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F 2.13.1 n1 Un-Mirandized Statement: Sua Sponte Limiting Instructions
There is a split in authority in California courts as to whether CJ 2.13.1 limiting the consideration of Miranda violative statements must be given sua sponte. (People v. Duncan (88) 204 CA3d 613, 619-21 [251 CR 355] [sua sponte duty]; People v. Wyatt (89) 215 CA3d 255, 258 [263 CR 556] [only required if requested]; see also People v. Baker (90) 220 CA3d 574, 579 [269 CR 475]; People v. Torrez (95) 31 CA4th 1084, 1091 [37 CR2d 712] [CJ 2.13.1 must be requested but “it may be time for the California Supreme Court to revisit this issue”].) However, there are two reasons why the failure to give CJ 2.13.1, even absent a request, is error. First, the federal rule which requires sua sponte instruction (Hinman v. McCarthy (9th Cir. 1982) 676 F2d 343, 349; see also Duran v. Stagner (N.D. Cal. 1985) 620 F Supp 803), should control because the California Supreme Court has held that Proposition 8 requires that “the Federal law must be applied as to the use of statements in violation of the Miranda rule ….” (People v. May (88) 44 C3d 309, 313 [243 CR 369].)
Second, even if the court has no sua sponte duty to give CJ 2.13.1, if only the standard instructions regarding inconsistent statements and admissions are given (CJ 2.13 and CJ 2.71), then the effect of giving these two instructions, without excluding from consideration the illegally obtained statements, would be to inform the jury that such admissions could be considered on the issue of guilt. (See e.g., Duncan 204 CA3d at 622.) [Additional briefing on this issue is available to FORECITE subscribers. Ask for Brief Bank # B-550.]
F 2.13.1 n2 Coerced or Involuntary Statements Not Admissible for Impeachment.
While un-Mirandized statements are admissible for the purpose of impeaching the defendant’s reliability (Harris v. New York (71) 401 US 222 [28 LEd2d 1; 91 SCt 643], coerced statements are inadmissible for all purposes. (Michigan v. Harvey (90) 494 US 344, 350-51 [108 LEd2d 293; 110 SCt 1176]; People v. Bey (93) 21 CA4th 1623, 1627-28 [27 CR2d 28].)
In People v. Peevy (98) 17 C4th 1184 [73 CR2d 865] the California Supreme Court held that statements that are a result of the police violating Miranda may not be used in the People’s case in chief, but may be used to impeach any testimony given by the defendant. The court rejected any claim that a deliberate violation precludes use of the statement to impeach, but did not reach the issue of whether the Miranda violation rendered the statement coerced. The court also failed to decide if the result would be different if the police had a policy of violating Miranda. (See also People v. Neal (2003) 31 C4th 63 [excellent discussion of the threat and promise used by the officer to get the confession, and why these render the statement involuntary; also discusses the defendant’s low intelligence, lack of education, and inexperience in legal matters].)
F 2.13.1 n3 Un-Mirandized Statements: Admissible For Impeachment.
In People v. Peevy (98) 17 C4th 1184 [73 CR2d 865] the court held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda are admissible for impeachment purposes even if Miranda was intentionally violated. However, the court did not reach the issue of whether the Miranda violation rendered the statement coerced. Peevy also failed to decide if the result would be different if the police had a policy of violating Miranda.
(See also FORECITE F 2.13.1 n2.)
F 2.13.1 n4 Un-Mirandized Statement: Introduction By Prosecution To Impeach.
See FORECITE F 2.03 n18.
F 2.13.1a
Prior Inconsistent Statement Of Defendant In Violation Of Miranda
*Add to end of ¶ 1 of CJ 2.13.1
The prosecution must use other evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime.
Points and Authorities
(Fed. Jud. Ctr., Pattern Crim. Jury Instructions (1988), Inst. # 42, p. 52.)
Jury consideration of improper matters lessens the prosecution’s burden of proof in violation of the defendant’s state (Art. I, § 15 and § 16) and federal (6th and 14th Amendments) constitutional rights to trial by jury and due process. [See generally, FORECITE PG VII.]
