Brief Bank # B-809-i *TEXT CONTINUES ON # B-809-ii* (Re: CHK IV [Rules Of Statutory Construction].)
CAVEAT: The file below was not prepared by FORECITE. FORECITE has not made any attempt to review or edit this material and is not responsible for its content or format. FORECITE cannot guarantee the information is complete, accurate or up-to-date. You are advised to conduct your own independent, comprehensive research on all issues addressed in the material below.
NOTE: FOR AN UPDATED VERSION OF THIS FILE GO TO THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT SERVICE’S WEB SITE: www.legintent.com
THE USE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT MATERIALS IN CALIFORNIA
Prepared and Written by William H. Keller & Thomas W. Stallard
SUMMARY
Whenever the interpretation of a legislative enactment becomes an issue in a case, courts will commonly resort to the rules of statutory construction to determine the proper application of the statutory language to the facts at hand. In applying these rules, courts of California, as well as those of most other jurisdictions, have routinely held that the “cardinal” principle of statutory construction is that the court must choose that interpretation which most nearly effectuates the purpose of the Legislature.
The intention of the Legislature has historically been determined by an examination of the problem with which the Legislature was faced when they considered the bill which enacted the language in question, the public policy issues which the problem raised and the drafting solutions which emerged during legislative consideration of the bill. The evidence which courts use to assist them in making this determination comes from the legislative documents which were generated before, during and after the bill in question moved through the legislative process.
These Points and Authorities will set forth the California statutory and case law authority for a court’s resort to legislative intent analysis, the rules differentiating between the use of various types of legislative materials plus examples of each and, finally, the proper procedure for bringing such historical evidence before both trial and appellate courts.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY
OUTLINE OF SECTIONS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (End of document)
CASES
FEDERAL CASES
STATUTES
OTHER SOURCES
TEXT AUTHORITIES
TABLE OF APPELLATE CASES BY DISTRICT
OUTLINE OF SECTIONS
I. THE AUTHORITY FOR COURT’S INVESTIGATION INTO THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE
A. The Preeminence of Legislative Intent in the Rules of Statutory Construction
B. The Applicability of Legislative Intent Analyses
to Initiatives, Local Ordinances, Rules, and Regulations
C. The Plain Meaning Rule and the Necessity of Ambiguity
II. THE EVIDENCE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
A. Pre-Enactment History: The Background Circumstances
and Events
1. The Problem to be Solved
2. Based on Federal, State, Model Act
3. Prior Law Presumption
B. Enactment History: The Legislative Process
1. Different Versions of the Bill
2. Committee Reports and Analyses
3. Committee Files
4. Official Commission Reports and Comments
5. Legislative Counsel’s Digest
6. Legislative Counsel’s Opinions
7. Urgency Clauses, Findings and Declarations,
and Other Uncodified Language
8. Ballot Summaries and Arguments/Statement
of Vote
9. Third Reading Analyses
a. Assembly Office of Research Analysis
b. Office of Assembly Floor Analyses
c. Senate Democratic and Senate Republican
Caucus Analyses
d. Office of Senate Floor Analyses
10. Departmental Sponsorship, Support, and Analysis
11. Transcripts of Hearing
12. Statements by Proponents and Opponents
13. News Media and Law Reviews
14. House Journals and Final Histories
15. Predecessor Bills
16. Statements of Author and Other Individual
Legislators
17. The Author’s File
18. Legislative Analyst
19. Rejection, Deletion, and Refusal to Act
20. Conference Committee Reports
C. Post-Enrollment History
1. Role of the Governor
2. Enrolled Bill Reports and Memoranda
3. Governor’s Correspondence and Press Releases
D. Post-Enactment History
1. Statements and Actions by Subsequent Legislatures
III. THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION
A. The Judicial Function
B. Judicial Notice at the Trial Court Level
C. Judicial Notice at the Appellate Court Level
D. Use of Legislative Materials Without the Requirements
Of Judicial Notice
E. Expert Testimony
F. Citation and Attribution
G. Legislative Intent Service Fees as Costs
I
THE AUTHORITY FOR COURT‘S INVESTIGATION INTO THE
INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE
A. The Preeminence of Legislative Intent in the Rules of Statutory Construction.
The classical statement of the importance of legislative intent analysis comes from the case of William v. Berkeley (1601) Plow 223, 231 where the court stated “Whoever would consider an act well ought always have particular regard to the intent of it, and accordingly as the intent appears, he ought to construe the words.” Our own Justice Holmes put it more succinctly when he said “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York v. Eisner (1921) 256 US 345, 349.
The California Supreme Court followed this reasoning recently in Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 235 “… on this question we agree with Justice Holmes that ‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’ [Citation omitted] The manifest purpose of Proposition 62 as a whole was to increase….”
California appellate courts have followed this line of reasoning and refined it in over 16,000 opinions. To construe or interpret a statute, the court’s primary objective is to determine the legislative intent of the enactment; all other rules of construction yield to this rule.
“In the construction of a statute the intention of the Legislature … is to be pursued, if possible…;” Code of Civil Procedure Section 1859
“As we have often noted, our role in interpreting or construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent.” LaurelHeights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of U.C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, 1127
“When questions as to the applicability or interpretation of statutes are presented to this court, numerous cases have recognized that the controlling issue is the intent of the Legislature. (Citations) The legislative history of the statute as well as the historical circumstances of its enactment may be considered in determining the intent of the Legislature. (Citations) Thus we shall look beyond the statute’s language and inquire into its history for the purpose of ascertaining legislative intent.” People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 993
“In construing constitutional and statutory provisions, whether enacted by the Legislature or by initiative, the intent of the enacting body is the paramount consideration.” In re Lance, W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 889 and In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 844
“…When the Legislature has stated the purpose of its enactment in unmistakable terms, we must apply the enactment in accordance with the legislative direction, and all other rules of construction must fall by the wayside. Speculation and reasoning as to legislative purpose must give way to expressed legislative purpose.” Milligan v. City of Laguna Beach (1983) 34 Cal.3d 829, 831
“In construing a statute we begin with the fundamental rule that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College District (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698, 699
“In the present instance both the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment are legitimate and valuable aids in divining the statutory purpose. (Citations)” California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Commission (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844, 846
“When statutory language is amenable to a range of meaning,… perhaps the factor of greatest significance in the interpretive equation is that of legislative purpose.” Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fish & Game Commission (1994, 3rd Dist) 28 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1123
“‘Our analysis starts from the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent … In determining intent, we look first to the words themselves … When the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction … When the
language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, however, we look to a variety of extrinsic aides including the … legislative history….’
“The provision must be given a reasonable and common sense interpretation consistent with apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers, practical rather than technical in nature, which upon application will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity.” GoldenState Homebuilding Association v. City of Modesto (1994, 5th Dist) 26 Cal.App.4th 601, 608
“In addition to the rules of statutory construction, a valuable aid in ascertaining legislative intent may be the legislative history of a statute.” In re Rudy L. (1994, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 29 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1012
“Third, whatever criticism there may be of judicial recourse to legislative intent in construing statutes (Citations), California is firmly committed to the practice.” Clavell v. NorthCoastBusinessPark (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 232 Cal.App.3d 328, 332
“In the matter before us, the legislative history does not change the outcome. We are concerned, however, that neither the parties to this action, nor amicus … demonstrate an awareness ofthe specific legislative history. Because this case presents such a troublesome set of circumstances and a difficult issue to resolve, the pertinent legislative history is consequential and should be discussed.” Zipton v. W.C.A.B. (1990, 1st Dist, Div 3) 218 Cal.App.3d 980, 987
“Because of the failure of the Legislature expressly to delineate the meaning of … ‘we must rely on a cardinal principle of statutory construction: … we are required to give it an interpretation based upon the legislative intent with which it was passed.’ …
“In our determination, we follow the general rule that legislative records may be looked at to determine legislative intention, and it will be presumed that the Legislature adopted the proposed legislation with the intent and meaning expressed in committee reports.” Southland Mechanical Constructors v. Nixen (1981, 4th Dist, Div 2) 119 Cal.App.3d 417, 427
“Where a statute is theoretically capable of more than one construction, we choose that which most comports with the intent of the Legislature. (Citations)…
“In determining that issue, we apply the recognized approach of seeking the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statutory scheme so that the intent may be carried out by judicial construction… More precisely, we search for the manner in which the Legislature would have treated the problem in the case at bench had the Legislature foreseen it. In that search, we are cognizant of at least three judicial approaches applied singly or in some combination. One approach utilizes maxims of statutory construction which, by a process of selection, can support any result a court thinks appropriate…. Another resolves the unforeseen problem in the way the court would have done had it been the Legislature and blessed with foresight equal to hindsight…. The third approach seeks clues of legislative intent from legislative history and within the statutory scheme of which the legislation to be interpreted is a part…. As seductive and uninhibited as the first and second approaches may be, we deem the third controlling upon us where clues to the legislative intent exist.” Lewis v. Ryan (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 330, 333
“The primary rule of statutory construction, to which every other rule as to interpretation of particular terms must yield, is that the intention of the Legislature must be ascertained if possible, and when once ascertained, will be given effect, even though it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.” MarinaVillage v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 388, 392
In re Haines (1925) 195 Cal. 605, 613; Alameda v. Kuchel (1948) 32 Cal.2d 193, 199; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259; Nunn v. State (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616; Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 724; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 810; Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826; Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County Employees Retirement System (1993) 6 Cal.4th 821, 826; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 54; California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Board of Rialto Unified School District (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632
———-
Neely v. Board of Retirement (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 815, 819; Taylor v. McKay (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 664, 650; Rushing v. Powell (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 604; Marrujo v. Hunt (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 974, 977; Mount Vernon Memorial Park v. Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 874-875; Lastarmes Inc. v. Commissioner (1982) CCH Dec. 39, 483, 79 Tax Court 810, 826; County of San Mateo v. Booth (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 388, 396; County of Ventura v. Stark (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1112; McCann v. Welden (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 814; In re Eldorado Insurance Company (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1152; People v. Thompson (1988, 2nd Dist, Div 6) 205 Cal.App.3d 871, 879; Lillebo v. Davis (1990, 3rd Dist) 222 Cal.App.3d 1421, 1439; Golden State Homebuilding Assn. v. City of Modesto (1994, 5th Dist) 26 Cal.App.4th 601, 608; Armenio v. County of San Mateo (1994, 1st Dist, Div 5) 28 Cal.App.4th 413, 416; In re Rottanak K. (1995, 5th Dist) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, 267, fn. 8; State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 3) 37 Cal.App.4th 675, 681; Conservatorship of Bryant (1996, 4th Dist, Div 1) 45 Cal.App.4th 117, 120; Decastro West Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 47 Cal.App.4th 410, 418; Fireman’s Fund Insurance Companies v. Quackenbush (1997, 1st Dist, Div 5) 52 Cal.App.4th 599, 606; Conway v. City of Imperial Beach (1997, 4th Dist, Div 1) 52 Cal.App.4th 78, 84
In some cases the court concludes its interpretation of a statute without reference to legislative intent and history. Within the context of the decision however, these courts then turn to analyze and consider the legislative history of the statute commenting that it supports their conclusion in any event. Typical of this is the following:
“We therefore conclude there is no persuasive authority contrary to the proposition we postulate … We are convinced that this was the law before the recent legislation, but are nevertheless happy to cite and rely on the legislative pronouncements to the same affect.” 1111 Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court (1995, 4th Dist, Div 1) 38 Cal.App.4th 570, 578, fn. 7 (Review Granted)
B. The Applicability of Legislative Intent Analysis to Initiatives, Local Ordinances, Rules, and Regulations.
The rules of statutory construction which enable courts to rely on legislative materials to ascertain legislative intent apply equally to the enactments of any body acting in a legislative capacity, including administrative agencies, local boards, and the electorate itself.
