Assault On School Employee]
CALCRIM 905 [Assault On Juror]
CALCRIM 906 [Assault Committed On School Or Park Property]
CALCRIM 907 [Assault Committed On Public Transportation Provider’s Property Or Vehicle]
CALCRIM 915 [Simple Assault]
CALCRIM 916 [Assault By Conditional Threat]
CALCRIM 917 [Insulting Words Are Not a Defense]
Research Notes:
See CLARAWEB Forum, Assaultive And Battery Crimes—Series 800-900.
F 915 Note 2 Simple Assault: Nature Of The Injury (PC 240)
People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 C4th 206, 214, fn 4 reaffirmed the statutory interpretation of “violent injury” in PC 240 to include a slight touching which injures the victim’s “feelings.” However, the language of CJ 9.00 (“application of physical force”) does not require jury consideration of the victim’s feelings. (See FORECITE F 16.141a for instruction requiring infliction of “emotional stress”; see also FORECITE F 16.140c regarding requirement that the intended touching be “nonconsensual.”)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 9.00 n3.
F 915 Note 3 Simple Assault: No Intent Required As To A Particular Victim
Transferred intent does not apply to assault because there is no specific intent to transfer. (See People v. Lee (1994) 28 CA4th 1724, 1737; see also FORECITE F 9.00 n5.) Rather, a person is liable for assault against anyone to whom injury is reasonably foreseeable, when there is a willful intent to commit a violent act. (See FORECITE F 9.00 n1.) Thus, for example, when an assault is made against a person holding a baby, there is liability for an assault against the baby even if the only intent was to commit a violent act against the adult. (People v. Tran (1996) 47 CA4th 253, 261-62.)
As to the foreseeability of a particular victim, see FORECITE F 9.00 n1 and F 9.00b. See Brief Bank # B-709 for additional briefing on this issue.
(See also FORECITE F 860 Note 15)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 9.00 n7.
F 915 Note 4 Simple Assault: Multiple Victims
People v. Raviart (2001) 93 CA4th 258, held that two convictions of assault are permissible when the defendant, who was confronted by two police officers, drew a loaded handgun and pointed it at one of the officers under circumstances from which the jury could conclude that the defendant had the intent to shoot both officers.
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 9.00 n13.
F 915 Note 5 Simple Assault: Requirement Of Overt Act
In clarifying the mental state required for assault, the California Supreme Court explained that an assault is an act done toward the commission of a battery and that “[a]n assault occurs whenever the next movement would, at least to all appearance, complete the battery.” (People v. Williams (2001) 26 C4th 779, 786 [internal citations, quotation marks and italics omitted]; People v. Raviart (2001) 93 CA4th 258 rejected the defendant’s argument that gun must actually be pointed at the victim to constitute an assault].)
“We do not understand this statement to mean that for the crime of assault to occur, the defendant must in every instance do everything physically possible to complete a battery short of actually causing physical injury to the victim. Such a holding would be inconsistent with numerous precedents… [citations]” (Raviart, 93 CA4th at 266.) For example, an assault may be committed by “[h]olding up a fist in a menacing manner, drawing a sword or bayonet, [or] presenting a gun at a person who is within its range…” (People v. McMakin (1857) 8 C 547, 548.)
Hence, the overt act required for an assault requires that the defendant bring the weapon “into a position where he [can] use it against [the potential victim]…” (Raviart, 93 CA4th at 266.)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 9.00 n14.
F 915 Note 6 Simple Assault: Knowledge Of The Act’s Potential For Injury
People v. Williams (2001) 26 C4th 779, held that subjective knowledge of the dangerousness of the act is not required. (But see dissenting opinion of Kennard, J. [without requiring subjective appreciation of the risk majority fashions a standard equivalent to negligence]; but see People v. Wright (2002) 100 CA4th 703 [analyzing and criticizing the Williams decision].)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 9.00 n15.
F 915 Note 7 Transferred Intent Not Applicable To Assault
“Under Colantuono [People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 C4th 206] and Rocha [People v. Rocha (1971) 3 C3d 893], a defendant need not intend to strike any particular person to be guilty of an assault, and it is therefore irrelevant whether the defendant strikes his intended victim or another person. It follows that the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply at all in an assault case; there is no specific intent to transfer.” (People v. Lee (1994) 28 CA4th 1724.)
Thus, “when the defendant shoots into a group of persons primarily targeting only one of them, the defendant can be convicted of assault with a deadly weapon as to the nontargeted members of the group. (Footnote omitted.)” (People v. Riva (2003) 112 CA4th 981, 999; see also People v. Bland (2002) 28 C4th 313, 329.)
(See also FORECITE F 860 Note 15.)
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 9.00 n5.
F 915 Note 8 Simple Assault: Intoxication Not A Defense (PC 240)
The Colantuono court reaffirmed that the mental state for assault may not be negated by intoxication (People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 C4th 206, 213, fn 3; see also People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 C4th 437, 451; PC 22.) However, if awareness or knowledge is an element of assault, there may be a federal constitutional argument that, notwithstanding PC 22, the defendant should be allowed to negate such a mental element by any available evidence including intoxication. (See FORECITE F 1.20b.)
Does Due Process Require Consideration Of Intoxication In Determining All Mental Elements Of The Charge? [See FORECITE F 4.21 n11.]
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 9.00 n2.
