Instruction Bank # I-870
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CARY STAYNER’S SPECIAL SANITY PHASE INSTRUCTION NO. 1
Introductory Instruction: DUTY OF JURY – SANITY PROCEEDINGS
You will now be instructed as to all of the law that applies to the sanity phase of this case.
You must determine what the facts are from the evidence received during any part of the trial of this case unless you are instructed otherwise. You must accept and follow the law that I shall state to you. Disregard all other instructions given to you in other parts of this trial.
Points and Authorities
This instruction is modeled verbatim on CALJIC 8.84.1 and 8.85, which apply to the penalty phase of the case. The principle articulated in these instructions is applicable to the sanity phase. Penal Code Section 190.4(d) provides: “In any case in which the defendant may be subject to the death penalty, evidence presented at any prior phase of the trial, including an proceeding under a pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to Section 1026 shall be considered in any subsequent phase of the trial, if the trier of fact of the prior phase is the same trier of fact at the subsequent phase.”
___ Given as modified
___ Refused/Reasons:
CARY STAYNER’S SPECIAL SANITY PHASE INSTRUCTION NO. 2
Add to CALJIC 4.00:
The word “knowing” as used in this instruction means realization or appreciation of the wrongfulness of seriously harming a human being. Thus, “knowledge” of the nature or wrongfulness of an act means more than merely a capacity to verbalize the “right” (i.e., socially expected) answers to questions put to a person relating to that act.
Points and Authorities
In People v. Wolff (1964) 64 Cal.2d 795, 800-801, the Court ruled as follows:
The original M’Naughton language from which the California rule has been evolved is set out in the margin. Under that language a mentally ill defendant could be found sane even though his “knowledge” of the nature or wrongfulness of his act was merely a capacity to verbalize the “right” (i.e., socially expected) answers to questions put to him relating to that act, without such “knowledge” having any affective meaning for him as a principle of conduct. Such a narrow literal reading of the M’Naughton formula has been repeatedly and justly condemned. (2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) pp.170-171; Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense (1954) pp. 76-77; Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed. 1960) pp.481, 494, 520; Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill (1961) 14 Stan.L.Rev. 59, 62; Gluek, Law and Psychiatry (1962) p. 49, fn. 14.) Rather, it is urged by many that the word “know” as used in the formula be given “a wider definition so that it means the kind of knowing that is relevant, i.e., realization or appreciation of the wrongness of seriously harming a human being” (Hall, op. cit. supra, at p. 520). “If the word ‘know’ were given this broader interpretation, so as to require knowledge ‘fused with affect’ and assimilated by the whole personality–so that, for example, the killer was capable of identifying with his prospective victim–much of the criticism of the knowledge test would be met.” (Weihofen, op.cit. supra, at p. 77.)
The California courts have not been unresponsive to such proposals for liberalization of the original language of the M’Naughton rule (ante, fn. 1); in evolving our own rule to meet statutory requirements, apply humane concepts, and at the same time protect society, we have reformulated the test with a variety of specifications to achieve this end. (See e.g., People v. Willard (1907) 150 Cal. 543, 554 [83 P. 124] [“if he understands the nature and character of his action and its consequences”]; People v. Harris,(1914) 169 Cal. 53, 61 [145 P. 520] [“having mental capacity to know and understand the nature and character of the act he was committing”]; People v. Oxnam (1915) 170 Cal. 211, 213 [149 P. 165] [“If appellant … had sufficient mental capacity to appreciate the character and quality of his act, knew and understood that it was a violation of the rights of another…, if he had the capacity thus to appreciate the character and comprehend the possible or probable consequence of this act”]; People v. Morisawa (1919) 180 Cal. 148, 150 [179 P. 888] [“if the defendant… did not appreciate the act he was committing”]; People v. Gilberg (1925) 197 Ca. 306, 314 [3] [240 P. 1000] [“he appreciated the nature and the quality of the act”]; People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330, 351 [20] [202 P. 2d 53] [“to know the nature of his act and appreciate that it was wrongful and could subject him to punishment”]; People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 716, 735 [18] [336 P.2d 492] [relative to identity or degree of a crime].) (Italics added.) Guided by such decisions, our trial courts place a commendably broad interpretation upon the M’Naughton “knowledge” test.