Initiatives
“The Courts must interpret a constitutional amendment to give effect to the intent of the voters adopting it.” In re Quinn (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 473, 483
Winchester v. Mabury (1898) 122 Cal. 522, 527; Winchester v. Howard (1902) 136 Cal. 432, 439; People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182; Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245; Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 505; Whitman v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1063, 1072
———-
People v. Markham (1986) 198 Cal.App.3d 249, 259; Larson v. Duca (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 324, 329; Sanford v. Garamendi (1991, 3rd Dist) 233 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1118
Local Ordinances
“This conclusion does not mean that TRPA’s ordinance cannot be upheld as valid. ‘It is the duty of the courts, wherever possible, to construe a statute in a manner which is reasonable, consistent with the statutory purpose, and eliminate doubts as to its constitutionality. (Citations) In examining the legislation for such a construction, the court should seek an interpretation which preserves as much of the constitutional provisions of the statute as possible, but which the legislative body would have intended to put into effect had it foreseen the constitutional limitations.” Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. King (1991, 3rd Dist) 233 Cal.App.3d 1365, 1406
C-Y Development Co. v. City of Redlands (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 926, 929; San Francisco International Yachting Group v. City and County of San Francisco (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 672, 682
Administrative Rules and Regulations
“The cardinal rule of construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the promulgating body so as to effectuate the intended purpose of the statute or regulation. This rule has been extended to construction of administrative regulations.” California State Restaurant Assn. v. Whitlow (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 340, 344-45
C. The Plain Meaning Rule and the Necessity of Ambiguity.
It is frequently said that the authority to investigate the intention of the Legislature is subject to the condition precedent that the statutory language in question must be shown to be ambiguous, uncertain, or unclear before the court may construe or interpret it, or conversely that the plain meaning of a statute must be respected. Lennane v. FTB (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268 and Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 744-746
Although this rule is often repeated, it is generally disfavored by commentators in favor of the primacy of legislative intent. Under the heading “The Limits of Literalism” Sutherland on Statutory Construction states at Section 46.07 the following:
“Although many expressions favoring literal interpretation may be found in the cases it is clear that if the literal import of the text of an act is not consistent with the legislative meaning or intent, or such interpretation leads to absurd results, the words of the statutes will be modified to agree with the intention of the legislature. Again, contrary to the traditional operation of the plain meaning rule, courts are increasingly willing to consider other indicia of intent and meaning from the start rather than beginning their inquiry by considering only the language of the act.
…
“The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to allow a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention. The intention prevails over the letter, and the letter must if possible be read to conform to the spirit of the act.” Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section 46.07
To like effect, the United States Supreme Court has said:
“But words are inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how clear the words may appear on superficial examination.” Harrison v. Northern Trust Co. (1943) 317 U.S. 476, 479; see also Lynch v. Overholser (1962) 369 U.S. 705, 710
Latent ambiguity can also justify a turn to rules of statutory construction, or legislative history for guidance.
“If the meaning of ‘cultivated’ and its related forms varies from statute to statute, it is appropriate to turn to legislative history in our effort to understand the Legislature’s intent concerning the meaning and scope of Section 1021.9.” Quarterman v. Kefauver (1997, 1st Dist, Div 1) 55 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1373
In many California appellate and supreme court cases the plain meaning rule is most often either honored in the breach, or used as dicta to buttress a meaning otherwise determined to be consistent with the legislative intent of the statute. In some cases the rule is repudiated outright.
“Although in our view, the language used in Section 64(c) is not ambiguous, the intent of the Legislature is the end and aim of all statutory construction….” Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. County of Riverside (1989) 48 Cal.3d 84, 95
“Where a statute is theoretically capable of more than one construction we choose that which most comports with the intent of the Legislature.” California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Commission (1979) 24 Cal.3d 844, 844, 846
“We disagree, however, with respondent’s sweeping assertion that in all cases ‘ambiguity is a condition precedent to interpretation.’ Although this proposition is generally true, ‘the literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results or to give effect to manifest purposes that, in the light of the statute’s legislative history, appear from its provisions considered as a whole.'” Silver v. Brown (1966) 63 Cal.2d 841, 845; County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 849; Poliak v. Board of Psychology (1997, 3rd Dist) 55 Cal.App.4th 342, 348; and People v. Anzalone (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 6) 59 Cal.App.4th 230, 234 (Petition for Review Granted)
“Further, even if we assume the statute is ambiguous on this point, the legislative history validates our interpretation. The legislative history reveals ….” People v. Olecik (1995, 6th Dist) 51 Cal.App.4th 54, 67, 69
“However, while the unadorned language and organization of the statute are consistent with plaintiff’s position, the legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment … persuade us that the Legislature intended to create the automatic immunity petitioners assert.” American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 480, 486
“The courts resist blind obedience to the putative `plain meaning’ of a statutory phrase where literal interpretation would defeat the Legislature’s central object.” Leslie Salt Co. v. S.F. Bay Conserv. and Develop. Comm. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 605, 614
“Once the intention of the Legislature is ascertained it will be given effect even though it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.” People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277 and Southland Mechanical Constructors v. Nixen (1981, 4th Dist, Div 2) 119 Cal.App.3d 417, 430
Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone #1 (1944) 24 Cal.2d 796, 802; Stafford v. Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Board (1954) 42 Cal.2d 795, 799; Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equalization (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645; San Bernardino Fire and Police v. City of San Bernardino (1962) 199 Cal.2d 410, 413; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 739-40; People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898-899; Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1334, fn. 7; Mercy Hospital and Medical Center v. Farmers Insurance Group of Companies (1997) 15 Cal.4th 213, 219
———-
People ex rel Flournoy v. Yellow Cab Co. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 41, 45; Sacramento County v. Pacific Gas & Electric (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 300; Santa Barbara County Taxpayers Assn. v. County of Santa Barbara (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 674, 680; Farnow v. Superior Court (1990, 1st Dist, Div 2) 226 Cal.App.3d 481, 490
In fact in one case, after rejecting the plain meaning rule an appellate court spoke of resort to legislative intent documents in terms of a duty.
“In the case at bench, the extrinsic evidence in dispute was highly relevant to show the legislative intent underlying the statute. It follows that the trial court was not only free, but also duty bound to admit the challenged extrinsic evidence to ascertain the true intent of the Legislature and to effectuate the purpose of the law.” Pennisi v. Fish & Game (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 268, 275
One recent Supreme Court case indicated that legislative documents with a clear statement of intent can “confirm a provision’s plain meaning”:
“(2c) Legislative materials inform our construction of a statute only when the words of the statute are unclear (People v. Jones (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142, 1146 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 753, 857 P.2d 1163]), but a clear statement of intent may serve to confirm a provisions plain meaning…. The Legislature’s substitution of ‘separate violations’ for ‘prior offenses’ in former section 23175, its explanation for doing so in section 23217, and the legislative materials available to assist and inform the Legislature’s consideration of Assembly Bill No. 3833, taken together, amply reflect the Legislature’s goal of preventing the DUI offender from escaping an enhanced penalty for multiple offenses. They indicate moreover the Legislature’s intention to punish all repeat DUI offenders harshly,…” People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1219
There is also the universal argument that any time there is a lawsuit in which there arises a disagreement over the meaning of statutory language, that the language must be “ambiguous, uncertain, or unclear” because it is obvious that it is susceptible to at least two meanings. An example of this approach can be found in the following California Supreme Court case.
“The phrase ‘such an action’ obviously refers to ‘a civil action under this part.’ This latter phrase is reasonably susceptible to two constructions. As defendants assert, the phrase could mean that only FEHA claims may be pursued in the county where the discriminatory practice allegedly occurred.
“Alternatively, as petitioners contend, the phrase could signify that any civil action which contains an FEHA claim may be brought in that county. Both constructions are reasonable.
“It is not clear from the language of Section 12965 which interpretation was intended. Therefore, this court must look at the purpose of the law to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.” Brown v. Superior Court (C.C. Myers, Inc.) (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477
Pollack v. DMV (1985) 38 Cal.3d 367
———-
Swift v. County of Placer (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 209, 214
The courts have also acknowledged that determining whether a statute is ambiguous is not always readily ascertainable. People v. Goodloe (1995, 1st Dist, Div 1) 37 Cal.App.4th 485, 491
One court, after stating the principles of the plain meaning rule, went on to look to legislative intent and history stating: “Nonetheless, as the parties have dwelled so on legislative history, we turn to that often murky arena for enlightenment.” Wells Fargo Bank v. Bank of America (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 32 Cal.App.4th, 424, 434. (stating the plain meaning rule and then referring to letter of the League of California Cities as source of legislative intent).
II
THE EVIDENCE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Source materials used in the construction of a statute besides those intrinsic to the verbal statement itself are called extrinsic aids. Most commentators discussing extrinsic aids have focused primarily on the historical background of the legislation. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Chapter 48 discusses these “aids” or evidence in three categories: Pre-enactment History, Enactment History, and Post-enactment History. These Points and Authorities will employ the same categorization.
A. Pre-Enactment History: The Background Circumstances and Events.
According to Sutherland, courts have traditionally examined statutory language in terms of the context from which it originated and the events which give it form and substance.
“It is established practice in American legal processes to consider relevant information concerning the historical background of enactment in making decisions about how a statute is to be construed and applied…. These extrinsic aids may show the circumstances under which the statute was passed, the mischief at which it was aimed and the object it was supposed to achieve. Although a court may make and pronounce findings about the purpose of a statute, or the mischief it was to remedy, without referring to its historical background, knowledge of circumstances and events which comprise the relevant background of a statute is a natural basis for making such findings.” Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section 48.03
Recent cases follow the established tradition of examining a statute’s legislative history:
“In March 1988 … the Attorney General sponsored and supported Assembly Bill No. 4282, which added paragraph (2) to section 1318, subdivision (a),… The parties focus their arguments upon this amendment to … They do not dispute the Court of Appeals conclusion that the amendment is ambiguous as to … nor do they contest the appellate court’s efforts to go behind the statutory language and explore its legislative history in an effort to determine the Legislature’s intent. Because we agree with the parties (and with the Court of Appeal) … we, too, have reviewed the pertinent legislative history in an effort to discover any indications of legislative intent. (Citations)” In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1143-1145
In the appellate decision the court looked to the legislative history and intent stating:
“… we have reviewed the pertinent legislative history in an effort to uncover any indications of legislative intent. [Citation omitted] We consider the circumstances and events leading up to the Introduction of the bill, including statements by various parties concerning the nature and effect of the proposed law, and the actions taken and statements made during legislative consideration. We also take into account ‘the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times, legislation upon the same subject, public policy and contemporaneous construction’ (citations). . . .” In re York (1994, 6th Dist) 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 771, 775-776
“The historical context of the various statutes and amendments establishes section 1717 as the fundamental statute to be applied to fees and costs claimed under a contract. Section 1717 was properly applied here.” Sears v. Baccaglio (1998, 1st Dist, Div 2) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1158
“We may properly look to the legislative history of an enactment, including legislative committee reports and other legislative records, as an aid to ascertaining the Legislature’s intent.” In re Rottanak K. (1995, 5th Dist) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, 267, fn. 8
“Where appropriate, courts may seek guidance in defining the legislative intent from such materials as the statutory history, committee reports, and legislative debates.” Perez v. Smith (1993, 1st Dist, Div 5) 19 Cal.App.4th 1595, 1598
1. The Problem to be Solved:
“One ferrets out the legislative purpose of a statute by considering its objective, the evils which it is designed to prevent, the character and context of the legislation in which the particular words appear, the public policy enunciated and vindicated, the social history which attends it, and the effect of the particular language on the entire statutory scheme.” Santa Barbara County Taxpayers Assn. v. County of Santa Barbara (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 674, 680
“Thus in analyzing the legislative usage of certain words, the object sought to be achieved by a statute as well as the evil to be prevented is of prime consideration….” Leslie Salt Co. v. S.F. Bay Conserv. and Develop. Comm. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 605, 614
“A wide variety of factors may illuminate legislative design, such as context, object in view, evils to be remedied, history of times, and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction.” People v. White (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 17; Cossack v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 726, 733; and Alford v. Pierno (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 688
Hancock Oil Company of California v. Independent Distributing Company (1944) 24 Cal.2d 497; Wolton v. Bush (1953) 41 Cal.2d 460; People ex rel S.F. Bay Comm. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 543
———-
Gallagher v. Campodonica (1932) 121 Cal.App.1st 765; Abram v. San Joaquin Cotton Oil Company (1943) 49 F. Supp. 393; Koenig v. Johnson (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 739, 750-751; H. S. Mann Corporation v. Moody (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 310; Zidell v. Bright (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 867; Blumenfeld v. S.F. Bay Conserv. Comm. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 50, 55; Arvin Union School District v. Ross (1985, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 176 Cal.App.3d 189, 199; Southern Pacific Pipe Lines v. Board of Supervisors (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 451, 460; Adoption of Haley A. (1996, 1st Dist, Div 2) 49 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1367, fn. 10
2. Based on Federal, State, Model Act
“… The similarity in language is apparent, and the legislative history shows that CESA [California Endangered Species Act] was patterned after FESA [Federal Endangered Species Act] in this respect…. Given these patterned similarities in language, structure and focus, it is appropriate to consult federal authority to help interpret this language. It is a basic premise of statutory construction that when a state law is patterned after a federal law, the two are construed together.” Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. Fish & Game Commission (1994, 3rd Dist) 28 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1117-1118
“Furthermore, it is a basic premise of statutory construction that when a state law is patterned after a federal law, the two are
construed together…. In these situations, the federal cases interpreting the federal law offer persuasive rather than controlling authority in construing the state law.” Moreland v. Department of Corporations (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 506, 512
“However, where California law parallels sister state legislation on the same subject … the judicial interpretation by the sister state courts of their legislation may be relevant in construing the California legislation. Correspondingly, an examination of the policies promoted by sister state legislation may be relevant in determining the policies and purpose of the parallel California legislation.” Webster v. State Board of Control (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 29, 37, fn. 3
Kaplan’s Fruit and Produce Company v. Superior Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 60, 65; Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 299; Williams v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 337, 352; Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 647-651, 654, 655, 661
———-
Solano County Employees’ Assn. v. County of Solano (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 256, 259; J.R. Norton Co. v. Teamsters, Local 890 (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 430, 442; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section 57.06; People v. Butler (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1237; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Greer (1998, 1st Dist, Div 2) 60 Cal.App.4th 877, 882
3. Prior Law and the Presumption of Legislative Knowledge
Closely related to the examination of the pre-enactment history of a statute is the maxim of statutory construction stating that the Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing law and judicial decisions.
