Return to CALJIC Part 9-12 – Contents
F 12.70 n1 Felony Hit and Run: Definition Of Accident (VC 20001).
In People v. Jiminez (92) 11 CA4th 1611, 1628 [15 CR2d 268], the court concluded that the term “accident,” as used in VC 20001, has a technical meaning peculiar to the law which is broader than the commonly understood definition of the term. (I.e., the term applies to “all injury-producing events involving vehicles.”)
F 12.70 n2 Felony Hit And Run: Consideration Of Circumstances Of The Collision.
People v. Digirolamo (96) 664 NE2d 720 [279 Ill.App.3d 487] suggests that the circumstances of the collision–e.g., whether it occurred in a poorly-lit high-crime area or on a dark country road–may be considered in determining whether there was a duty to stop.
F 12.70 n3 Hit And Run: Unconsciousness As Complete Defense To Duty To Render Aid.
VC 20001, VC 20002, VC 20003, VC 20004, and VC 20008 impose requirements upon a driver involved in an accident to render assistance and perform other tasks at the scene of the accident. However, unconsciousness at the scene of the accident is a complete defense to a charge of violation of VC 20001. (See People v. Crouch (80) 108 CA3d Supp. 14, 21-22 [166 CR 818]; People v. Mayo (61) 194 CA2d 527, 536-37 [15 CR 366]; People v. Wallace (34) 2 CA2d 238, 244 [37 P2d 1053]; People v. Scofield (28) 203 C 703, 708-09 [265 P 914]. Accordingly, in such a case, CJ 4.30 and CJ 4.31 as well as appropriate FORECITE instructions on unconsciousness should be given to instruct the jury on this point. [See Brief Bank # B-703 for additional briefing on this issue.]
People v. Flores (96) 51 CA4th 1199, 1204 [59 CR2d 637] held that under VC 20001 and VC 20003 a driver who was rendered unconscious at the scene of the accident is required to meet the disclosure requirements of VC 20003 as soon as reasonably possible after regaining consciousness. Flores further held that VC 20001 requires the driver to both stop and comply with VC 20003. The driver who stops but does not comply with VC 20003 is still liable for hit and run per VC 20001.
F 12.70 n4 Hit And Run: Duties Limited To The Scene Of The Accident (VC 20001, VC 20002, VC 20003, VC 20004, VC 20008).
VC 20001 et seq. impose duties on a driver who is involved in an accident, which must be fulfilled at the scene of the accident. As set forth in FORECITE F 12.70 n3, unconsciousness is a complete defense to such a charge. This is so even if the defendant later, after leaving the scene of the accident, regains consciousness. At that point, there is no longer any duty to do the acts required by VC 20001. [See Brief Bank # B-703 for additional briefing on this issue.]
F 12.70 n5 Hit And Run Enhancement: Failure To Stop Must Proximately Cause Permanent And Serious Injury.
VC 20001(b)(2) provides for enhancement penalties for hit and run in violation of VC 20001(a) in situations where the violation results in death or permanent serious injury. However, the enhancement does not apply unless the defendant’s failure to comply with VC 20001(a) caused permanent, serious injury to another person. (People v. Braz (98) 65 CA4th 425 [76 CR2d 531]; see also People v. Wood (2000) 83 CA4th 862 [100 CR2d 115] [hit and run doesn’t become “serious felony” just because victim’s injuries are serious]; see also FORECITE F 12.70 n9.)
NOTE: VC 20001(b)(2) was amended (urgency legislation effective 10/8/99) to provide that “if the accident described in” VC 20001(a) results in death or permanent, serious injury of a person, the defendant is subject to felony or misdemeanor punishment. The statute no longer provides that it is the “violation” of VC 20001(a) itself that must “result” in the death or permanent injury. For crimes committed prior to the operative date of the statute ex post facto principles preclude application of the new legislation if it increases punishment or expands criminal liability. (See In re Baert (88) 205 CA3d 514, 517-18 [252 CR 418]; see also Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 US 386 [1 LEd2d 648].)
F 12.70 n6 Hit And Run: Prior Flight From Scene Inadmissible.
(See FORECITE F 2.50 n13.)
F 12.70 n7 Hit And Run: Requirement That Person Identify Himself As Driver Does Not Violate Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination.