___ Given as requested
___ Given as modified
___ Refused/Reasons:
CARY STAYNER’S SPECIAL SANITY PHASE INSTRUCTION NO. 3
In lieu of subparagraph 1 in paragraph five of CALJIC (“knowing the nature and quality of his act”), replace with the following:
1. Knowing and appreciating the nature and quality of his act.
In People v. Wolff (1964) 64 Cal.2d 795, 802, the Court explicitly approved this formulation, citing People v. Oxnam (1915) 170 Cal. 211, 213 [149 P. 165] [“If appellant… had sufficient mental capacity to appreciate the character and quality of his act, knew and understood that it was a violation of the rights of another…, if he had the capacity thus to appreciate the character and comprehend the possible or probable consequence of his act”]; People v. Morisawa (1919) 180 Cal. 148, 150 [179 P. 888] [“if the defendant … did not appreciate the act he was committing”]; People v. Gielberg (1925) 197 Cal. 306, 314 [3] [240 P. 1000] [“he appreciated the nature and the quality of the act”]; People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330, 351 [20) [202 P.2d 53] [“to know the nature of his act and appreciate that it was wrongful and could subject him to punishment”].
___ Given as requested
___ Given as modified
___ Refused/Reasons:
CARY STAYNER’S SPECIAL SANITY PHASE INSTRUCTION NO. 4
In lieu of subparagraph 2 in paragraph five of CALJIC 4.00 (“understanding the nature and quality of his act”), replace with the following:
2. Understanding the nature and character of his action and its consequences, and that it was a violation of the rights of another
Points and Authorities
In People v. Wolff (1964) 64 Cal.2d 795, 802, the Court explicitly approved of this formulation, citing People v. Willard (1907) 150 Cal. 543, 554 [83 P. 124] [“if he understands the nature and character of his action and its consequences”]. See also, Id. at 801 (“The test of sanity is this: First, did the defendant have sufficient mental capacity to know and understand what he was doing, and second, did he know and understand that it was wrong and a violation of the rights of another?).
___ Given as requested
___ Given as modified
___ Refused/Reasons:
CARY STAYNER’S SPECIAL SANITY PHASE INSTRUCTION NO. 5
In lieu of subparagraph 3 in paragraph five of CALJIC 4.00 (“distinguishing right from wrong”), replace with the following:
3. Distinguishing right from wrong. The defendant must know that the act was inherently, or morally wrong. A person who is incapable of understanding that his act is morally wrong is not criminally liable merely because he knows the act is unlawful.
Points and Authorities
In People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 529, 61 n.5, the Court stated:
In People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 [217 Cal.Rptr 685, 805 P. 2d 752], this court construed the test of legal insanity adopted in June 1982, by initiative (Prop. 8) as Penal Code section 25, subdivision (b), which provides: “In any criminal proceeding… in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be found by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.” We held, with regard to the application of the second prong of the insanity definition: “If the mental illness is manifested in delusions which render the individual incapable… of understanding that [the act] is wrong, he is legally insane under the California formulation of the McNaughton test.” (Skinner, at p. 782.) The defendant must know that the act was “inherently, or morally wrong.” (Ibid.) As applied when a defendant suffers from a delusional mental illness, a person who “Because of mental illness believed that God commanded and expected him to kill another human being and that therefore, the killing was morally justified and was not ‘wrong'” would meet that prong of the insanity test. (Id. at p. 783.) A person “who is incapable of understanding that his act is morally wrong is not criminally liable merely because he knows the act is unlawful.” (Ibid.)
___ Given as requested
___ Given as modified
___ Refused/Reasons:
CARY STAYNER’S SPECIAL SANITY PHASE INSTRUCTION NO. 6
If a mental illness is manifested in delusions which render the individual incapable of understanding that the act is wrong, he is legally insane. The defendant must know that the act was inherently, or morally wrong. As applied when a defendant suffers from a delusional mental illness, a person who because of mental illness believed that some force commanded and expected him to kill another human being and that therefore the killing was morally justified and was not wrong would be insane.
Points and Authorities
In People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal. 4th 529, 61 n.5, the Court stated:
In People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 [217 Cal.Rptr 685, 805 P. 2d 752], this court construed the test of legal insanity adopted in June 1982, by initiative (Prop. 8) as Penal Code section 25, subdivision (b), which provides: “In any criminal proceeding… in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be found by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.” We held, with regard to the application of the second prong of the insanity definition: “If the mental illness is manifested in delusions which render the individual incapable… of understanding that [the act] is wrong, he is legally insane under the California formulation of the McNaughton test.” (Skinner, at p. 782.) The defendant must know that the act was “inherently, or morally wrong.” (Ibid.) As applied when a defendant suffers from a delusional mental illness, a person who “Because of mental illness believed that God commanded and expected him to kill another human being and that therefore, the killing was morally justified and was not ‘wrong'” would meet that prong of the insanity test. (Id. at p. 783.) A person “who is incapable of understanding that his act is morally wrong is not criminally liable merely because he knows the act is unlawful.” (Ibid.)
