F 105.2 Jurors May Consider Anything Re: Truth Or Accuracy

SERIES 100 PRETRIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
F 105.2 Inst 1 (a & b) Improper To Imply A Defense Obligation To “Disprove” The Truth Or Accuracy Of Testimony
F 105.2 Inst 2 Listed Factors Are Not Exclusive; Consider Relevant Factors; Do Not Consider Irrelevant Factors
F 105.2 Inst 3 (a-d) Credibility Of Witness: Use Of Drugs, Alcohol Or Other Mental Impairment Of Witness At The Time Of The Events
F 105.2 Inst 4 Interest Of Witness In Outcome Of Proceeding
F 105.2 Inst 5 (a-c) Consideration Of Witness Coercion
F 105.2 Inst 6 (a & b) Testimony Of Witness Who Was Under The Influence Of Drugs Or Alcohol When Testifying Should Be Viewed With Greater Caution Than Other Witnesses

Return to Series 100 Table of Contents.

F 105.2 Inst 1 (a & b) Improper To Imply A Defense Obligation To “Disprove” The Truth Or Accuracy Of Testimony

*Modify CC 105, paragraph 2, sentence 1, as follows [added language is underlined; deleted language is stricken]:

Alternative a:

In evaluating a witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or disprove bears on the truth or accuracy of that testimony.

Alternative b [CC 330 & 331 Format]:

In evaluating the truth or accuracy of a witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth or accuracy of all of the factors surrounding that testimony.

Points and Authorities

Delete “Tends To Prove Or Disprove”—The phrase “tends to prove or disprove” as used in CALCRIM 105 could be interpreted by the jurors to impose a duty on the defendant to “prove or disprove” specific facts. (See FORECITE F 104.1 Inst 1.)

Thus the instruction risks an unconstitutional shifting of the prosecution’s burden of proof to the defendant. (See FORECITE F 100.1 Inst 1.)

Delete “You May”—Jurors should not be allowed to simply ignore or not consider evidence that has been presented. (See Giles v. State (AR 1977) 549 SW2d 479, 484-85 [misconduct for jurors to arbitrarily and completely disregard mitigating evidence of defendant’s severe cognitive impairment due to organic brain syndrome]; Duckworth v. State (AR 1907) 103 SW 601, 602 [relevant and competent testimony in a criminal case should not be arbitrarily disregarded by the jury]; People v. Sumner (IL 1982) 437 NE2d 786, 788 [jury must consider all of the evidence; trier of fact cannot simply ignore exculpatory evidence].)

For example, an instruction on a defense theory such as voluntary intoxication is defective if it informs the jury that consideration is permissive rather than mandatory. (See FORECITE F 4.21e; cf. United States v. Marcucci (9th Cir. 2002) 299 F3d 1156 [stating that the grand jury “should”—rather than “shall” or “must”—indict if it finds probable cause, “leaves room—albeit limited room—for a grand jury to reject an indictment that, although supported by probable cause, is based on governmental passion, prejudice, or injustice” ].)

Consistent with the above principles numerous CALCRIM instructions correctly admonish the jurors to “consider” relevant factors and circumstances. (See, e.g., CC 103 [“… consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial”]; CC 105 [“Consider the testimony of each witness …”]; CC 240 [“In deciding whether a consequence is natural or probably, consider all the circumstances …”]; CC 315 [“In evaluating identification testimony, consider the following questions: . . .”]; CC 330 [“When you evaluate the child’s cognitive development, consider the child’s ability to perceive, understand, remember, and communicate”]; CC 375 [“In evaluating this evidence, consider the similarity or lack of similarity between the uncharged (offense[s]/ [and] act[s]) and the charged offense[s]”]; CC 571 [“In evaluating the defendant’s beliefs, consider all the circumstances as they were known and appeared to the defendant”]; CALCRIM 590 [“In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence”].)

Identification Of Parties— See FORECITE F 100.2 Note 1.

Right To Jury Consideration Of The Evidence.