(See People v. Kroncke (99) 70 CA4th 1535 [83 CR2d 493] (VC 20001 and VC 20003).) Kroncke relied on Byers v. Justice Court (69) 71 C2d 1039 [80 CR 553], and California v. Byers (71) 402 US 424 [29 LEd2d 9; 91 SCt 1535], which held that VC 20002(a) did not violate the Fifth Amendment by requiring a driver involved in an accident causing property damage to stop and identify himself. (71 C2d at 1041-42.) Kroncke also relied on Banks v. Commonwealth (VA 1976) 230 SE2d 256 [217 Va. 527], which noted that California v. Byers did not consider whether the reporting requirement violated the Fifth Amendment. Nevertheless, Banks held that “when we balance the public interest, on the one hand, and the individual’s constitutional claim, on the other, the additional requirement of police reporting does not tip the scales in favor of the accused.” (230 SE2d at 259; see also People v. Samuel (NY 1971) 327 NYS2d 321, 328 [277 NE2d 381] [“If the purpose of the statute is to incriminate, it is no good. If its purpose is important in the regulation of lawful activity to protect the public from significant harm, especially to the person but also to property, and only the incidental effect is occasionally to inculpate, then the statute is good within constitutional limitations.”].)
F 12.70 n8 Hit And Run: Necessity As Defense.
When the defendant is involved in an injury-accident, there may be situations where the need to seek immediate help for an injured person is more important than giving a name and address to that person per VC 20001. In such situations, the defense of necessity should apply. (See People v. Richards (69) 269 CA2d 768, 774-775 [75 CR 597]; People v. Lovercamp (74) 43 CA3d 823, 827 [118 CR 110].) [See Brief Bank # B-797 for additional briefing on this issue.]
NOTE: The rule that the defense of duress is not available if the defendant contributed to the need for the duress should not be applicable to necessity in a hit and run situation. However, if the rule is applicable, then there will be an issue as to whether or not the defendant was at fault in the accident.
F 12.70 n9 Hit And Run: Bodily Injury Caused By Original Impact Is Not A Serious Felony Under PC 1192.7(c)(8).
Hit and run (VC 20001) is not a serious felony under PC 1192.7(c)(8) unless the serious injuries are caused by the flight rather than the impact. (People v. Wood (2000) 83 CA4th 862, 867 [100 CR2d 115]; see also FORECITE F 12.70 n5.)
F 12.70 n10 Hit and Run: May Apply To Person Who Did Not Commit The Underlying Offense.
See People v. Calhoun (2007) 40 C4th 398 [VC 20001(c), which enhances a vehicular manslaughter conviction for fleeing the scene, applies to a person who did not personally and directly commit the underlying offense.
F 12.70a
Hit and Run: No Duty To Render Aid
If It Is Being Adequately Provided By Another
*Add to CJ 12.70:
As to the duty to render aid imposed upon drivers knowingly involved in an accident resulting in injury to another, even if aid is necessary, a driver is excused from providing such aid if it is being adequately provided by another. The law requires only that necessary assistance be rendered. A failure to provide aid which is not necessary under the facts in a given case does not subject a driver to criminal responsibility under the law. In determining whether a driver is required to render aid, you may consider the aid and/or assistance being rendered to the injured party by others. If the needs of the injured party are apparently met, no duty to render aid remain. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the rendering of aid was necessary, it is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and find that there was no duty to render aid.
Points and Authorities
People v. Scofield (28) 203 C 703, 708-09 [265 P 914].
People v. Scheer (98) 68 CA4th 1009 [80 CR2d 676] concluded that the driver’s duty to render assistance under VC 20003 does not apply “where such assistance by the driver is unnecessary….” (Scheer, 68 CA4th at 1027.) However, the driver does have a duty to ascertain what assistance, if any, the injured person needs and to make a reasonable effort to see that such assistance is provided, whether through himself or third parties. (Ibid.)
Failure to adequately instruct the jury upon matters relating to proof of any element of the charge and/or the prosecution’s burden of proof thereon violates the defendant’s state (Art. I, § 15 and § 16) and federal (6th and 14th Amendments) constitutional rights to trial by jury and due process. [See generally, FORECITE PG VII(C).]