All posts by jpadmin

Attempted Murder: Intent

 

People v. Ramos (2011) 193 Cal. App. 4th 43, 47, concluded that CC 600 adequately instructs jurors on the intent required for attempted murder. Its language is virtually identical to CJ 8.66, except that CC 600 does not reference “malice aforethought” in defining murder. The Court of Appeal held that, “To instruct on the definition of malice is unnecessary and confusing because [CC 600] is a complete and adequate instruction.” (Ibid.)

Voluntary Intoxication Resulting in Unconsciousness Instruction Not Applicable To Second Degree Murder Due To Drunk Driving

 

People v. Ferguson (2011) 194 Cal. App. 4th 1070, 1082, held that although voluntary intoxication resulting in unconsciousness will normally reduce second degree murder to involuntary manslaughter, it does not do so in the context of drunk driving because the manslaughter statute states it is inapplicable “to acts committed in the driving of a vehicle.” Hence, CC 626 should not be used in cases where a defendant is charged with second degree murder due to driving under the influence.

Robbery: Constructive Possession Of Employer’s Property

 

The Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions revised CC 1600 in August, 2009, and stated:

 

The committee revised [CC No. 1600], Robbery, after the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in People v. Scott (2009) 45 Cal. 4th 743. The Scott case found that an employee on duty has constructive possession of the employer’s property during a robbery.

 

CC 1600 now provides that “A (store/[or] business) (employee___<insert description> who is on duty has possession of the (store/[or] business) owner’s property.

Voluntary Manslaughter: Defense Claims Rejected

 

In People v. Genovese (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 817, three challenges to CC 571 were rejected. First, the court rejected a claim that the voluntary manslaughter instructions were erroneous because they did not tell the jury the role that malice or lack of malice plays in reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter. Genovese rejected the challenge, stating, “[t]he definition of malice may be interesting to lawyers and judges and law professors, but it does not aid the task of lay jurors to inform them that, when the defendant acts in an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend another, he is acting without malice.” (Ibid.)

 

The defense also argued that the trial court should have expressly instructed the jury that intent to kill or conscious disregard for life is an essential and required element of voluntary manslaughter. This claim was rejected because the instructions did let the jury know that a killing in imperfect self-defense (or heat of passion, etc.), whether intentional or in conscious disregard of life, is voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at 832.)

 

Finally, the defense contended that even if they found express or implied malice to exist, the jurors could still find defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter if they believed that the defendant acted in heat of passion or in reasonable or unreasonable self-defense. The Court of Appeal concluded that the “defendant’s argument is defeated by the plain language of the instructions as given to the jury. [CC 571] states that ‘[a] killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter’ if defendant acted in imperfect defense of another or sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (Ibid.)