“We presume that the legislators were aware of the law of burglary in enacting section 1192.7(c)(18), and of judicial decisions interpreting the language they chose to employ.” People v. Cruz (1996, 1st Dist) 13 Cal.4th 764, 775
“Generally, the drafters who frame an initiative statute and the voters who enact it may be deemed to be aware of the judicial construction of the law that served as its source.” In re Harris (1989) 49 Cal.3d 131, 136
“In addition, the Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial decisions in effect at the time legislation is enacted and to have enacted and amended statutes in the light of such decisions as have a direct bearing upon them.” People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897
Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977-978, fn. 10; People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514; In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 552; People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329; Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 187; Mercy Hospital and Medical Center v. Farmers Insurance Group of Companies (1997) 15 Cal.4th 213, 221
———-
Estate of Simoni (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 339, 341; Rosenthal v. Cory (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 950, 953; People v. Horn (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 1014; Tafoya v. Hastings College of Law (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 437, 447; Yoffie v. Marin Hospital District (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 743, 748; People v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Clinic (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 225, 233-34; Bullock v. City and County of San Francisco (1990, 1st Dist, Div 4) 221 Cal.App.3d 1072, 1096; Hobbs v. Municipal Court (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 233 Cal.App.3d 670, 682; In re Thanh Q (1992, 4th Dist, Div 3) 2 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1389; State Board of Education v. Honig (1993, 3rd Dist) 13 Cal.App.4th 720, 733; Southern Pacific Pipe Lines v. State Board of Equalization (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 42, 54; In re Rottanak K. (1995, 5th Dist) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, 267; Stone v. New England Insurance Co. (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 3) 33 Cal.App.4th 1175, 1211; In re Walters (1995, 3rd Dist) 39 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1557; People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 98, 100; County of Orange v. Ranger Insurance Co. (1998, 4th Dist, Div 3) 61
Cal.App.4th 795, 801; Dant v. Superior Court (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 61 Cal.App.4th 380, 387, fn. 10; Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998, 6th Dist) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1177; In re Marriage of Perry (1998, 3rd Dist) 61 Cal.App.4th 295, 305, 306; People v. Garcia (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 63 Cal.App.4th 820, 830; Townzen v. County of El Dorado (1998, 3rd Dist) 64 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1357, 1358; Edgar v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (1998, 4th Dist, Div 1) 65 Cal.App.4th 1, 18
A 1992 Supreme Court case discusses Attorney General opinions in the context of presumption of legislative knowledge:
“When construing a statute, we may presume that the Legislature acts with knowledge of the opinions of the Attorney General which affect the subject matter of proposed legislation. (Cal. State Employees Assn. v. Trustees of Cal. State Colleges (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 530, 536 [47 Cal.Rptr. 73].) [1c] Here it is significant that, before the Bill of Rights Act was enacted, a published opinion of the California Attorney General had concluded that ‘cadets’ and ‘trainee officers’ were not peace officers under former Penal Code section 817, the predecessor statute to Penal Code section 830 et seq. fn. 11.” Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 564
B. Enactment History: The Legislative Process.
The most common source of legislative intent is the Legislature itself. The Legislature, through its various bodies, generates and attracts varying degrees of commentary on each bill which enters the legislative process. It is this commentary in the form of statements, analyses, reports, and transcripts which has been most heavily relied on for its interpretive value by the supreme and appellate courts of California. These are the extinsic aides to statutory construction. Sutherland summarizes the situation succinctly when it states:
“The events occurring immediately prior to the time when an act becomes law comprise an instructive source, indicative of what meaning the legislature intended. Therefore, the history of events during the process of enactment, from its introduction in the legislature to its final validation, has generally been the first extrinsic aid to which courts have turned in attempting to construe an ambiguous act.
…
“The contemporary history of events during this period consists chiefly in statements by various parties concerning the nature and effect of the proposed law and statements or other evidence on the evils to be remedied. Contemporary history also includes information concerning the activities of pressure groups, economic conditions in the country at the time, prevailing business practices, and the prior state of the law, including judicial decisions, applicable to the subject of the legislation in question.” Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Section 48.04
Listed immediately below are a number of categories of legislative documents along with case law authority addressing their respective relevance to statutory construction.
1. Different Versions of the Bill:
“The evolution of a proposed statute after its original introduction in the Senate or Assembly can offer considerable enlightenment as to legislative intent.” People v. Goodloe (1995, 1st Dist, Div 1) 37 Cal.App.4th 485, 491
“Senate Bill No. 1137 was amended during the July 9, 1991, hearing before the Assembly Committee on Public Safety. It was this amendment which added subdivisions (b) and (c) to Section 800. Especially when considering subdivision (b)(4), the evolution of the bill’s language clearly suggests the Legislature intended to expand the People’s right to appeal….” In re Rottanak K. (1995, 5th Dist) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, 267
“The original version of Senate Bill No. 1294…. Subsequent amendments to the bill narrowed the language to deny recovery…. The final version limited the application of the law…. Defendant is asking this court to adopt an interpretation of Civil Code Section 1714.7 which was specifically rejected by the Legislature. For three justices to construe a law in a fashion inconsistent with the statutory language deliberately chosen by a majority of the Legislature and approved by the Governor, in the absence of a constitutional infirmity, is an act squarely in contravention of the fundamental principles of a democratic form of government.” Wiley v. So. Pacific Trans. Co. (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 220 Cal.App.3d 177, 192, fn. 8
“Our conclusion is supported by the legislative history of Penal Code Section 653k. The original bill became increasingly broader in scope as it went through successive drafts and when it was amended.” People v. Quattrone (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1389, 1398
California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Commission (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844, 846; People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 994-997; County of San Bernardino v. City of San Bernardino (1997) 15 Cal.4th 909, 917, 926
———-
Estate of Wanamaker (1977) 65 Cal.App.3d 587, 593; State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Haight (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 223, 236; California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board (1989, 3rd Dist) 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 601; Zipton v. W.C.A.B. (1990, 1st Dist, Div 3) 218 Cal.App.3d 980, 988, 989; Schwetz v. Minnerly (1990, 4th Dist, Div 1) 220 Cal.App.3d 296, 308; Perez v. So. Pacific Trans. Co. (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 218 Cal.App.3d 462, 467; Billings v. Health Plan of America (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 225 Cal.App.3d 250, 257, fn. 3; Farnow v. Superior Court (1990, 1st Dist, Div 2) 226 Cal.App.3d 481, 487, fn. 4; Clark v. W.C.A.B. (1991, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 230 Cal.App.3d 684, 695; O’Brien v. Dudenhoeffer (1993, 2nd Dist, Div 6) 16 Cal.App.4th 327, 354; WDT-Winchester v. Nilsson (1994, 6th Dist) 27 Cal.App.4th 516, 534; JA Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994, 4th Dist, Div 3) 27 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1581; People v. Olecik (1995, 6th Dist) 51 Cal.App.4th 54, 67, 69; Joyce G. v. Superior Court (1995, 3rd Dist) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1509; Coniglio v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995, 6th Dist) 39 Cal.App.4th 666, 675; Walsh v. Superior Court (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 42 Cal.App.4th 1822, 1831, 1834; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Livermore (1996, 1st Dist, Div 3) 45 Cal.App.4th 719, 737; Quarterman v. Kefauver (1997, 1st Dist, Div 1) 55 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1373-1375; Soil v. Superior Court (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 55 Cal.App.4th 872, 878; People v. Prothero (1997, 3rd Dist) 57 Cal.App.4th 126, 132, fn. 5; Federal National Mortgage Assn. v. Bugna (1997, 4th Dist, Div 1) 57 Cal.App.4th 529, 540; Azusa Land Reclamation Co. v. Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 52 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1203; In re Parker (1998, 4th Dist, Div 1) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1465, fn. 12; Sears v. Baccaglio (1998, 1st Dist, Div 2) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1144, 1145
2. Committee Reports and Analyses:
“We are persuaded the Legislature intended §12022.5(d) to be mandatory for several reasons. Legislative history materials for Assembly Bill 476, … include a bill analysis prepared for the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice stating: …” People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 98, 100
“The Court of Appeal declined to consider this report, (Assembly Committee on Judiciary) stating that ‘the views of a committee staff member are not appropriate legislative history.’ However it is well established that reports of legislative committees and commissioners are part of a statute’s legislative history and may be considered when the meaning of a statute is uncertain. (Citations) The United States Supreme Court has long followed a similar practice in using committee reports as an aid in construing federal legislation. (Citations) The rationale for considering committee reports when interpreting statutes is similar to the rationale for considering voter materials when construing an initiative measure. In both cases it is reasonable to infer that those who actually voted on the proposed measure read and considered the materials presented in explanation of it, and that the materials therefore provide some indication of how the measure was understood at the time by those who voted to enact it.” Hutnick v. U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 456, 465, fn. 7
“Statements in legislative committee reports concerning the statutory objects and purposes which are in accord with a reasonable interpretation of the statutes are legitimate aids in determining legislative intent.” National R.V., Inc. v. Foreman (1995, 4th Dist, Div 1) 34 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1083
“… a legislative staff analysis of a measure may be relevant to ascertaining legislative intent when the analysis is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the enactment.” Pacific Bell v. California State and Consumer Services Agency (1990, 1st Dist, Div 3) 225 Cal.App.3d 107, 116
So. Pacific Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission (1942) 19 Cal.2d 271, 275; People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514; So. California Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1979) 24 Cal.3d 653, 659; Milligan v. City of Laguna Beach (1983) 34 Cal.3d 829, 831-32; Dyna Med, Inc. v. F.E.H.C. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387; Altaville Drug Store v. EDD (1988) 44 Cal.3d 231, 238; City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 89; Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 50 Cal.3d 402, 424; Napa Valley Wine Train v. Public Utilities Commission (1990) 50 Cal.3d 370, 382 fn. 19; People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 62; Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1335; Nickelsberg v. W.C.A.B. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 288, 295; Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 189; People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 213; People v. Hansel (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1211, 1217; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 56; DuBois v. W.C.A.B. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 393-394; People v. Cruz (1996, 1st Dist) 13 Cal.4th 764, 773, 774, fn. 5; California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Board of Rialto Unified School District (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 646-648; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 13; Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 481; Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771, 779; People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1218; Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 1003 (dissent); People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 33; Estate of Joseph (1998) 17 Cal.4th 203, 209, 210, 217; Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 783, fn. 7; County of Santa Clara v. Perry (1998) 18 Cal.4th 435, 444; Planning & Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources (1998) 17 Cal.4th 264, 271, 272; Quelimane Company, Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45; Bank of America v. Lallana (1998) 19 Cal.4th 203, 212
———-
Hope v. Contractors’ Etc. Board (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 414, 419; Reimel v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 340, 345; In re Marriage of Paddock (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 355, 359; In re Marriage of Bjornestad (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 801, 805; Osgood v. Shasta (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 586, 589; People v. Swinney (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 332, 342; Seibert v. Sears
Roebuck (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 11, 19; Smith v. Rhea (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 361, 369; Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 377, 384; Belton Electronics Corp. v. Superior Court (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 452, 455-6; In re Marriage of Brigden (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 380, 391; Southland Mechanical Constructors v. Nixen (1981, 4th Dist, Div 2) 119 Cal.App.3d 417, 427; Honey Springs Homeowners Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1122; Somerset Importers Ltd. v. Continental Vintners (1986) 790 F.2D 775, 778; Coastal Care Centers, Inc. v. Meeks (1986, 1st Dist, Div 5) 184 Cal.App.3d 85, 89; People v. Martinez (1987, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 194 Cal.App.3d 15, 22; Zipton v. W.C.A.B. (1990, 1st Dist, Div 3) 218 Cal.App.3d 980, 988, 989; Schwetz v. Minnerly (1990, 4th Dist, Div 1) 220 Cal.App.3d 296, 305; Valnes v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 221 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1122; Van De Kamp v. Gumbiner (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 221 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1278, 1281; Hall v. Hall (1990, 4th Dist, Div 1) 222 Cal.App.3d 578, 585; Aguimatang v. California State Lottery (1991, 3rd Dist) 234 Cal.App.3d 769, 788; People v. Henson (1991, 5th Dist) 231 Cal.App.3d 172, 178; Cal Service Station Assn. v. Union Oil Co. (1991, 1st Dist, Div 5) 232 Cal.App.3d 44, 54; Industrial Risk Insurers v. The Rust Engineering Co. (1991, 1st Dist, Div 4) 232 Cal.App.3d 1038, 1045; People v. Brady (1991, 1st Dist, Div 5) 234 Cal.App.3d 954, 960; County of San Diego v. Department of Health Services (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 1 Cal.App.4th 656, 661; People v. Heston (1991, 5th Dist) 1 Cal.App.4th 471, 478; Hung v. Wang (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 908, 920; O’Brien v. Dudenhoeffer (1993, 2nd Dist, Div 6) 16 Cal.App.4th 327, 334; Greenwood Addition Homeowners Assn. v. City of San Marino (1993, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 14 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1370, fn. 5; In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1145; JA Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994, 4th Dist, Div 3) 27 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1582, fn. 28; In re Rudy L. (1994, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 29 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1012-1013; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fish & Game Commission (1994, 3rd Dist) 28 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1118; Armenio v. County of San Mateo (1994, 1st Dist, Div 5) 28 Cal.App.4th 413, 416; 1111 Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court (1995, 4th Dist, Div 1) 38 Cal.App.4th 570, 578, fn. 7 (Review Granted); In re Rottanak K. (1995, 5th Dist) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, 267; National R.V., Inc. v. Foreman (1995, 4th Dist, Div 1) 34 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1085; Villa v. McFerren (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 744; People v. Olecik (1995, 6th Dist) 51 Cal.App.4th 54, 67, 69; People v. Medina (1995, 5th Dist) 39 Cal.App.4th 643, 647-648; Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995, 1st Dist, Div 5) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383; People v. Turner (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 40 Cal.App.4th 733, 741; Walsh v. Superior Court (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 42 Cal.App.4th 1822, 1832; People v. Butler (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1236; Voss v. Superior Court (1996, 5th Dist) 46 Cal.App.4th 900, 913; Decastro West Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 47 Cal.App.4th 410, 418; Hogoboom v. Superior Court (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 51 Cal.App.4th 653, 670; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Livermore (1996, 1st Dist, Div 3) 45 Cal.App.4th 719, 737-738; Adoption of Haley A. (1996, 1st Dist, Div 2) 49 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1367, fn. 10; County of Alameda v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1997, 6th Dist) 51 Cal.App.4th 1691, 1700; Andreacchi v. Price Co. (1997, 1st Dist, Div 1) 53 Cal.App.4th 646, 655, 656; Quarterman v. Kefauver (1997, 1st Dist, Div 1) 55 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1373-1374; In re Marriage of Fell (1997, 2ndDist, Div 6) 55 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1062; Soil v. Superior Court (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 55 Cal.App.4th 872, 879; Keh v. Walters (1997, 6th Dist) 55 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1532; Bank of America v. Lallana (1997, 1st Dist, Div 3) 55 Cal.App.4th 543, 552, 553; People v. Madrana (1997, 5th Dist) 55 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1048; People v. Prothero (1997, 3rd Dist) 57 Cal.App.4th 126, 133-134; Forty-Niner Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. (1997, 3rd Dist) 58 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1273, 1275, 1280, 1281, 1284, fn. 5, fn. 11; Californians for Population Stabilization v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (1997, 6th Dist) 58 Cal.App.4th 273, 284; Valley Title Co. v. San Jose Water Co. (1997, 6th Dist) 57 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1499, 1500; Federal National Mortgage Assn. v. Bugna (1997, 4th Dist, Div 1) 57 Cal.App.4th 529, 540; Hudson v. Board of Administration (1997, 1st Dist, Div 2) 59 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1323; Grossmont Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (1997, 4th Dist, Div 1) 59 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1358, 1359; Pandazos v. Superior Court (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 60 Cal.App.4th 324, 327; Delaney v. Baker (1997, 1st Dist, Div 5) 59 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1413 (Petition for Review Granted); Azusa Land Reclamation Co. v. Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 52 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1203, fn. 7; Clemente v. Amundson (1998, 3rd Dist) 60 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104-1107, fn. 10; People v. Townsend (1998, 6th Dist) 62 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1397, 1398; Aquilino v. Marin County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (1998, 1st Dist, Div 2) 60 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1516; Stahl v. Wells Fargo Bank (1998, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 63 Cal.App.4th 396, 403; Goodstone v. Southwest Airlines Co. (1998, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 63 Cal.App.4th 406, 422, 423; City of Vernon v. Board of Harbor Comrs. (1998, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 63 Cal.App.4th 677, 692, 693, fn. 14; Patterson v. City of Livermore (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 64 Cal.App.4th 206, 215; People v. Atlas (1998, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 64 Cal.App.4th 523, 526, 527, fn. 3; County of Orange v. Ranger Insurance Co. (1998, 4th Dist, Div 3) 61 Cal.App.4th 795, 801; Dant v. Superior Court (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 61 Cal.App.4th 380, 386; Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998, 6th Dist) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1181; In re Parker (1998, 4th Dist, Div 1) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1465; People v. Ward (1998, 4th Dist, Div 2) 62 Cal.App.4th 122, 128; In re Marriage of Perry (1998, 3rd Dist) 61 Cal.App.4th 295, 308, fn. 3; Sears v. Baccaglio (1998, 1st Dist, Div 2) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1147; Universal City Nissan, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 65 Cal.App.4th 203, 208; Terhune v. Superior Court (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 65 Cal.App.4th 864, 880; City of Richmond v. Commission on State Mandates (1998, 3rd Dist) 64 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1199, 1200; Muller v. Automobile Club of So. California (1998, 4th Dist, Div 1) 61 Cal.App.4th 431, 442; In re Carr (1998, 2nd Dist) 65 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1532-1534
3. Committee Files:
“This report, contained within the files of the Senate Judiciary Committee, clearly states the Legislature’s understanding
that Section 1157, as a ‘peer review statute,’ was intended to provide a bar to civil, as opposed to criminal discovery. We must assume the committee relied upon this report in making their recommendations to the full Senate.” People v. Superior Court (Memorial Medical Center) (1991, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 234 Cal.App.3d 363, 380
Van De Kamp v. Gumbiner (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 221 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1280; Farnow v. Superior Court (1990, 1st Dist, Div 2) 226 Cal.App.3d 481, 490; Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 899; Mosier v. DMV (1993, 4th Dist, Div 3) 18 Cal.App.4th 420, 424; Walsh v. Superior Court (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 42 Cal.App.4th 1822, 1832, 1833; County of Orange v. Ranger Insurance Co. (1998, 4th Dist, Div 3) 61 Cal.App.4th 795, 800, 801
4. Official Commission Reports and Comments:
“Petitioner requests us to take judicial notice of the records of the Law Revision Commission containing the language quoted in the text, specifically, a two-page document entitled ‘March ’83 ECH-Notes.’ (The initials evidently refer to the notes’ author, who was apparently Professor Edward C. Halbach, Jr.) We hereby grant the request. We must of course, judicially notice California statutory law. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a).) We may also judicially notice matters underlying such law. (E.g., Schmidt v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 23, 30, fn. 10 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 340].) Including, to our mind, the commission records here.” Estate of Joseph (1998) 17 Cal.4th 203, 210
“Reports of commissions which have proposed statements that are subsequently adopted are entitled to substantial weight in construing the statements. This is particularly true where the statement proposed by the commission is adopted by the Legislature without any change whatsoever and where the commission’s comment is brief, because in such a situation there is ordinarily strong reason to believe that the legislators’ votes were based in large measure upon the explanation of the commission proposing the bill.” Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 250
“… interpretative comment of the Law Revision Commission on this section is enlightening. Such comments are well accepted sources from which to ascertain legislative intent.” Davis v. Cordova Recreation and Park District (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 789, 796
Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 630; Kaplan v. Superior Court (1971) 6 Cal.3d 150, 157-8; People v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1975) 15 Cal.3d 271, 277; Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 817; People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 171; People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663, 668; Brian W., a minor v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 618, 622; People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514; In re Lance, W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 674; Estate of MacDonald (1990) 51 Cal.3d 262, 268; Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross (1991) 54 Cal.3d 26, 39; People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 289; People v. Valladoli (1996, 2nd Dist) 13 Cal.4th 590, 602, 603, 605; People v. Cruz (1996, 1st Dist) 13 Cal.4th 764, 773, 774, fn. 5; Brown v. Poway Unified School District (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 831-835; Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 570
———-
Arellano v. Moreno (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 877, 884; Osgood v. Shasta (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 586, 589; Shae-Kaiser-Lockheed-Healy v. Department of Water and Power (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 679, 688; Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770, 782; Curtis v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1243; Pacific Trust Co. v. Fidelity Federal (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 817; Hall v. Hall (1990, 4th Dist, Div 1) 222 Cal.App.3d 578, 585; Estate of Reeves (1991, 3rd Dist) 233 Cal.App.3d 651, 656, 658; FPI Development v. Nakashima (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 727, 746; In re Marriage of Hublou (1991, 6th Dist) 231 Cal.App.3d 956, 962; Hattersley v. American Nucleonics Corp. (1992, 2nd Dist, Div 6) 3 Cal.App.4th 397, 401; Estate of Sanders (1992, 4th Dist, Div 1) 2 Cal.App.4th 462, 471; Scarzella v. DeMers (1993, 3rd Dist) 17 Cal.App.4th 1762, 1768; Bringante v. Huang (1993, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 20 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1581; Fireman’s Fund Insurance Companies v. Quackenbush (1997,
1st Dist, Div 5) 52 Cal.App.4th 599, 606; Californians for Population Stabilization v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (1997, 6th Dist) 58 Cal.App.4th 273, 288; Valley Title Co. v. San Jose Water Co. (1997, 6th Dist) 57 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1498; Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans (1998, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 65 Cal.App.4th 314, 319, 333 (Petition for Review Granted); Cheyanna M. v. A.C. Nielsen Co. (1998, 2nd Dist) 66 Cal.App.4th 855, 864, 868-870, 875; Clayton v. Superior Court (1998, 4th Dist) 67 Cal.App.4th 28, 32, 33
5. Legislative Counsel’s Digests:
“The Legislative Counsel’s Digest is a proper resource to determine the intent of the Legislature. (Citations) Here the Legislative Counsel’s Digest indicates unequivocally that the Legislature intended to change the law.” Five v. Chaffey Joint Union High School District (1990, 4th Dist, Div 2) 225 Cal.App.3d 1548, 1555
“Since the Legislative Counsel is a state official (Government Code Section 10200), who is required by law to give such consideration to and service concerning any measure before the Legislature as circumstances will permit, and which is in any way requested by … the Senate or Assembly,… (Government Code Section 10234), it would seem by analogy that it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature adopted Section 139.7 of the Civil Code with the intent and meaning expressed in this digest of the bill.” Maben v. Superior Court (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 708, 713
Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420, 443; People v. Superior Court (Douglass) (1979) 24 Cal.3d 428, 434; People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 209, 213; People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1074; California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Board of Rialto Unified School District (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 646; Mercy Hospital and Medical Center v. Farmers Insurance Group of Companies (1997) 15 Cal.4th 213, 222; Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. v. Board of Retirement (1997) 16 Cal.4th 483, 504-505; Quelimane Company, Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45
———-
Haworth v. Lira (1991, 2nd Dist) 232 Cal.App.3d 1362, 1369-1370; Southland Mechanical Constructors v. Nixen (1981, 4th Dist, Div 2) 119 Cal.App.3d 417, 427; Shelton v. City of Westminster (1982, 4th Dist, Div 1) 138 Cal.App.3d 610, 614; California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Board (1983, 5th Dist) 141 Cal.App.3d 606, 613; People v. Rodriguez (1984, 5th Dist) 160 Cal.App.3d 207, 214, fn. 11; In re Tri-Valley Herald (1985, 1st Dist, Div 3) 169 Cal.App.3d 865, 871; Coastal Care Centers, Inc. v. Meeks (1986, 1st Dist, Div 5) 184 Cal.App.3d 85, 94; People v. Martinez (1987, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 194 Cal.App.3d 15, 22; Terry York Imports v. DMV (1987, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 197 Cal.App.3d 307, 317, fn. 2; Schwetz v. Minnerly (1990, 4th Dist, Div 1) 220 Cal.App.3d 296, 306; Billings v. Health Plan of America, (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 225 Cal.App.3d 250, 257, fn. 3; People v. Superior Court (Memorial Medical Center) (1991, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 234 Cal.App.3d 363, 377; Clavell v. North Coast Business Park (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 232 Cal.App.3d 328, 332; County of San Diego v. Department of Health Services (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 1 Cal.App.4th 656, 663; Franklin v. Appel (1992, 2nd Dist, Div 3) 8 Cal.App.4th 875, 890; Perez v. Smith (1993, 1st Dist, Div 5) 19 Cal.App.4th 1595, 1598; In re Rudy L. (1994, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 29 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1013; In re Rottanak K. (1995, 5th Dist) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, 267; Lorenz v. Commercial Acceptance Insurance Co. (1995, 6th Dist) 40 Cal.App.4th 981, 993; Voss v. Superior Court (1996, 5th Dist) 46 Cal.App.4th 900, 914, fn. 5; Hogoboom v. Superior Court (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 51 Cal.App.4th 653, 670; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Livermore (1996, 1st Dist, Div 3) 45 Cal.App.4th 719, 730, fn. 8; In re Marriage of Fell (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 6) 55 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1062; People v. Prothero (1997, 3rd Dist) 57 Cal.App.4th 126, 132, 133, fn. 7; Amvest Mortgage Corp. v. Antt (1997, 1st Dist, Div 3) 58 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1245; Valley Title Co. v. San Jose Water Co. (1997, 6th Dist) 57 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1499, 1500; People v. Hinks (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 58 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1163; People v. Henson (1997, 4th Dist, Div 2) 57 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1386; Hudson v. Board of Administration (1997, 1st Dist, Div 2) 59 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1324; Delaney v. Baker (1997, 1st Dist, Div 5) 59 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1414 (Petition for Review Granted); Almar Limited v. County of Ventura (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 6) 56 Cal.App.4th 105, 109; People v. Steffens (1998, 6th Dist) 62 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1284; Butler v. Superior Court (1998, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 63 Cal.App.4th 64, 67; Dant v. Superior Court (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 61 Cal.App.4th 380, 387, fn. 9; In re Parker (1998, 4th Dist, Div 1) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1465; Sears v. Baccaglio (1998, 1st Dist, Div 2) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1147; Townzen v. County of El Dorado (1998, 3rd Dist) 64 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1357; Terhune v. Superior Court (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 65 Cal.App.4th 864, 880, fn. 10; Cheyanna M. v. A.C. Nielsen Co. (1998, 2nd Dist) 66 Cal.App.4th 855, 875; In re Carr (1998, 2nd Dist) 65 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1534
6. Legislative Counsel’s Opinions:
“Under the circumstances, we find the Legislative Counsel’s construction persuasive. Though not binding, opinions of the Legislative Counsel are entitled to great weight, ‘since they are prepared to assist the Legislature in its consideration of pending legislation,’ and it is assumed the Legislature will undertake corrective measures if the Legislative Counsel’s interpretation misstates the legislative intent. (California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 17 [270 Cal.Rptr. 796, 793 P.2d 2].)” North Hollywood Project Area Com. v. City of Los Angeles (1998, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 61 Cal.App.4th 719, 724
“In response to a request for analysis by Assembly-member Richard K. Rainey, the Office of Legislative Counsel in a letter dated February 16, 1994 states: `Given the plain language of A.B. 971, it is abundantly clear that the Legislature intends the sentencing provisions proposed by A.B. 971 to apply’ … Utilization of a legislative counsel opinion is appropriate in construing a statute.” (Citations) People v. Turner (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 40 Cal.App.4th 733, 741
“The most cogent statement of legislative intent regarding section 3212.1 is found in a letter dated August 26, 1982, from legislative counsel (sic) to Senator Newton Russell.” Zipton v. W.C.A.B. (1990, 1st Dist, Div 3) 218 Cal.App.3d 980, 988
People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1074; California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 17; Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 922; Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 238; Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. v. Board of Retirement (1997) 16 Cal.4th 483, 502, 504-505
———-
Morin v. ABA Recovery Service (1987, 4th Dist, Div 1) 195 Cal.App.3d 200, 206; California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board (1989, 3rd Dist) 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 602, fn. 7; Karrin v. Ocean-Aire Mobile Home Estates (1991, 2nd Dist, Div 6) 1 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1071; People v. Ramirez (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 33 Cal.App.4th 559, 572
7. Urgency Clauses, Findings and Declarations, and Other Uncodified Language:
“Legislative findings, while not binding on the courts, are given great weight and will be upheld unless they are found to be unreasonable and arbitrary.” (Citations) Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1252
“Where the purpose of an initiative measure is subject to varying interpretations, as here, evidence of its purpose may be drawn from many sources, including its uncodified portions and its ballot materials….
“In passing the Act, the people made certain uncodified findings and declarations.
“… Where the purpose of an initiative measure is subject to varying interpretations, as here, evidence of its purpose may be drawn from many sources, including its uncodified portions and its ballot materials.” (Citations) Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights v. State of California (1996, 3rd Dist) 51 Cal.App.4th 724, 737
“The Legislature explained its purpose in enacting the statute by stating in an uncodified section,…” People v. Goodloe (1995, 1st Dist, Div 1) 37 Cal.App.4th 485, 491
“The change in this uncodified language indicates the following: 1) the Legislature recognized the revisions it made might not conform to federal standards; 2) it elected to risk losing some federal funding under NHPRDA; and 3) it sought to shift the burden of enforcement to the federal bureaucracy rather than to rely on a self-policing system within OSHPD.” Coastal Care Centers, Inc. v. Meeks (1986, 1st Dist, Div 5) 184 Cal.App.3d 85, 89
Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 564; Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 786
———-
People v. Barry (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 158; California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board (1989, 3rd Dist) 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 602; Del Mar v. Caspe (1990, 6th Dist) 222 Cal.App.3d 1316, 1325; Hung v. Wang (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 908, 919; Rideout Hospital Foundation v. County of Yuba (1992, 3rd Dist) 8 Cal.App.4th 214, 222; Johnson v. Superior Court (1994, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 25 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1569; Campbell v. Zolin (1995, 6th Dist) 33 Cal.App.4th 489, 494-496; Sounhein v. City of San Dimas (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 47 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1189, 1191; Wells Fargo Bank v. Goldzband (1997, 5th Dist) 53 Cal.App.4th 596, 616; Sears v. Baccaglio (1998, 1st Dist, Div 2) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1150; Kidd v. State of California (1998, 3rd Dist) 62 Cal.App.4th 386, 403
8. Ballot Summaries and Arguments/Statement of Vote:
“It is clear not only from the stated purpose of the legislation and the initiative but from an examination of the statutory provisions that the purpose of ‘three strikes’ laws was to …. A perceived failure of the criminal justice system to deal effectively with recidivism is evident from the initiative proponents’ arguments which refer to the ‘judicial system’s revolving door’ (Ballot Pamp., argument in favor or Prop. 184 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 36) and ‘soft-on-crime judges, politicians, defense lawyers and probation officers’ (Ballot Pamp., rebuttal to the argument against Prop. 184 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 37).” People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504, 520, 528
“Amwest and its supporting amicus curiae, … argue that in determining the purposes of Prop. 103, we are limited to the express statement of purpose included in the initiative … We are aware of no case that holds we are so constrained. To the contrary, in construing a constitutional amendment enacted by initiative, we desired: ‘Where, as here, a constitutional amendment is subject to varying interpretations, evidence of its purpose may be drawn from many sources, including the historical context of the amendment, and the ballot arguments favoring the measure.’ (Citations)” Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1256
“On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the ballot pamphlet for Proposition 209. (Evid. Code, §452, subd. (c).) The ballot pamphlet may properly be considered to show the intent of the voters in passing an initiative measure. (Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown, supra, 29 Cal.3d 168, 182-183 & fn. 6; Mobilepark West Homeowners Assn. v. Escondido Mobilepark West (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 32, 42, fn. 6 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 393].)” Kidd v. State of California (1998, 3rd Dist) 62 Cal.App.4th 386, 407, fn. 7
“Plainly the Three Strikes Initiative, as well as the legislative act embodying its terms was intended …. We may accept ballot arguments as evidence of that intent.” People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504, 520, 528 and Kidd v. State of California (1998, 3rd Dist) 62 Cal.App.4th 386, 400, 401, 407, fn. 5, fn. 7
“Initiative ballot arguments are considered the equivalent of the legislative history of a legislative enactment.” County of Sacramento v. Fair Political Practices Commission (1990, 3rd Dist) 222 Cal.App.3d 687, 693, fn. 2
“To ascertain the intent of the electorate it is proper to consider the official statements made to the voters in connection with propositions of law they are requested to approve or reject.” Diamond International Corp. v. Boas (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1015, 1034
“A court may … rely on extrinsic aids such as the history of the statement, committee reports, the legislative debates, and statements to the voters on initiative and referendum measures.” Noroian v. Department of Administration (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 651, 654-55
A recent appellate court case, in analyzing the intent of a proposition, considered not only official ballot materials but also a publication of the Criminal Law Section of the State Bar of California, as well as analyses prepared by Senate and Assembly committees and by the Office of the Public Defender of the City and County of San Francisco. Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998, 6th Dist) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1175-1177, 1181
People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182; Lundberg v. County of Alameda (1956) 46 Cal.2d 644, 653; San Diego Coast Regional Commission v. See the Sea Limited (1973) 9 Cal.3d 888, 891; White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775; California Housing Finance Agency v. Patitucci (1978) 22 Cal.3d 171, 177; Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. V. State Board of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245; Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan (1980) 27 Cal.3d 855; Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 267, fn. 7; Arvin Union School District v. Ross (1985, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 176 Cal.App.3d 189, 199; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 739-40; Taxpayers v. FPPC (1990) 51 Cal.3d 744, 755, 766; Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 504; Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978, 982; Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 235-238; Amwest Surety Insurance Co. v. Wilson (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1243, 1264; People v. Cruz (1996, 1st Dist) 13 Cal.4th 764, 774, fn. 5; Western Telcon, Inc. v. California State Lottery (1996) 13 Cal.4th 475, 484-485; People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 33
———-
California Institute of Technology v. Johnson (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 856, 859; Crees v. California State Board of Medical Examiners (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 195, 211; Miro v. Superior Court (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 87, 98; Sanders v. Pacific Gas and Electric (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 661; Consumer’s Union v. California Milk Product Adv. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 439, 446, 448; People v. Zikorus (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 324, 330; Aguimatang v. California State Lottery (1991, 3rd Dist) 234 Cal.App.3d 769, 790; Sanford v. Garamendi (1991, 3rd Dist) 233 Cal.App.3d 1109, 1118; People v. Ramirez (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 33 Cal.App.4th 559, 565-566; People v. Turner (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 40 Cal.App.4th 733, 742; Thomsen v. City of Escondido (1996, 4th Dist, Div 1) 49 Cal.App.4th 884, 891; Americans for Nonsmokers’ Rights v. State of California (1996, 3rd Dist) 51 Cal.App.4th 724, 738; People v. Griggs (1997, 5th Dist) 59 Cal.App.4th 557, 561; People v. Tran (1997, 6th Dist) 59 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1139 (concurrence); People v. Garcia (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 63 Cal.App.4th 820, 831, 832; Hondo Co. v. Superior Court (1998, 2nd Dist) 67 Cal.App.4th 176, 182, 183
9. Third Reading Analyses:
“We recognize that materials prepared for the Senate’s Third Reading -…- state that Senate Bill No. 1137 ….” In re Rottanak K. (1995, 5th Dist) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, 267
a. Assembly Office of Research Analysis:
“Similarly, the Assembly Office of Research Third Reading analysis refers the reader to ‘existing law’ on enforcement of orders,… the Assembly document states ….” People v. Tabb (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 228 Cal.App.3d 1300, 1309
Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 188, fn. 3
———-
Southland Mechanical Constructors v. Nixen (1981, 4th Dist, Div 2) 119 Cal.App.3d 417, 428; Honey Springs Homeowners Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1122; People v. Martinez (1987, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 194 Cal.App.3d 15, 22; O’Loughlin v. W.C.A.B. (1990, 1st Dist, Div 1) 222 Cal.App.3d 1518, 1524; In re Rikki, D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1624, 1630; Kishida v. State of California (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 229 Cal.App.3d 329, 335; Franklin v. Appel (1992, 2nd Dist, Div 3) 8 Cal.App.4th 875, 889; Coronado Yacht Club v. California Coastal Commission (1993, 4th Dist, Div 1) 13 Cal.App.4th 860, 870; Forty-Niner Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. (1997, 3rd Dist) 58 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1273, 1274; Terhune v. Superior Court (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 65 Cal.App.4th 864, 879, fn. 9
b. Office of Assembly Floor Analyses:
People v. Superior Court (Memorial Medical Center) (1991, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 234 Cal.App.3d 363, 379; In re Rudy L. (1994, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 29 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1013
c. Senate Democratic and Senate Republican Caucus Analyses:
“Likewise, an analysis of the bill by the Senate Republican Caucus concluded Section 65961 …. These comments, although not necessarily dispositive on the subject of legislative intent, reflect an intent similar to that suggested by other provisions of the Act.” Golden State Homebuilding Assn. v. City of Modesto (1994, 5th Dist) 26 Cal.App.4th 601, 609
“Similarly the third reading analyses of Assembly Bill No. 1303 by both the Senate Democratic Caucus and the Senate Republican Caucus refer to ‘the present 48-hour limitation.'” Youngblood v. Gates (1988, 2nd Dist) 200 Cal.App.3d 1302, 1343
People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1218
———-
Southland Mechanical Constructors v. Nixen (1981, 4th Dist, Div 2) 119 Cal.App.3d 417, 428; People v. Cardoza (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 40, 44; Honey Springs Homeowners Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1122, 1138; People v. Martinez (1987, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 194 Cal.App.3d 15,22; Knighten v. Sam’s Parking Valet (1988, 4th Dist) 106 Cal.App.3d 69, 77; American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 480, 486, 487; Schwetz v. Minnerly (1990, 4th Dist, Div 1) 220 Cal.App.3d, 296, 306; Van De Kamp v. Gumbiner (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 221 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1281, 1282; Alexander, D. v. State Board of Dental Examiners (1991, 1st Dist, Div 1) 231 Cal.App.3d 92, 97; Industrial Risk Insurers v. The Rust Engineering Co. (1991, 1st Dist, Div 4) 232 Cal.App.3d 1038, 1044; Forty-Niner Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. (1997, 3rd Dist) 58 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1273
d. Office of Senate Floor Analyses:
“A Senate Floor Analysis of Senate Bill 2404, prepared after the bill had been amended by the Assembly, demonstrates that the Legislature intended that Senate Bill 2404 correct the anomaly in the statutory scheme noted by the court in People v. Downing….” People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1075
Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 188, fn. 3; Planning & Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources (1998) 17 Cal.4th 264, 272, 273
———-
Valnes v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 221 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1122; Farnow v. Superior Court (1990, 1st Dist, Div 2) 226 Cal.App.3d 481, 490; In re Marriage of Abernethy (1992, 1st Dist, Div 5) 5 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1198; Texas Commerce Bank v. Garamendi (1992, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 11 Cal.App.4th 460, 490; California Country Club Homes Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1993, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 18 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1440; In re Rudy L. (1994, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 29 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1013; Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995, 1st Dist, Div 5) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383; Cisneros v. Vuere (1995, 1st Dist, Div 2) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 911; People v. Butler (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1236; Delaney v. Baker (1997, 1st Dist, Div 5) 59 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1413 (Petition for Review Granted); Andreacchi v. Price Co. (1997, 1st Dist, Div 1) 53 Cal.App.4th 646, 656; Grossmont Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (1997, 4th Dist, Div 1) 59 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1358; People v. Steffens (1998, 6th Dist) 62 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1285; Bodell Construction Co. v. Trustees of California State University (1998, 4th Dist, Div 1) 62 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1524; Terhune v. Superior Court (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 65 Cal.App.4th 864, 879; Cheyanna M. v. A.C. Nielsen Co. (1998, 2nd Dist) 66 Cal.App.4th 855, 875, 876; In re Carr (1998, 2nd Dist) 65 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1533
10. Departmental Sponsorship, Support, and Analysis:
“AB 4282 was sponsored by the Attorney General’s Office and authored by Assemblyman Bruce Bronzan. In its letter urging Bronzan to support AB 4282, the Attorney General explained that the bill …. Identical letters were sent to the chairman of the Committee on Public Safety, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and former Governor George Deukmejian. This letter’s analysis was adopted virtually verbatim in the analyses of the bill prepared by the Assembly Committee on Public Safety and the Senate Committee on Judiciary.” In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1145
“The Judicial Council sponsored this legislation, described in its annual report as providing:…” California Court Reporter’s Association v. Judicial Council of California (1995, 1st Dist, Div 4) 39 Cal.App.4th 15, 31
“We note that our review of the legislative history discloses nothing that indicates the board’s (Board of Equalization) analysis which was made available to the Legislature and the legislative committees that passed judgment on it, was ever disputed at any point in the legislative process. It is reasonable to infer from the absence of any challenge to the board’s statements that the Legislature accepted these authoritative representations as to the proper construction of the bill.” Kern v. County of Imperial (1990, 4th Dist, Div 1) 226 Cal.App.3d 391, 401
“The Judicial Council is a constitutionally created body,… The interpretation given by the Judicial Council to its proposed legislation is entitled to the greatest respect.” Reimel v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 340, 345
Gay v. Reclamation District No. 1500 (1917) 174 Cal. 622, 630; Armenta v. Churchill (1954) 42 Cal.2d 448, 455; Pearson v. State Social Welfare Board (1960) 54 Cal.2d 184, 210; People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514; Nickelsberg v. W.C.A.B. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 288, 296; Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 564; DuBois v. W.C.A.B. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 394; Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 587 (dissent); Planning & Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources (1998) 17 Cal.4th 264, 273
———-
Brownell v. City and County of San Francisco (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 102, 114; ABC Acceptance v.
Delby (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d Supp. 826, 828; Watson v. Los Altos School District (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 768, 772; Sockett v. Gottlieb (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 760, 768; Michaels v. Wayson (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 404, 407; Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 601; Worthington v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 384, 388; Adamson v. Zipp (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 14, fn. 17; Blakey v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 101, 105; Comite De Padres De Familia v. Honig (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 528, 533; E. Peninsula Ed. Council v. Palos Verdes School District (1989, 2nd Dist) 210 Cal.App.3d 155, 168; Van De Kamp v. Gumbiner (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 221 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1278, fn. 10; People v. Henson (1991, 5th Dist) 231 Cal.App.3d 172, 178; Al-Sal Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1991, 3rd Dist) 232 Cal.App.3d 969, 978; People v. Newman (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 646, 649, fn. 3; CIGA v. W.C.A.B. (1992, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 10 Cal.App.4th 988, 996, fn. 6; Johnson v. Superior Court (1994, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 25 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1570; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Livermore (1996, 1st Dist, Div 3) 45 Cal.App.4th 719, 730, 737; Sounhein v. City of San Dimas (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 47 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1190; Keh v. Walters (1997, 6th Dist) 55 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1532; People v. Erickson (1997, 5th Dist) 57 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1402; Clemente v. Amundson (1998, 3rd Dist) 60 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1105; Hudson v. Board of Administration (1997, 1st Dist, Div 2) 59 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1323; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Greer (1998, 1st Dist, Div 2) 60 Cal.App.4th 877, 882
11. Transcripts of Hearings:
“Statutes should be construed to produce a reasonable result consistent with the legislative purpose. (Citations) The object to be achieved and the evil to be prevented are prime considerations in determining legislative intent. (Citations)
“The provisions of section 1203.066 should be construed in light of the major areas of concern expressed at the legislative hearings, one of which was ….” People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 997
“On the other hand, excerpts from testimony at public legislative hearings which preceded the enactment of a statute may be of some relevance in ascertaining legislative intent.” Pacific Bell v. California State Consumer Services Agency (1990, 1st Dist, Div 3) 225 Cal.App.3d 107, 115
“General background materials pertaining to this 1961 legislation amending Section 825 were furnished by the Legislative Intent Service (Citation) and included the transcript of a public hearing of the Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure conducted on February 18 and 19, 1960, pertaining to ‘Laws of Arrest.’ Such documents are the type of material this division has readily consulted in the past.” Youngblood v. Gates (1988, 2nd Dist) 200 Cal.App.3d 1302, 1340
Flesker v. W.C.A.B. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 382, 325; People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514
———-
Post v. Prati (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 626, 634; F&P Growers Assn. v. A.L.R.B. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 667, 678; Maggio v. A.L.R.B. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1329, 1333; People v. Thompson (1988, 2nd Dist, Div 6) 205 Cal.App.3d 871, 879-80; In re Marriage of Watt (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 340, 349; Conservatorship of Bryant (1996, 4th Dist, Div 1) 45 Cal.App.4th 117, 120
12. Statements by Proponents and Opponents:
“While we find the plain meaning rule applicable,… we note that the parties have cited a letter from the League of California Cities dated June 2, 1980, to show the legislative intent of the section …. The letter states ….” County of San Bernardino v. City of San Bernardino (1997) 15 Cal.4th 909, 917, 926
“In Quarterman v. Kefauver cited above, the court extracted the sponsor statements from legislative committee analyses. In a similar fashion, the court in Soil v. Superior Court (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 55 Cal.App.4th 872, 878-880, made several references to the statements of the sponsor of the legislation, and opponents, as found in legislative committee analyses.” See also: In re York (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1145
“Statements by the sponsor of the legislation may be instructive (Citations) ….” Quarterman v. Kefauver (1997, 1st Dist, Div 1) 55 Cal.App.4th 1366
“The statements of the sponsor of legislation are entitled to be considered in determining the import of the legislation.” Kern v. County of Imperial (1990, 4th Dist, Div 1) 226 Cal.App.3d 391, 401
“Finally, the chairman of the State Bar subcommittee which was the driving force behind revision of the challenge for cause statute, wrote in a supporting memorandum:…” Woodman v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 407, 414
People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 548, 561; Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 577, fn. 7; Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of U.C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, 1127
———-
Woodwork Mfrs. V. N.L.R.B. (1967) 386 U.S. 612, 640; De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors (1977 N.D. Cal.) 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1139, fn. 22; Southland Mechanical Constructors v. Nixen (1981, 4th Dist, Div 2) 119 Cal.App.3d 417, 428; Carroll v. State Bar (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1193, 1202; Anaheim Redevelopment Agency v. Dusek (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 249, 256; People v. Jenkins (1987, 2nd Dist) 196 Cal.App.3d 394, 404; California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board (1989, 3rd Dist) 207 Cal.App.3d 585, 602-603, fn. 7; American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 480, 487; People v. Weatherill (1989, 2nd Dist) 215 Cal.App.3d 1569, 1576; Van De Kamp v. Gumbiner (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 221 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1279, 1289; Ferraro v. Chadwick (1990, 4th Dist, Div 1) 221 Cal.App.3d 86, 94; Perez v. So. Pacific Trans. Co. (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 218 Cal.App.3d 462, 468; Kishida v. State of California (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 229 Cal.App.3d 329, 335; Alexander, D. v. State Board of Dental Examiners (1991,1st Dist, Div 1) 231 Cal.App.3d 92, 97; Cal Service Station Assn. v. Union Oil Co. (1991, 1st Dist, Div 5) 232 Cal.App.3d 44, 54; Shapell Industries v. Governing Board (1991, 6th Dist) 1 Cal.App.4th 218, 242; Transamerica Occidental Life v. State Board of Equalization (1991, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 232 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1058; County of San Diego v. Department of Health Services (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 1 Cal.App.4th 656, 661; In re Marriage of Seaman and Menjou (1991, 1st Dist, Div 2) 1 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1502; People v. Bishop (1993, 6th Dist) 11 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1132; Mosier v. DMV (1993, 4th Dist, Div 3) 18 Cal.App.4th 420, 424; JA Jones Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1994, 4th Dist, Div 3) 27 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1579; Dubins v. Regents of the University of California (1994, 1st Dist, Div 2) 25 Cal.App.4th 77, 86, 87; Johnson v. Superior Court (1994, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 25 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1569; Coniglio v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995, 6th Dist) 39 Cal.App.4th 666, 675; Lorenz v. Commercial Acceptance Insurance Co. (1995, 6th Dist) 40 Cal.App.4th 981, 993; People v. Butler (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1236; Walsh v. Superior Court (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 42 Cal.App.4th 1822, 1832; Conrad v. Medical Board of California (1996, 4th Dist, Div 1) 48 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1050; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Livermore (1996, 1st Dist, Div 3) 45 Cal.App.4th 719, 737; Crusader Insurance Co. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co. (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 54 Cal.App.4th 121, 136; Forty-Niner Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. (1997, 3rd Dist) 58 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1273, 1274, 1280, 1281; Valley Title Co. v. San Jose Water Co. (1997, 6th Dist) 57 Cal.App.4th 1490,1499-1501; Pandazos v. Superior Court (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 60 Cal.App.4th 324, 327; County of Orange v. Ranger Insurance Co. (1998, 4th Dist, Div 3) 61 Cal.App.4th 795, 800; Dant v. Superior Court (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 61 Cal.App.4th 380, 386
13. News Media and Law Reviews:
“SB No. 604, which, as amended, became section 453.5, was introduced by Senator Stull (R-Escondido) in March, 1977, the month after issuance of the OII in Case No. 10255 and in response to it. (Kuersteiner & Herbach, supra at p.674.) [law review article]” California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Commission (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 845, 846
“Moreover, many of the background materials pertaining to Senate Bill No. 1028 referred to an article in the State Bar Journal in July of 1980, which offered examples of factual situations in which unjust results could be reached under the previous, restrictive view of section 1717. (Legislative Intent Service (July 24, 1991) Civ. Code, § 1717, exhibit B, #12 documents B-3 through B-6.)” Sears v. Baccaglio (1998, 1st Dist, Div 2) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1146
“‘The legislative history further reveals that the source of the bill was a coalition of McGeorge Law Students’ and that the ‘impetus for this bill was an intimidating experience recently suffered by a Sacramento law student.’ Newsweek in the July 4, 1977 issue, described it in the following passage:…” Diamond View Limited v. Herz (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 612, 619
People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 547-549 (news article); Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 571
———-
Federal National Mortgage Assn. v. Bugna (1997, 4th Dist, Div 1) 57 Cal.App.4th 529, 539; John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Greer (1998, 1st Dist, Div 2) 60 Cal.App.4th 877, 882, 884; Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998, 6th Dist) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1181; Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans (1998, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 65 Cal.App.4th 314, 319, 333 (Petition for Review Granted)
14. House Journals and Final Histories:
“Also revealing of intent is the fact the Legislature considered legislation amending section 4685 at the same time it considered legislation which added section 4791-the statute which required the regional centers to submit cost-cutting plans in response to the state’s fiscal crisis. (Sen. Bill No. 485, 1 Sen. Final Hist. (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) pp 381-382; Sen. Bill No. 1383, 2 Sen. Final Hist. (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) p. 1000.)” Clemente v. Amundson (1998, 3rd Dist) 60 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1106
“Moreover, we have independently examined the legislative history of Section 170.3(d) which makes it abundantly clear that the 1984 revision of the challenge for cause statute, of which this section is part, was to have no effect on the preemptory challenge statute. The Senate Final History of Senate Bill 1633 which amended the statute specifically notes:…” Woodman v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 407, 413
County of Yolo v. Colgan (1901) 132 Cal. 265; County of Los Angeles v. State (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 51, fn. 2; People v. Jeffers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 984, 996
———-
In re Marriage of Martinez (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 20, 28; People v. Monroe (1993, 1st Dist, Div 2) 12 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1184; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504, 520, 528; Joyce G. v. Superior Court (1995, 3rd Dist) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1510, fn. 7; People v. Ramos (1996, 5th Dist) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 821; People v. Butler (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1236
15. Predecessor Bills:
The courts consider predecessor bills when such are a part of the legislative history of a statutory enactment or amendment.
“Further, the view that the Legislature was proceeding by stages in enacting chapter 478/89 finds support in the history of the nearly identical predecessor to chapter 478/89, Assembly Bill No. 1097.” City of Richmond v. Commission on State Mandates (1998, 3rd Dist) 64 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1199
“Section 170.3, subdivision (d) was enacted as part of the overhaul of the system of challenging judges for cause which occurred in 1984 through enactment of Senate Bill 1633 (Stats.1984, ch. 1555, § 7). A virtually identical provision was contained in an unsuccessful predecessor bill, Senate Bill No. 598. Detailed analysis of Senate Bill No. 598 was provided to the Senate Judiciary Committee by Professor Preble Stolz, chair of the State Bar committee which drafted the legislation. Page 15 of that analysis, which has been furnished to us by Legislative Intent Service states:…” People v. Jenkins (1987, 2nd Dist) 196 Cal.App.3d 394, 404
People v. Prothero (1997, 3rd Dist) 57 Cal.App.4th 126, 134; Muller v. Automobile Club of So. California (1998, 4th Dist, Div 1) 61 Cal.App.4th 431, 441, 442; In re Carr (1998, 2nd Dist) 65 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1532, 1533
16. Statements of Author and Other Individual Legislators:
There has developed over the years a long line of confusing and often contradictory appellate cases regarding the admissibility and relevance of statements by the authors of legislation and other individual legislators. In 1981 the California Supreme Court summarized and synthesized these cases in its decision in the case California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College District (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698, 699:
“While the court in California Teachers upholds the rule against admitting statements of an individual legislator’s personal belief or intent, the court also acknowledges a number of exceptions to this rule.” (Ibid. at p. 700.) (See also Quelimane Company, Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 46, fn.9
The Court has employed these exceptions in the following cases: In re Marriage of Buol (1985) 39 Cal.3d 751, 761-762; County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 54, fn. 6; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 377; and Mercy Hospital and Medical Center v. Farmers Insurance Group of Companies (1997) 15 Cal.4th 213, 222.
Within one year of the CTA case the Supreme Court accepted and considered an author’s letter to the Governor in Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 219, fn. 9, even over the objection of Justice Mosk in a Concurring Opinion. And in a 1997 case, the Supreme Court quoted from a Legislator’s letter with no discussion at all concerning the possible inadmissibility of this type of document. Mercy Hospital and Medical Center v. Farmers Insurance Group of Companies (1997) 15 Cal.4th 213, 222
The First District Court of Appeal, in a decision rendered after the CTA ruling, determined the intention of the Legislature from various historical documents and then quoted extensively from the author’s letter to the Governor “Confirming this intent….” Rogers v. Alvas (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 997, 1003 An author’s letter was quoted, without comment, in Blakey v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 101, 105; see also Duty v. Abex Corp. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 742, 747 (citing the same letter). The First District, in F&P Growers Assn. v. A.L.R.B. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 667, 678 made the statement “Declarations of a legislator are admissible as part of legislative history for whatever help it may be.” Also see Bank of the Orient v. Town of Tiburon (1990, 1st Dist, Div 1) 220 Cal.App.3d 992, 1002, fn. 11 and Farnow v. Superior Court (1990, 1st Dist, Div 2) 226 Cal.App.3d 481, 490. In a 1995 case, the court simply quoted an author’s letter to the Governor. Cisneros v. Vuere (1995, 1st Dist, Div 2) 37 Cal.App.4th 906, 911. See also Delaney v. Baker (1997, 1st Dist, Div 5) 59 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1413 (Petition for Review Granted) A 1998 case cites an author’s letter and an author’s statement, stating in a footnote that:
“We recognize that courts ordinarily do not consider statements of personal belief or intent by individual legislators, including the author of a bill, on the issue of legislative intent. But a legislator’s statement may be entitled to consideration when it is a reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading to adoption of legislation or when it gives some indication of arguments made to the Legislature. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 700-701 [170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856].)” Terhune v. Superior Court (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 65 Cal.App.4th 864, 879, fn. 9
The Second District Court of Appeal has similarly relied on legislator’s statements. The court analyzed a Committee memorandum and an author’s letter to the Governor together and decided that the letter was proper for separate bills in Van De Kamp v. Gumbiner (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 221 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1274, 1276, and 1280; see also People v. Superior Court (Memorial Medical Center) (1991, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 234 Cal.App.3d 363, 380; Texas Commerce Bank v. Garamendi (1992, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 11 Cal.App.4th 460, 490; Arcadia Redevelopment v. Ikemoto (1993, 2nd Dist, Div 3) 16 Cal.App.4th 444, 457; People v. Butler (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 43 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1237; Amex Life Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1996, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 48 Cal.App.4th 810, 819; and Cheyanna M. v. A.C. Nielsen Co. (1998, 2nd Dist) 66 Cal.App.4th 855,876, 877. A 1995 case relied on comments made by the author of legislation stating:
“Courts are generally reluctant to rely on the position of one legislator to reveal legislative intent except, as here when the speaker was the author of the bill and no other interpretations of the statutory language exist. [Citation omitted] Comments by the author of a bill are properly considered where such comments are before the legislative body and presumably entered into its deliberations in passing the bill. [Citation to CTA case omitted]” Wells Fargo Bank v. Bank of America (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 32 Cal.App.4th 424, 434
A 1997 Second District case cited statements made by the vice-chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee-Minority, noting that they were “comments within the Assembly Judiciary Committee.” Steinfeld v. Foote-Goldman Proctologic Medical Group, Inc. (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 60 Cal.App.4th 13, 18, 19
In 1986, the Third District took judicial notice of “the floor statement of the sponsoring legislator.” In re Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36, 46, fn. 6
Also that year, the Fourth District found an author’s statement persuasive “not to show the personal beliefs of the legislator as to the meaning of the statute (which may not reflect the collective view of the enacting legislative body) but rather to cast light on the history of the measure and the arguments before the Legislature when it considered the matter.” (emphasis added) County of San Diego v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 1009. See also McDowell v. Watson (1997, 4th Dist, Div 2) 59 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1161, fn. 3. Another division of the Fourth District stated that an objection to an author’s letter to the Governor “may have merit” in a case where there were other legislative documents upon which they could rely. People v. Cherry (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1135; see also City of Poway v. City of San Diego (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 229 Cal.App.3d 847, 866; Estate of Sanders (1992, 4th Dist, Div 1) 2 Cal.App.4th 462, 474; and William Lyon Co. v. Franchise Tax Board (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 267, 275.
In 1991, the Fifth District cited an author’s letter to the Governor in People v. Henson (1991, 5th Dist) 231 Cal.App.3d 172, 179. In 1994 this District quoted from an author’s floor statement, Golden State Homebuilding Association v. City of Modesto (1994, 5th Dist) 26 Cal.App.4th 601, 609, stating:
“These comments, although not necessarily dispositive on the subject of legislative intent, reflect an intent similar to that suggested by other provisions of the Act.”
In 1996, the Fifth District found that a Legislator’s letter was entitled to consideration on the question of legislative intent based on the fact that the legislator was granted unanimous consent to print it in the Assembly Journal. The court reasoned that:
“The statement of an individual legislator has also been accepted when it gave some indication of argument made to the Legislature and was printed upon motion of the Legislature as a ‘letter of legislative intent.’ [Citation.] … Assembly Member Katz’s letter appears to fall within this latter category inasmuch as he was granted unanimous consent to print it in the Assembly Journal.” People v. Ramos (1996, 5th Dist) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 821, fn. 12
17. The Author’s File:
“Commodore requests we take judicial notice of various reports, letters, and legislators’ memos dealing with 1977 amendment…. An undated memo in Assemblyman Lockyer’s files, furnished by the Legislative Intent Service, states….” Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 219, fn. 9
Farnow v. Superior Court (1990, 1st Dist, Div 2) 226 Cal.App.3d 481, 490; Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 924, fn. 2; Pacific Gas & Electric v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143
18. Legislative Analyst:
“The Ballot Pamphlet Legislative Analysis of Proposition 184 described to voters the effect of the initiative. The analysis
noted ….” People v. Ramirez (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 33 Cal.App.4th 559, 566
“Moreover, a 1970 report prepared by the Legislative Analyst for the Joint Legislative Budget Committee recommended that…. While not dispositive, we may properly consider such an extrinsic aid to help determine legislative intent.” Shippen v. DMV (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1119
County of Los Angeles v. State (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 50, fn. 1; Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 301; Taxpayers v. F.P.P.C. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 744, 749-754; DuBois v. W.C.A.B.
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 394; Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 237; People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1218; People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 33
———-
Estate of Cirone (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 199, 202; Arvin Union School District v. Ross (1985, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 176 Cal.App.3d 189; Somerset Importers, Ltd. v. Continental Vintners (1986) 790 F.2d 775, 778; Van De Kamp v. Gumbiner (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 221 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1276, 1281; County of Sacramento v. Fair Political Practices Commission (1990, 3rd Dist) 222 Cal.App.3d 687, 692-693; People v. Henson (1991, 5th Dist) 231 Cal.App.3d 172, 178; Aguimatang v. California State Lottery (1991, 3rd Dist) 234 Cal.App.3d 769, 788; Greenwood Addition Homewood Assn. v. City of San Marino (1993, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 14 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1370; People v. Turner (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 40 Cal.App.4th 733, 742; Crusader Insurance Co. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co. (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 2) 54 Cal.App.4th 121, 132, 133; Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998, 6th Dist) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1177, 1178, fn. 6; People v. Garcia (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 63 Cal.App.4th 820, 831; Kidd v. State of California (1998, 3rd Dist) 62 Cal.App.4th 386, 407, fn. 7; Hondo Co. v. Superior Court (1998, 2nd Dist) 67 Cal.App.4th 176, 182, 183
19. Rejection, Deletion, and Refusal to Act:
“A few days before passing the final version of Assembly Bill No. 971, the Senate rejected language … (Sen. Floor Amend. RN 9406668 to Assembly Bill No. 971 (1993-1994 Reg Sess.) Mar. 2, 1994.) that the amendment was not adopted makes it difficult to view the final wording of,… as anything but a purposeful choice.” People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504, 520, 528
“The legislative history of Section 1043 reveals that the Legislature expressly considered and rejected a requirement of personal knowledge.” City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 88, 89, 92
“The evolution of a proposed statute after its original introduction in the Senate or Assembly can offer considerable enlightenment as to legislative intent [Citations omitted]. Generally the Legislature’s reaction of a specific provision which appeared in the original version of an act supports the conclusion that the act should not be construed to include the omitted provision [Citations omitted].” People v. Goodloe (1995, 1st Dist, Div 1) 37 Cal.App.4th 485, 491
“The rejection (by the Legislature) of a specific provision contained in an act as originally introduced is ‘most persuasive’ that the act should not be interpreted to include what was left out.” Wilson v. City of Laguna Beach (1992, 4th Dist, Div 3) 6 Cal.App.4th 543, 555
“When the Legislature deletes an express provision of a statute, it is presumed that it intended that to effect a substantial change in the law.” Royal Company Auctioneers v. Coast Printing (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 868, 873 and Barajas v. City of Anaheim (1993, 4th Dist, Div 3) 15 Cal.App.4th 1808, 1814
Pearson v. State Social Welfare Board (1960) 54 Cal.2d 184, 210; California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Commission (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844, 846; Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel & Tel Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 480, fn. 13); People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897; Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County Employees Retirement System (1993) 6 Cal.4th 821, 830-831
———-
People v. Brannon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971; Madrid v. Justice Court (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 819; Seibert v. Sears Roebuck (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 11, 19; Western Land Office v. Cervantes (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 724; Moseley v. Abrams (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 355; In re Marriage of Norvall (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1047; Morin v. ABA Recovery Service (1987, 4th Dist, Div 1) 195 Cal.App.3d 100, 206, fn. 2; Terry York Imports v. DMV (1987, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 197 Cal.App.3d 307, 317; Fallbrook Sanitation District v. LAFCO (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 753, 764; People v. Harrell (1989) 207
Cal.App.3d 1439, 1446; Graham v. W.C.A.B. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 499, 505; Van De Kamp v. Gumbiner (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 221 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1282; People v. Barrett (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 226 Cal.App.3d 244, 252; Shapell Industries v. Governing Board (1991, 6th Dist) 1 Cal.App.4th 218, 242; Clark v. W.C.A.B. (1991, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 230 Cal.App.3d 684, 696; Estate of Sanders (1992, 4th Dist, Div 1) 2 Cal.App.4th 462, 473; People v. Gangemi (1993, 1st Dist, Div 2) 13 Cal.App.4th 1790, 1798; People v. Jones (1993, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 12 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1114; Central Delta Water Agency v. Water Resources Control Board (1993, 3rd Dist) 17 Cal.App.4th 621, 634; Adoption of Haley A. (1996, 1st Dist, Div 2) 49 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1382; Steinfeld v. Foote-Goldman Proctologic Medical Group, Inc. (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 60 Cal.App.4th 13, 18; Universal City Nissan, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 65 Cal.App.4th 203, 207, 208; Azusa Land Reclamation Co. v. Main San Gabriel Basin Watermaster (1997, 2nd Dist, Div 7) 52 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1203
20. Conference Committee Reports:
“We find instructive the Conference Committee Report for that final version of the bill which explained….” Salem v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 595, 601
Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 924
———-
O’Loughlin v. W.C.A.B. (1990, 1st Dist, Div 1) 222 Cal.App.3d 1518, 1524; Crowl v. Commission on Professional Competence (1990, 3rd Dist) 225 Cal.App.3d 334, 347; Grossmont Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (1997, 4th Dist, Div 1) 59 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1358
C. Post-Enrollment History.
1. Role of the Governor:
It has long been held that the Governor is acting in a legislative capacity and not as an executive when he is engaged in considering bills which have passed both Houses of the Legislature and which are presented to him for disapproval or approval. Lukens v. Nye (1909) 156 Cal. 498, 501 His statements are relative to legislative intent. People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514
2. Enrolled Bill Reports and Memoranda:
“Further evidence of the concern for the financial impact of section 3226 on landowners is provided by the Department of Conservation’s Enrolled Bill Report on the enactment of article 4.2:…” Wells Fargo Bank v. Goldzband (1997, 5th Dist) 53 Cal.App.4th 596, 616, 617
“Our review of that [legislative] history discloses a single reference relevant to the issue before us, from an analysis of the bill by the Governor’s office … (See Governor’s Office Department of Legal Affairs, Enrolled Bill Report,…) The implication of the emphasized language….” People v. Superior Court (Bauman & Rose) (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 37 Cal.App.4th 1757, 1765
“The legal affairs department of the Governor’s office noted that ‘The bill reflects present Regent policies under existing law.’ Thus we infer that the Legislature intended that only the meetings of the Regents … would be subject to the open meeting requirements of the Bagley-Keene Act….” Tafoya v. Hastings College of Law (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 437, 444
Nickelsberg v. W.C.A.B. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 288, 295; Mercy Hospital and Medical Center v. Farmers Insurance Group of Companies (1997) 15 Cal.4th 213, 222; People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1219; Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, 1003 (dissent)
———-
Post v. Prati (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 626, 634; People v. Cardoza (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 40; People v. Rodriguez (1984, 5th Dist) 160 Cal.App.3d 207, 214, fn. 11; Bell v. Superior Court (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1103, 1109, fn. 7; Bank of the Orient v. Town of Tiburon (1990, 1st Dist, Div 1) 220 Cal.App.3d 992, 1002, fn. 11; Van De Kamp v. Gumbiner (1990, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 221 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1278; People v. Tabb (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 228 Cal.App.3d 1300, 1310; Kishida v. State of California (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 229 Cal.App.3d 329, 335; City of Poway v. City of San Diego (1991, 4th Dist, Div 1) 229 Cal.App.3d 847, 866; Transamerica Occidental Life v. State Board of Equalization (1991, 2nd Dist, Div 1) 232 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1058; Texas Commerce Bank v. Garamendi (1992, 2nd Dist, Div 4) 11 Cal.App.4th 460, 490; Bell v. DMV (1992, 1st Dist, Div 3) 11 Cal.App.4th 304, 311 ; Kaiser Foundation Health Plan v. Lifeguard (1993, 1st Dist, Div 4) 18 Cal.App.4th 1753, 1764; Johnson v. Superior Court (1994, 2nd Dist, Div 5) 25 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1570; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Fish & Game Commission (1994, 3rd Dist) 28 Cal.App.4th 1104, 1118; Golden State Homebuilding Association v. City of Modesto (1994, 5th Dist) 26 Cal.App.4th 601, 609; State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Worker’s Compensation Appeals Board (1995, 2nd Dist, Div 3) 37 Cal.App.4th 675, 682; Cuadra v. Bradshaw (1997, 1st Dist) 53 Cal.App.4th 869, 875; Forty-Niner Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. (1997, 3rd Dist) 58 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1273, 1274; Grossmont Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (1997, 4th Dist, Div 1) 59 Cal.App.4th 1348, 1359; Aquilino v. Marin County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (1998, 1st Dist, Div 2) 60 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1516
3. Governor’s Correspondence and Press Releases:
“In his signature message, Governor Wilson noted, ‘this bill imposes a sentence enhancement of up to five years for the use of a firearm.’ (Ibid) As with the inclusion of assault with a firearm, granting discretionary sentencing authority under §12022.5(d) would be inconsistent with the obvious seriousness of these violent crimes and the legislative intent to punish them accordingly.” People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 98, 100
“Once the Governor had signed the legislation, his office issued a press release stating: ‘The bill declares that civil liability to a third party is incurred solely by the intoxicated person’ (Governor’s Press Release No. 320 [September 20, 1978]). Such documents may be used to determine legislative intent (Citations)….” Knighten v. Sam’s Parking Valet (1988, 4th Dist) 106 Cal.App.3d 69, 77
“This includes matter appearing in ‘official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments’ (Evidence Code, Section 452, subd. (c)) and which may consist of materials such as administrative determinations, committee reports, correspondence directed to the governor’s office and testimony at public hearings.” Karlin v. Zalta (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 953, 968, fn. 9
People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 520
———-
Post v. Prati (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 626, 634; People v. Stepney (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1020, fn. 4; People v. Garcia (1998, 1st Dist, Div 1) 63 Cal.App.4th 820, 831; In re Carr (1998, 2nd Dist) 65 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1535
D. Post-Enactment History.
1. Statements and Actions by Subsequent Legislatures:
“The Legislature’s adoption of subsequent, amending legislation that is ultimately vetoed may be considered as evidence of the Legislature’s understanding of the unamended existing statute.” [Citations omitted] Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County Employees’ Retirement System (1993) 6 Cal.4th 821, 832-833
“Although a legislative expression of the intent of an earlier act is not binding upon the courts in their construction of the prior act, that expression may properly be considered together with other factors in arriving at the true legislative intent existing when the prior act was passed.” Eu v. Chacon (1976) 16 Cal.3d 465, 470
“The Legislature declared that its intent in enacting these provisions was to confirm existing law…. Although we are not bound by a legislative declaration that a statute merely confirms or clarifies existing law [Citations omitted] we may certainly weigh the legislative declaration in evaluating the operation of the prior statutory scheme. [Citations omitted] When a court must interpret a statutory scheme, a subsequent legislative enactment intended to clarify that scheme may be considered by the court in construing the operation of the preamendment statutory scheme.” 1111 Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court (1995, 4th Dist, Div 1) 38 Cal.App.4th 570, 578, fn. 7 (Review Granted)
“[A]lthough construction of a statute is a judicial function, where a statute is unclear, a subsequent expression of the Legislature bearing upon the intent of the prior statute may be properly considered in determining the effect and meaning of the prior statute.” Tyler v. California (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 973, 977
“[T]he Legislature has no authority to interpret a statute. That is a judicial task. The Legislature may define the meaning of statutory language by a present legislative enactment which, subject to constitutional restraints, it may deem retroactive. But it has no legislative authority simply to say what it did mean. Courts do take cognizance of such declarations where they are consistent with the original intent. ‘[A] subsequent expression of the Legislature as to the intent of the prior statute, although not binding on the court, may properly be used in determining the effect of a prior act.'” Del Costello v. State of California (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 887, 893
West Pico Furniture v. Pacific Finance (1970) 2 Cal.3d 594, 610; People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514; Russ Building Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco (1988) 44 Cal.3d 839, 852; People v. Cruz (1996, 1st Dist) 13 Cal.4th 764, 781; Mercy Hospital and Medical Center v. Farmers Insurance Group of Companies (1997) 15 Cal.4th 213, 222, fn. 4
———-
Friends of Lake Arrowhead v. Board of Supervisors (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 497, 506; Seibert v. Sears Roebuck (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 11, 19; County of Sacramento v. State of California (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 428, 433-34; People v. Martinez (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1254; Salem v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 595, 601; People v. Preller (1997, 3rd Dist) 54 Cal.App.4th 93, 98; In re Parker (1998, 4th Dist, Div 1) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1467, fn. 14; Edgar v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (1998, 4th Dist, Div 1) 65 Cal.App.4th 1, 17
[TEXT CONTINUES ON BRIEF BANK # B-809-ii]
