*Modify CC 250, paragraph 2, sentence 1 and 2 as follows [added language is underlined]:
When the offense requires multiple acts or a course of conduct the necessary criminal intent should concur with each act and/or course of conduct. (See PC 20; People v. Jeffers (1996) 41 CA4th 917, 920-23.)
In death penalty cases, additional federal claims should be added including, but not limited to, those in FORECITE CG 13.
However, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the act with actual knowledge of the existence of the facts which bring the act within the provisions of the statute under which the defendant is charged.
Points and Authorities
PC 20 requires a union of the act committed by the defendant and criminal intent. Hence, unless the crime is one of “strict liability,” it is not enough that the defendant intentionally commit the act which the statute proscribes. “Mens rea and actus res must come together to make an act a crime under [PC 20].” (People v. Lopez (1986) 188 CA3d 592, 598.)
With general intent crimes, ignorance of the law is no excuse and there is no requirement of proof as to the defendant’s knowledge that the act committed was illegal. (See CJ 3.30; CJ 4.36.)
However, there is an element of knowledge in general intent crimes which is omitted from cc 250; i.e., knowledge of the existence of the facts which bring the act within the criminal statute. (See PC 7(5); see also People v. Garcia (2001) 25 C4th 744, 752-754 [instruction on the knowledge element of general intent is required sua sponte]; People v. Osband (1996) 13 C4th 622, 681 [“to intend means to have in mind as a purpose or goal… [and should be defined] in terms of purpose or knowledge” [internal citations and punctuation omitted]; People v. Poslof (2005) 126 CA4th 92, 100-101 [knowledge element of PC 290 was supplied by the following supplement to CJ 3.30: “One cannot fail to perform an act without knowing what act is required to be performed” ]; People v. Honig (1996) 48 CA4th 289, 334 [knowledge is “concomitant of willfulness” ].) Without knowledge of the existence of the facts of an act which bring the act within the statute, there is no criminal intent. (See Lopez, 188 CA3d at 598.) “The moral quality of an intent may be determined by knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of pertinent facts.” (Perkins, Criminal Law (3d ed 1982) Ch 6, §5, p. 697; see also, FORECITE F 1.20a.)
For example, PC 148(a) is a general criminal intent statute which proscribes the act of willfully resisting arrest, such as, running away from an arresting officer. However, merely proving that the defendant intentionally committed such an act does not establish general criminal intent. It must also be shown that the defendant had knowledge of the particular facts proscribed by the statute: e.g., that the arresting person was a police officer. “Merely running away from someone is not resisting arrest. Running from a plain clothes officer who does not identify that he or she is an officer could not, for instance, be a crime.” (Lopez, 188 CA3d at 598. Other examples abound: People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 C4th 206, 214, 219 [general criminal intent for assault requires knowledge of the violent consequences of the act committed]; People v. Beaugez (1965) 232 CA2d 650, 657-58 [general criminal intent in PC 273d requires knowledge of the consequences of the act committed]; People v. Reynolds (1988) 205 CA3d 776, 779-80 [general intent for possession of drugs requires knowledge that drugs are present]; People v. Jurado (1972) 25 CA3d 1027, 1030-31 [general intent offense of carrying a concealed weapon (PC 12025) requires knowledge of the weapon’s presence].)
Moreover, both the California and the U.S. Supreme Courts have consistently disapproved imposition of criminal liability based upon a “strict liability” interpretation of a statute to disallow criminal liability in situations where the defendant is unaware of all the facts which bring the act committed within the criminal statute. (See Bryan v. U.S. (1998) 524 US 184, 194 [141 LEd2d 197; 118 SCt 1939] [knowledge of legal duty required only when statute presents “the danger of ensnaring individuals in apparently innocent conduct”]; Staples v. U.S (1994) 511 US 600 [128 LEd2d 608; 114 SCt 1793]; Lambert v. California (1957) 355 US 225 [2 LEd2d 228; 78 SCt 240]; People v. Simon (1995) 9 C4th 493, 519-22; see also FORECITE CHK IV(L).)
Cc 250 fails to convey this knowledge or awareness element to the jury. It merely informs the jury that the defendant must intentionally do that which the law declares to be a crime without requiring that the defendant be aware of the nature and consequences of the act which cause it to be criminal. Hence, CJ 3.30, “while consistent with the knowledge requirement, does not clearly and directly convey that requirement to the jury. Since knowledge is an element of the offense, [the defendant] [is] entitled to a specific instruction thereon. [Citations.]” (Reynolds, 205 CA3d at 780.) [See Brief Bank # B-925 forbriefing on this issue.]
Identification Of Parties—See FORECITE F 100.2 Note 1.
WARNING! Federal constitutional claims may be lost without proper federalization—To preserve federal claims, counsel should add the applicable constitutional provisions and authority to the above points and authorities and explain how those provisions will be violated under the circumstances of this case. Potential constitutional grounds for this request include, but are not limited to:
FORECITE CG 2.2 [Burden Of Proof: Elements And Essential Facts]
FORECITE CG 3.12 [Requirement Of Criminal Mens Rea]
FORECITE CG 4.1 [Right To Instruct The Jurors On Defense Theories]
In death penalty cases, additional federal claims should be added including, but not limited to, those in FORECITE CG 13.
NOTES
Constructive Knowledge—[See FORECITE F 1.20a, NOTES].
Willful Blindness Or Deliberate Ignorance (Federal/Model Penal Code Rule)— [See FORECITE F 1.20a, NOTES].
Negation Of Knowledge By Intoxication Or Mental Impairment— [See FORECITE F 3426 Inst 5].
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 3.30a.
F 250 Inst 3 General Intent: Deletion Of Terms “General” and “Specific” Intent
Modify CC 250 as follows: Delete references to “General” or “Specific” intent in the title and/or body of the instruction.
Points and Authorities
See FORECITE PG XI(H).
F 250 NOTES
F 250 Note 1 Concurrence Of Act And General Intent
So long as the intent required by the statute is conveyed to the jury, no further use of the exact term “specific intent” is required. (People v. Thomas DEPUBLISHED (1994) 26 CA4th 891.)
In People v. Jeffers (1996) 41 CA4th 917, the failure to instruct on the concurrence of act and general intent was prejudicial where the defendant’s theory was that the prosecution failed to prove joint union of possession and intent, i.e., a knowing, intentional exercise of control over the gun.
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 3.30 n1.
F 250 Note 2 Does Due Process Require Consideration Of Intoxication And/Or Mental Impairment In Determining All Mental Elements Of The Charge?
[See FORECITE F 3426 Inst 5.]
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 3.30 n2.
F 250 Note 3 Concurrence Of Act And Intent Requirement Of Causal Connection
“No crime is committed unless the mental fault concurs with the act or omission, in the sense that the mental state actuates the act or omission.” (People v. Martinez (1984) 150 CA3d 579, 602 citing LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law (1972), §34, p. 237 [emphasis added by Martinez].)
[Research Note: See FORECITE BIBLIO 3.30 et al.]
CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 3.31 n2.
F 250 Note 4 Act-Intent/Mental State Concurrence: Standard Of Prejudice
See FORECITE F 3.31 n3.
