People v. Lawrence (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 547, held that CC 600 does not erroneously conflate the mental state and act requirements of attempt.
People v. Lawrence (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 547, held that CC 600 does not erroneously conflate the mental state and act requirements of attempt.
People v. Ramos (2011) 193 Cal. App. 4th 43, 47, concluded that CC 600 adequately instructs jurors on the intent required for attempted murder. Its language is virtually identical to CJ 8.66, except that CC 600 does not reference “malice aforethought” in defining murder. The Court of Appeal held that, “To instruct on the definition of malice is unnecessary and confusing because [CC 600] is a complete and adequate instruction.” (Ibid.)
Based on People v. Mendoza (1998) Cal. 4th 1114, 1122-23, People v. Curry (2007) 158 Cal. App. 4th 766, approved CC 404’s admonition to not consider intoxication in deciding whether certain crimes are the natural and probable consequence of the commission of designated target offenses.
People v. Ferguson (2011) 194 Cal. App. 4th 1070, 1082, held that although voluntary intoxication resulting in unconsciousness will normally reduce second degree murder to involuntary manslaughter, it does not do so in the context of drunk driving because the manslaughter statute states it is inapplicable “to acts committed in the driving of a vehicle.” Hence, CC 626 should not be used in cases where a defendant is charged with second degree murder due to driving under the influence.
The Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions revised CC 1600 in August, 2009, and stated:
The committee revised [CC No. 1600], Robbery, after the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in People v. Scott (2009) 45 Cal. 4th 743. The Scott case found that an employee on duty has constructive possession of the employer’s property during a robbery.
CC 1600 now provides that “A (store/[or] business) (employee___<insert description> who is on duty has possession of the (store/[or] business) owner’s property.
People v. Clark (2011) 201 Cal. App. 4th 235, 250, found that the trial court properly instructed the jury with CC 3470 regarding the principles of self-defense.
CC treats the People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 522, issue as purely a legal one, for the court. Although the court should make a determination on this issue, Apprendi now requires that the jury make the necessary finding that the felony was independent of the killing. (Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466; See also ¶ 4:3; but see CCJICH § 4:31, p. 171.)
In People v. Genovese (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 817, three challenges to CC 571 were rejected. First, the court rejected a claim that the voluntary manslaughter instructions were erroneous because they did not tell the jury the role that malice or lack of malice plays in reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter. Genovese rejected the challenge, stating, “[t]he definition of malice may be interesting to lawyers and judges and law professors, but it does not aid the task of lay jurors to inform them that, when the defendant acts in an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend another, he is acting without malice.” (Ibid.)
The defense also argued that the trial court should have expressly instructed the jury that intent to kill or conscious disregard for life is an essential and required element of voluntary manslaughter. This claim was rejected because the instructions did let the jury know that a killing in imperfect self-defense (or heat of passion, etc.), whether intentional or in conscious disregard of life, is voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at 832.)
Finally, the defense contended that even if they found express or implied malice to exist, the jurors could still find defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter if they believed that the defendant acted in heat of passion or in reasonable or unreasonable self-defense. The Court of Appeal concluded that the “defendant’s argument is defeated by the plain language of the instructions as given to the jury. [CC 571] states that ‘[a] killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter’ if defendant acted in imperfect defense of another or sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (Ibid.)
The trial judge does not have a sua sponte duty to instruct on mistake of fact. (People v. Lawson (2013) 215 Cal. App. 4th 108.)
Acts of civil disobedience do not trigger a necessity defense. (See People v. Garziano (1991) 230 Cal. App. 3d 241.)