CAVEAT: To properly preserve a federal constitutional claim, the defendant must explain how the constitutional provision is violated under the circumstances of the case. Therefore, the issues, language and authorities included in FORECITE’s Constitutional Grounds are not a substitute for individual consideration and presentation of each constitutional claim on a case-by-case basis. Counsel should also independently consider and research whether additional constitutional claims and/or authority may apply under the circumstances of the specific case.

(See FORECITE CG Table of Contents [PG VII(I)(a)] for a partial list of other potential constitutional grounds.)

This request is based, inter alia, on the Due Process, Trial By Jury, Confrontation, Compulsory Process and Right to Counsel Clauses of the California Constitution (Art I, ‘ 7, 15 and 16) and the federal constitution (5th, 6th and 14th Amendments) as applied to California through the Incorporation Doctrine. (Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 US 145 [20 LEd2d 491; 88 SCt 1444]; see also Tennessee v. Lane (2004) 541 US 509, 562 [158 LEd2d 820; 124 SCt 1978].)

Unless this instructional request is granted, the instruction will abridge the defendant’s rights under the above constitutional provisions by failing to require the jury to consider any evidence upon which the defendant relies to leave the jury with a reasonable doubt as to any element of the charge. (See e.g., Martin v. Ohio (1987) 480 US 228, 234 [107 SCt 1098; 94 LEd2d 267] [instruction that jury could not consider self-defense evidence in determining whether there was a reasonable doubt about the state’s case would violate In re Winship (1970) 397 US 358 [90 SCt 1068; 25 LEd2d 368]]; Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 US 44 [107 SCt 2704; 97 LEd2d 37] [domestic rule of evidence may not be used to exclude crucial defense evidence]; Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 US 284 [93 SCt 1038; 35 LEd2d 297]; People v. Bobo (1990) 229 CA3d 1417, 1442 [legislature cannot deny defendant an opportunity to prove he or she did not possess a statutorily required mental state].)

These rights are implicated by any procedures and/or instructions which permit and/or encourage the jurors to convict the defendant without having considered all of the evidence. (See Conde v. Henry (9th Cir. 1999) 198 F3d 734, 739-42 [the right to present evidence is meaningless if the jury is not required to consider it]; People v. Cox (1991) 53 C3d 618, 695-96 [“defendant as well as the prosecution have a right to the reasoned, dispassionate and considered judgment of the jury”].)

This request is also based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause which is violated by:

(1) The arbitrary denial of a state created right. (Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 US 343 [65 LEd2d 175; 100 SCt 2227].) [See also FORECITE CG 6.3.]

(2) Multiple errors of state law which cumulatively render the trial unfair. (Greer v. Miller (1987) 483 US 756, 765 [107 SCt 3092; 97 LEd2d 618]; Taylor v. Kentucky (1978) 436 US 478, 488 [98 SCt 1930; 56 LEd2d 468]; Mak v. Blodgett (9th Cir. 1992) 970 F2d 614, 622; People v. Hill (1998) 17 C4th 800, 844-45.) [See also FORECITE CG 6.4.]

Furthermore, because this instruction request is necessary to assure the reliability of the jury’s disposition of this case, it is required by the above provisions of the federal constitution. (See generally Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 US 36 [158 LEd2d 177; 124 SCt 1354]; White v. Illinois (1992) 502 US 346, 363-64 [112 SCt 736; 116 LEd2d 848]; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 US 637, 646 [94 SCt 1868; 40 LEd2d 431]; Thompson v. City of Louisville (1960) 362 US 199, 204 [80 SCt 624; 4 LEd2d 654].) [See also FORECITE CG 1.14.]

If this instruction request is not granted there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury will apply the instructions in a way that will prejudicially violate the defendant’s federal constitutional rights. (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 US 62 [116 LEd2d 385; 112 SCt 475]; McDowell v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1997) 130 F3d 833, 839.)

ADDITIONAL FEDERALIZATION FOR CAPITAL/DEATH PENALTY CASES: In death penalty cases additional federal constitutional claims will apply, above and beyond the claims discussed above. (Insert appropriate grounds into Points and Authorities including, but not limited to, those applicable from FORECITE (PG VII(I)(c)] [Constitutional Grounds: Death Penalty].)

WARNING! Federal constitutional claims may be lost without proper federalization – To preserve federal claims, counsel should add the applicable constitutional provisions and authority to the above points and authorities and explain how those provisions will be violated under the circumstances of this case.

Potential constitutional grounds for this request include, but are not limited to:

FORECITE CG 7.1 [Right To Jury Consideration Of The Evidence]

In death penalty cases, additional federal claims should be added including, but not limited to, those in FORECITE CG 13.

F 105.2 Inst 2 Listed Factors Are Not Exclusive; Consider Relevant Factors; Do Not Consider Irrelevant Factors

*Modify CC 105, paragraph 2, as follows [added language is underlined; deleted language is stricken]:

In evaluating a witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that reasonably tends to prove or disprove bears on the truth or accuracy of that testimony. Among the factors that you may consider are: The factors which may be relevant to your evaluation include, but are not limited to, the following:

Points and Authorities

Delete “Tends To Prove Or Disprove”—See FORECITE F 105.2 Inst 1.

Delete “You May”—See FORECITE F 105.2 Inst 1.

Not Limited To—Jurors should understand that they may rely on factors not included in the list.

Jurors Must Not Consider Irrelevant Factors – See FORECITE F 105 Note 1.

Right To Pinpoint Instructions On Relevant Factors—An instruction which singles out specific testimony or factors for juror consideration is not necessarily improper. (See, e.g., People v. Battle (2011) 198 CA4th 50; CC 315; see also FORECITE PG III(B).) However, a cautionary instruction may be appropriate to avoid the danger that such an instruction may give undue emphasis to the enumerated factors. (See, e.g., People v. Benson (1990) 52 CA3d 754, 805, fn 12; People v. Harris (1989) 47 CA3d 1047, 1098, fn 31; cf., Davis v. Erickson (1960) 53 CA2d 860, 863-64 [no undue emphasis of supplemental instructions]; U.S. v. Rodgers (6th Cir. 1997) 109 F3d 1138, 1144-45 [recognizing “real danger” that jurors will place undue emphasis on specific testimony that is read back during deliberations]; U.S. v. Harris (7th Cir. 1975) 521 F2d 1089, 1093-94 [judge properly ordered readback of witness’s entire testimony were jury requested readback on a specific point]; State v. Wood (CT 1988) 545 A2d 1026, 1030 [jurors should be cautioned not to give undue emphasis to reproduced or written exhibits]; U.S. v. Johnson (4th Cir. 1975) 54 F2d 1150, 1159, fn 10 [no undue emphasis of pedagogical summaries].)

Moreover, the instruction should make it clear to the jurors that the enumerated factors are not exclusive. For example, the CALCRIM instructions have various formulations for conveying this point:

CC 105 [“Among the factors you may consider are: …” ]

CC 330 [“In evaluating a child’s testimony you should consider all of the factors surrounding that testimony including …” ]

CC 331 [“In evaluating the testimony of a person with a (developmental disability[,]/ [or] [a] (cognitive[,]/ [or] mental[,]/ [or] communication) impairment), consider all of the factors surrounding that person’s testimony, including …” ]

CC 375 / CC 852 [“If you conclude that the defendant committed the (uncharged offense[s]/ act[s]), that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence.” ]

CC 840 / CC 852 / CC 2701 [“Factors that may determine whether people are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) …, (2) …, (3) …, (4) …, (5) …” ]

CC 1156 [“This list of factors is not intended to be a complete list of all the factors you may consider on the question of intent. The factors are provided only as examples to assist you in deciding whether the defendant acted with the intent to commit prostitution.” ]

Identification Of Parties—See FORECITE F 100.2 Note 1.

WARNING! Federal constitutional claims may be lost without proper federalization.—To preserve federal claims, counsel should add the applicable constitutional provisions and authority to the above points and authorities and explain how those provisions will be violated under the circumstances of this case.

Potential constitutional grounds for this request include, but are not limited to:

FORECITE CG 5.3 [Impairing Jury’s Assessment Of Witness Credibility]
FORECITE CG 7.1 [Right To Jury Consideration Of The Evidence]
FORECITE CG 7.2 [Jury’s Duty To Fully And Fairly Apply The Law]

In death penalty cases additional federal claims should be added including, but not limited to, those in FORECITE CG 13.

F 105.2 Inst 3 (a-d) Credibility Of Witness: Use Of Drugs, Alcohol Or Other Mental Impairment Of Witness At The Time Of The Events

*Add to CC 105 as a factor to consider:

Alternative a:

Was the witness [under the influence of drugs or alcohol] [or] [mentally impaired] at the time about which the witness testified?

Alternative b:

“In determining the credibility of a witness you may consider … his capacity to hear or see that about which he testified and his ability to recollect or relate to such matters; specifically in this regard, you may consider whether any witness was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicants at the time he testified; and if you believe that any witness was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicants at the time of his testimony, you may but are not obligated to disregard or give little weight to his or her testimony insofar as you find that his credibility has been impaired thereby; you may reach that conclusion if you find that as a result of being under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicants while testifying, such witness’s ability to recollect and relate matters about which he or she testified was impaired.”

[Source: People v. Barnett (1976) 54 CA3d 1046,1050 fn 2.]

Alternative c:

A witness’s mental condition at a time about which the witness testifies affects his or her credibility. It goes to the witness’s ability to comprehend, know and correctly recall the truth. It is for you to consider whatever impairment the witness might have had in assessing the witness’s credibility and in determining what weight to give to the testimony.

[Source: United States v. Partin (5th Cir. 1974) 493 F2d 750, 762-64 and United States v. Martino (5th Cir. 1981) 648 F2d 367.]

Alternative d:

The [testimony] [out of court statements]* of some witnesses must be considered with more caution than other witnesses.

For example, a witness who was using addictive drugs at the time may have an impaired ability to perceive or remember the matters to which he or she has testified.

So, while a witness of that kind may be entirely truthful when [testifying] [making out of court statements], you should consider that [testimony] [out of court statements] with more caution than that of other witnesses.

[Source: Adapted from 11th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions—Criminal Special Instructions 1.3 [Accomplice-Addictive Drugs-Immunity] (1997); see also U.S. v. Fajardo (11th Cir. 1986) 787 F2d 1523, 1527.]

Points and Authorities

CALCRIM 105 does not include the witness’s mental impairments among the factors which the jury should consider in evaluating credibility. However, if the witness is intoxicated, on drugs, or otherwise mentally impaired, this can be an important factor for the jury to consider in determining the witness’s credibility. (See generally People v. Anderson (Anderson II) (2001) 25 C4th 543, 574.) Therefore, instruction upon this factor is appropriate. (See U.S. v. Vgeri (9th Cir. 1995) 51 F3d 876, 880-81.)

Identification Of Parties—See FORECITE F 100.2 Note 1.

WARNING! Federal constitutional claims may be lost without proper federalization.—To preserve federal claims, counsel should add the applicable constitutional provisions and authority to the above points and authorities and explain how those provisions will be violated under the circumstances of this case.

Potential constitutional grounds for this request include, but are not limited to:

FORECITE CG 5.3 [Impairing Jury’s Assessment Of Witness Credibility]
FORECITE CG 7.1 [Right To Jury Consideration Of The Evidence]
FORECITE CG 7.2 [Jury’s Duty To Fully And Fairly Apply The Law]

In death penalty cases, additional federal claims should be added including, but not limited to, those in FORECITE CG 13.

CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 2.20c.

F 105.2 Inst 4 Interest Of Witness In Outcome Of Proceeding

*Add to CC 105, paragraph 2(e), when appropriate:

Bias, interest, or other motive may include a financial interest in the outcome of the proceeding. Such a financial bias, interest, or motive may result from ___________ <Insert financial interest of the witness>.

Points and Authorities

“It is, of course, an elementary rule that the financial interest of a witness in the result of a case in which he testifies is a proper subject of cross-examination as tending to show his bias and affecting his credibility.” (People v. Philpott (1962) 201 CA2d 859, 864; see also Calvert v. State Bar (1991) 54 C3d 765, 777.)

Hence, the jury may properly be instructed to consider a witness’s interest in the outcome of the case in evaluating the credibility of the witness. (People v. Brown (1943) 22 C2d 752, 758 [“In determining the credibility of any witness … you may also consider … the interest or absence of interest in connection with the results of the issues before you” ]; see also Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions, Criminal (1994) §1.7 [“you may take into account … the witness’s interest in the outcome of the case …” ].)

In CALCRIM 105 this concept is arguably encompassed within the discussion of “bias or prejudice, a personal relationship with someone involved in the case, or a personal interest in how the case is decided.” However, when a specific financial interest is involved based on matters which may not be within the jury’s common knowledge, it may be necessary to identify the particular financial interest (e.g., financial interest of police in forfeiture proceeding (see FORECITE F 332 Note 5); damages liability dependent on DUI proceeding. (See FORECITE F 12.60f.)

Identification Of Parties—See FORECITE F 100.2 Note 1.

Potential constitutional grounds for this request include, but are not limited to:

FORECITE CG 5.3 [Impairing Jury’s Assessment Of Witness Credibility]
FORECITE CG 7.1 [Right To Jury Consideration Of The Evidence]
FORECITE CG 7.2 [Jury’s Duty To Fully And Fairly Apply The Law]

In death penalty cases, additional federal claims should be added including, but not limited to, those in FORECITE CG 13.

NOTE: The constitutionality of CivC 3333.4 has been ruled on in Yoshioka v. Superior Court (Todd) (1997) 58 CA4th 972 [Prop. 213 constitutional in both its retroactive and prospective application].

CAVEAT: It is error generally to single out the testimony of a civil defendant when instructing the jury regarding bias from a personal interest in the outcome of the case. (See People v. Brown (1943) 22 C2d 752, 757.) The same concerns apply with even greater force to the testimony of a criminal defendant. (See e.g., U.S. v. Bear Killer (8th Cir. 1976) 534 F2d 1253, 1260.) Hence, counsel should carefully consider the potential downside of focusing the jury on consideration of witnesses’ personal interest in the outcome of the case when the defendant has testified.

CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 2.20e.

F 105.2 Inst 5 (a-c) Consideration Of Witness Coercion

*Add to CC 105 when appropriate:

Alternative a:

In evaluating an alleged out-of-court statement of a witness, consider the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of the witness together with any psychological factors that may have influenced the witness in making the statement. The weight, if any, to be given by you to any alleged out-of-court statement is for your sole determination.

Alternative b:

If you find [it more likely than not] that an alleged out-of-court statement was made by a witness, you must then determine if it was produced by means of coercion. Although coercive methods do not necessarily produce false statements, they certainly may have that effect. Therefore, if you determine that coercion did occur, consider this fact in deciding the weight and believability, if any, such statement should be given.

Alternative c:

In deciding whether any statement, confession, admission, or act or omission alleged to have been made by a witness outside of court was knowingly and voluntarily made or done, consider the age, training, education, occupation, and physical and mental condition of the witness, and his or her treatment while in custody or under interrogation. Also consider all other circumstances in evidence surrounding the making of the statement, confession or admission.

If after considering the evidence, you find [it more likely than not] that a statement, confession, admission, or act or omission was made or done knowingly and voluntarily, you may give it such weight as you feel it deserves under the circumstances.

Points and Authorities

Preliminary Fact/More Likely Than Not Standard—See FORECITE F 105.8 Inst 1; see also FORECITE F 1.05 Note 6.

Relevance Of Coercion—”[The] physical and psychological environment that yielded the confession can … be of substantial relevance to the ultimate factual issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 US 683, 689 [90 LEd2d 636; 106 SCt 2142]; see also A.M. v. Butler (7th Cir. 2004) 360 F3d 787, 797 [defendant’s age is a crucial factor in evaluating whether the totality of the circumstances would have led a reasonable person in defendant’s position to believe he was under arrest]; Alvarado v. Hickman (9th Cir. 2002) 316 F3d 841, 851; United States v. Ervin, L. (10th Cir. 1998) 147 F3d 1240, 1248.) Hence, “juries have been at liberty to disregard confessions that are insufficiently corroborated or otherwise deemed unworthy of belief.” (Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 US 477, 486-87 [30 LEd2d 618; 92 SCt 619].) When the record contains evidence upon which the jury may question the credibility of the confession, the jury should be informed about the need to weigh the statement in light of the circumstances. (See e.g., U.S. v. Hoac (9th Cir. 1993) 990 F2d 1099, 1107-09 [court is obligated under federal rules to instruct the jury concerning the weight to be accorded a defendant’s statement when the defendant raises a genuine issue concerning the voluntariness of the statement; Hof v. State (Maryland) (1995) 655 A2d 370 [337 Md 581] [requiring jury to consider whether confession was voluntary]; see also In re Cameron (1968) 68 C2d 487, 498 [coercion should be determined by considering the “totality of the circumstances” ].)

The same considerations apply when a coerced admission or confession is made by a witness. Although the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not apply, the defendant’s federal constitutional right to due process and to a fair, reliable trial by jury are implicated. (See People v. Badgett (1995) 10 C4th 330, 347 [41 CR2d 635]; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 C3d 468 [268 CR 126]; U.S. v. Chiavola (7th Cir. 1984) 744 F2d 1271; U.S. v. Fredericks (5th Cir. 1978) 586 F2d 470; La France v. Bohlinger (1st Cir. 1974) 499 F2d 29.)

Accordingly, when appropriate, specific instructions should be given regarding the factors which may impact the believability of a witness’s admission or confession.

Identification Of Parties—See FORECITE F 100.2 Note 1.

Potential constitutional grounds for this request include, but are not limited to:

FORECITE CG 5.3 [Impairing Jury’s Assessment Of Witness Credibility]
FORECITE CG 7.1 [Right To Jury Consideration Of The Evidence]
FORECITE CG 7.2 [Jury’s Duty To Fully And Fairly Apply The Law]

In death penalty cases, additional federal claims should be added including, but not limited to, those in FORECITE CG 13.

[See Article Bank #A-73 for an article discussing this issue (“Defendant’s Right to Challenge Coerced Statements by Witnesses” by Kim Malcheski, Cal App News, Spring 1999).]

CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 2.20h.

F 105.2 Inst 6 (a & b) Testimony Of Witness Who Was Under The Influence Of Drugs Or Alcohol When Testifying Should Be Viewed With Greater Caution Than Other Witnesses

*Add to CC 105 as a factor to consider:

Alternative a:

Whether or not the witness was under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol when he or she testified.

Alternative b:

The [testimony] [out of court statements] of some witnesses must be considered with more caution than the [testimony] [out of court statements] of other witnesses. For example, the testimony of a witness who was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of his or her [testimony] [out of court statements] should be considered with more caution than the [testimony] [out of court statements] of other witnesses.

Points and Authorities

It should be beyond dispute that a witness who testifies while using or while under the influence of drugs or alcohol is more suspect than a witness who is not so impaired. Hence, it is appropriate to specifically instruct the jury that the testimony of a witness who was using or was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of his or her testimony should be viewed with more caution than the testimony of other witnesses. (11th Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions—Criminal Special Inst. 1.3 [Accomplice—Addictive Drugs—Immunity] (1997); see also U.S. v. Fajardo (11th Cir. 1986) 787 F2d 1523, 1527].)

Identification Of Parties—See FORECITE F 100.2 Note 1.

Potential constitutional grounds for this request include, but are not limited to:

FORECITE CG 5.3 [Impairing Jury’s Assessment Of Witness Credibility]
FORECITE CG 7.1 [Right To Jury Consideration Of The Evidence]
FORECITE CG 7.2 [Jury’s Duty To Fully And Fairly Apply The Law]

In death penalty cases, additional federal claims should be added including, but not limited to, those in FORECITE CG 13.

CALJIC NOTE: See FORECITE F 2.20k.