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F 3.30 n1 Concurrence Of Act And General Intent.
So long as the intent required by the statute is conveyed to the jury, no further use of the exact term “specific intent” is required. (People v. Thomas DEPUBLISHED (94) 26 CA4th 891 [31 CR2d 731].)
In People v. Jeffers (96) 41 CA4th 917 [49 CR2d 86], the failure to instruct on the concurrence of act and general intent was prejudicial where the defendant’s theory was that the prosecution failed to prove joint union of possession and intent, i.e., a knowing, intentional exercise of control over the gun.
F 3.30 n2 Does Due Process Require Consideration Of Intoxication And/Or Mental Impairment In Determining All Mental Elements Of The Charge?
[See FORECITE F 4.21 n11.]
F 3.30 n3 Concurrence Of Act and Intent: Specific Intent And Murder.
In People v. Alvarez (96) 14 C4th 155, 220 [58 CR2d 385] the court concluded that the trial court erred insofar as its instruction on the concurrence of act and “specific intent” did not include the crime of murder.
F 3.30 n4 Appellate Issue Alert: Pre-1997 Version.
The pre-1997 version of CJ 3.30 failed to require concurrence of act and general criminal intent as to allegations such as enhancements and special circumstances. (See CALJIC History CJ 3.30.)
F 3.30 n5 Conflict Between CJ 3.30 And Knowledge Requirement For Controlled Substance Offenses.
(See FORECITE F 3.30a.)
[See Brief Bank # B-856 for briefing on this issue.]
F 3.30a
General Intent: Knowledge Element
*Add to CJ 3.30:
However, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the act with actual knowledge of the existence of the facts which bring the act within the provisions of the statute under which the defendant is charged.
Points and Authorities
PC 20 requires a union of the act committed by the defendant and criminal intent. Hence, unless the crime is one of “strict liability,” it is not enough that the defendant intentionally commit the act which the statute proscribes. “Mens rea and actus res must come together to make an act a crime under [PC 20]”. (People v. Lopez (86) 188 CA3d 592, 598 [233 CR 207].)
With general intent crimes, ignorance of the law is no excuse and there is no requirement of proof as to the defendant’s knowledge that the act committed was illegal. (See CJ 3.30; CJ 4.36.)
However, there is an element of knowledge in general intent crimes which is omitted from CJ 3.30; i.e., knowledge of the existence of the facts which bring the act within the criminal statute. (See PC 7(5); see also People v. Garcia (2001) 25 C4th 744, 752-754 [107 CR2d 355] [instruction on the knowledge element of general intent is required sua sponte]; People v. Osband (96) 13 C4th 622, 681 [55 CR2d 26] [“to intend means to have in mind as a purpose or goal… [and should be defined] in terms of purpose or knowledge” [internal citations and punctuation omitted]; People v. Poslof (2005) 126 CA4th 92, 100-101 [knowledge element of PC 290 was supplied by the following supplement to CJ 3.30: "One cannot fail to perform an act without knowing what act is required to be performed"]; People v. Honig (96) 48 CA4th 289, 334 [55 CR2d 555] [knowledge is “concomitant of willfulness”].) Without knowledge of the existence of the facts of an act which bring the act within the statute, there is no criminal intent. (See Lopez, 188 CA3d at 598.) “The moral quality of an intent may be determined by knowledge, or lack of knowledge, of pertinent facts.” (Perkins, Criminal Law (3d ed 1982) Ch 6, § 5, p. 697; see also, FORECITE F 1.20a.)
For example, PC 148(a) is a general criminal intent statute which proscribes the act of willfully resisting arrest, such as, running away from an arresting officer. However, merely proving that the defendant intentionally committed such an act does not establish general criminal intent. It must also be shown that the defendant had knowledge of the particular facts proscribed by the statute: e.g., that the arresting person was a police officer. “Merely running away from someone is not resisting arrest. Running from a plain clothes officer who does not identify that he or she is an officer could not, for instance, be a crime.” (Lopez, 188 CA3d at 598. Other examples abound: People v. Colantuono (94) 7 C4th 206, 214, 219 [26 CR2d 908] [general criminal intent for assault requires knowledge of the violent consequences of the act committed]; People v. Beaugez (65) 232 CA2d 650, 657-58 [43 CR 28] [general criminal intent in PC 273d requires knowledge of the consequences of the act committed]; People v. Reynolds (88) 205 CA3d 776, 779-80 [252 CR 637] [general intent for possession of drugs requires knowledge that drugs are present]; People v. Jurado (72) 25 CA3d 1027, 1030-31 [102 CR 498] [general intent offense of carrying a concealed weapon (PC 12025) requires knowledge of the weapon’s presence].)
Moreover, both the California and the U.S. Supreme Courts have consistently disapproved imposition of criminal liability based upon a “strict liability” interpretation of a statute to disallow criminal liability in situations where the defendant is unaware of all the facts which bring the act committed within the criminal statute. (See Bryan v. U.S. (98) 524 US 184, 194 [141 LEd2d 197; 118 SCt 1939] [knowledge of legal duty required only when statute presents “the danger of ensnaring individuals in apparently innocent conduct”]; Staples v. U.S (94) 511 US 600 [128 LEd2d 608; 114 SCt 1793]; Lambert v. California (57) 355 US 225 [2 LEd2d 228; 78 SCt 240]; People v. Simon (95) 9 C4th 493, 519-22 [37 CR2d 278]; see also FORECITE CHK IV(L).)
CJ 3.30 fails to convey this knowledge or awareness element to the jury. It merely informs the jury that the defendant must intentionally do that which the law declares to be a crime without requiring that the defendant be aware of the nature and consequences of the act which cause it to be criminal. Hence, CJ 3.30, “while consistent with the knowledge requirement, does not clearly and directly convey that requirement to the jury. Since knowledge is an element of the offense, [the defendant] [is] entitled to a specific instruction thereon. [Citations.]” (Reynolds, 205 CA3d at 780.) [See Brief Bank # B-925 for briefing on this issue.]
Failure to adequately instruct the jury upon matters relating to proof of any element of the charge and/or the prosecution’s burden of proof thereon violates the defendant’s state (Art. I, § 15 and § 16) and federal (6th and 14th Amendments) constitutional rights to trial by jury and due process. [See generally, FORECITE PG VII(C).]
NOTES
Constructive Knowledge: [See FORECITE F 1.20a, NOTES].
Willful Blindness Or Deliberate Ignorance (Federal/Model Penal Code Rule): [See FORECITE F 1.20a, NOTES].
Negation Of Knowledge By Intoxication Or Mental Impairment: [See FORECITE F 1.20b].
F 3.30b
Felony Murder: Specific Intent To Commit General Intent Offense
(See FORECITE F 8.21i.)