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F 8.95 n1 Vehicular Manslaughter: Speed Laws — Improper Mandatory Presumption.
The CALJIC speed law instructions state that a violation of a speed law is “an act inherently dangerous to human life and safety, amounting to a misdemeanor or an infraction.” (CJ 8.95 (Basic); CJ 8.96 (Prima Facie); CJ 8.97 (Maximum).) These instructions create an impermissible mandatory presumption in violation of settled principles of due process. In a murder case this presumption undermines the defendant’s right to a jury determination of an essential element of implied malice which requires that the killing result from an intentional act the natural consequences of which are “dangerous to human life.” (See CJ 8.11.) Additionally, the presumption goes to an element of the charge of vehicular manslaughter which requires a finding that the defendant committed “an act inherently dangerous to human life or safety, amounting to a misdemeanor or an infraction.” (See CJ 8.90; CJ 8.93.) (People v. Vanegas(2004) 115 CA4th 592 [instruction that told jury any violation of the basic speed law established “dangerous to human life” element of implied malice established mandatory presumption which withdrew this element from the jury’s consideration in violation of rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments]; People v. Hammond DEPUBLISHED (92) 9 CA4th 1523 [12 CR2d 205]. See also Schwendeman v. Wallenstein (9th Cir. 1992) 971 F2d 313, 316.)
[See FORECITE F 8.45c.]
F 8.95 n2 Improper Presumption That Violation Of Basic Speed Law Is Inherently Dangerous To Human Life.
[See FORECITE F 8.45c, F 8.95a and F 8.97a.]
[Additional briefing on this issue including prejudicial error argument is available to FORECITE subscribers. Ask for Brief Bank #B-556.]
F 8.95 n3 Vehicular Manslaughter: Speed Laws — Definition Of Basic Speed Law.
FORECITE has suggested that any instruction on violating the speeding laws in the context of vehicular manslaughter should be deleted. (See FORECITE F 8.97a.) Instead, the jury must determine whether the conduct of the defendant was dangerous to human life and safety under the circumstances of the violation.
However, if the definition of speeding does become an issue, see FORECITE 12.60 n13, discussing the definition of speeding in the context of driving under the influence.
F 8.95a
Basic Speed Law
[DELETE CJ 8.95]
Points and Authorities
[See FORECITE F 8.97a]
F 8.95b
Basic Speed Law:
Requirement That Speed Endangered People Or Property Or Was Unreasonable
Under Particular Circumstances
*Add to CJ 8.95:
To prove this crime, the prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the rate of speed either:
1. Endangered people or property; or
2. Was unreasonable under the particular circumstances.
Points and Authorities
See People v. Behjat (2000) 84 CA4th Supp 1 [101 CR2d 193].