___ Given as requested
___ Given as modified
___ Refused/Reasons:
CARY STAYNER’S SPECIAL SANITY PHASE INSTRUCTION NO. 7
In lieu of CALJIC 4.05, the following instruction is requested:
If a person is conscious of, knows, appreciates, and understands the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of his act, then it is not a defense that he committed the act of which he is accused because of an uncontrollable or irresistible impulse. However, evidence regarding an uncontrollable or irresistible impulse may be considered by you in determining whether the defendant was insane.
Points and Authorities
In People v. Wolff (1964) 64 Cal.2d 795, 802, the Court approved of this formulation, stating that “The jury were also instructed (CALJIC No. 806) that “irresistible impulse” is not a defense “if a person is conscious of, knows and appreciates the nature and wrongfulness of his act.” Id. at 802 n.2. See also, People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal 4th 529, 603 (“Moreover, if he believed that this instruction might mislead the jury, appellant could have, but did not, request a clarifying instruction… Nothing in the instruction given would have precluded consideration of the evidence of irresistible impulse to the extent that the evidence suggested that appellant did not know his acts were wrong.”)
___ Given as requested
___ Given as modified
___ Refused/Reasons:
CARY STAYNER’S SPECIAL SANITY PHASE INSTRUCTION NO. 8
In lieu of subparagraph 3 in paragraph five of CALJIC 4.00 (“Distinguishing right from wrong”), replace with the following:
2. Distinguishing right from wrong in relation to that act
Points and Authorities
In People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 765, 779, the Court stated:
(I)n People v. Kelly, supra, 10 Cal.3d 565, our last pre-Drew application of the McNaughton test, … we stated: ‘Insanity, under the California McNaughton test, denotes a mental condition which renders a person incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act, or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong in relation to that act. (People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 801 [40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959].)’ (People v. Kelly, supra, 10 Cal.3d 565, 574.).
In People v. Horn (1984) 158 Cal App 3d 1014, 1024, the Court stated:
Although refusing to abandon the right and wrong tests as the measure of criminal responsibility, the “California courts have not been unresponsive to such proposals for liberalization of the original language of the M’Naughton rule…; in evolving our own rule to meet statutory requirements, apply humane concepts, and at the same time protect society, we have reformulated the test with a variety of specifications to achieve this end.” (People v. Wolff, supra., 61 Cal.2d at p. 800.) Thus, the courts have declined to construe knowledge of the nature and wrongfulness of an act as the mere ability to verbalize the “right” or socially expected answers when questioned. IN order to be considered sane and therefore responsible for his actions, a defendant had to have the kind of knowledge that is relevant, namely, an understanding or appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct. (61 Cal.2d at pp. 800-801).) And this knowledge had to be in relation to the very act with which the defendant was charged. (Ibid.)] (FN 7) Citing its decision in Wolff, the California Supreme Court later summarized the test of insanity in California this way: “Insanity, under the California McNaughton test, denotes a mental condition which renders a person incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act, or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong in relation to the act.” (People v. Kelly, supra., 10 Cal.3d at p. 574.)
Footnote 7 of Nunn states:
This latter requirement was not a California innovation. The answer of the judges in the McNaughton case which serves as the basis for the right and wrong test is generally only quoted in part. With regard to the ability to know the difference between right and wrong, the judges said: ” ‘The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the accused, at the time of doing the act, knew the difference between right and wrong, which mode, though rarely if ever leading to any mistake with the jury , is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put generally and in the abstract, as when put with reference to the party’s knowledge of right and wrong in respect to the very act with which he is charged.'” (See People v. Hoin, supra., 62 Cal. at p. 121; italics in original.) California adhered to this part of the test. (Ibid.)
___ Given as requested
___ Given as modified
___ Refused/Reasons:
CARY STAYNER’S SPECIAL SANITY PHASE INSTRUCTION NO. 9
In any criminal proceeding in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, the defense shall not be found solely on the basis of a personality or adjustment disorder, a seizure disorder, or an addiction to, or abuse of, intoxicating substances.
Points and Authorities
This instruction is a verbatim recitation of Penal Code Section 25.5. See also, People v. Robinson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 421.
___ Given as requested
___ Given as modified
___ Refused/Reasons:
CARY STAYNER’S SPECIAL SANITY PHASE INSTRUCTION NO. 10
In lieu of CALJIC 4.01, the following instruction is requested:
A verdict of “not guilty by reason of insanity” does not mean the defendant will be released from custody. Instead, he will remain in confinement under sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole imposed in his federal case.
Points and Authorities
CALJIC 4.01 correctly embodies the concept that the jury must be instructed regarding the consequences of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. However, in the context of this case, the instruction is misleading and inaccurate. The giving of a misleading and inaccurate instruction is federal constitutional error. See, Hamilton v. Vasquez (9th Cir. 1994) 17 F.3d 1149. See also, Shafer v. South Carolina (2001) 532 U.S. 36; Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154.
___ Given as requested
___ Given as modified
___ Refused/Reasons:
