Return to CALJIC Part 3-4 – Contents
F 4.00 n1 Medication of Defendant At Trial.
Sell v. United States (2003) 539 US 166 [123 SCt 2174: 156 LEd2d 197] cited Washington v. Harper (90) 494 US 210 [110 Sct 1028; 108 LEd2d 178] and Riggins v. Nevada (1992) 504 US 127 [112 SCt 1810; 118 LEd2d 479], in holding that as a matter of federal constitutional law:
[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if [1] the treatment is medically appropriate, [2] is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, [3] taking account of less intrusive alternatives, [4] is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests.
(Sell, 539 US at p. 179-83 [123 SCt at p. 2184-85; 156 LEd2d 197].)
Sell further held that this would be a difficult standard to meet: "This standard will permit involuntary administration of drugs solely for trial competence purposes in certain instances. But those instances may be rare." (539 US at p. 180 [123 SCt at p. 2185].)
Most importantly, Sell held that the trial court must make findings on the four specific issues quoted above, before a case might qualify as one of the "rare instances" where antipsychotic drugs might be given on a nonconsensual basis for purposes of creating trial competence. (Ibid.; see also People v. O’Dell (2005) 126 CA4th 562, noting amendment to PC 1370 to comply with the holding of Sell and holding that there was insufficient evidence to justify involuntary medication of the defendant.)
[See Brief Bank #B-971 for briefing on this issue.]
Retroactivity Note: (See Flowers v. Walters (9th Cir. 2001) 239 F3d 1096 [prohibition against forced administration of drugs to criminal defendant is new watershed rule within the meaning of 28 USC 2244(b)(2)(A) which may be retroactively applied in habeas proceeding].)
F 4.00 n2 Legal Definition Of Insanity Not Impermissibly Vague (PC 1026, et seq.).
Argument rejected that legal definition of insanity (i.e., distinguishing right from wrong and realizing the crimes were morally wrong) is impermissibly vague. (People v. Kelly (92) 1 C4th 495, 533-35 [3 CR2d 677].)
F 4.00 n3 Outline Of Defenses To Assault Crimes.
THIS ENTRY HAS BEEN DELETED.
F 4.00 n4 Insanity Instruction Regarding Demeanor Altering Medication.
In cases where the requirements of Riggins v. Nevada (92) 504 US 127 [118 LEd2d 479; 112 SCt 1810] have been met and the defendant is involuntarily given a demeanor altering medication in order to be competent to stand trial, the true demeanor of the defendant – without such medication – is of probative value with respect to the defense of insanity. In Lawrence v. State (Georgia) (95) 454 SE2d 446 [265 Ga 310], the court resolved this question by holding that the defendant is entitled, upon motion of defense counsel, to have the jury informed, at the beginning of trial and in the charge to the jury, that the defendant is under the influence of medication, that the defendant’s behavior in their presence is conditioned by the medication, and that the insanity asserted as the defendant’s defense is to be evaluated as of the time the alleged criminal acts were committed.
F 4.00 n5 Appellate Issue Alert: Pre-1997 Version.
The pre-1997 version of CJ 4.00 failed to adequately convey the test for insanity. While no elements were omitted from the 5th edition instruction, the 6th edition revision illustrates that the earlier instruction was confusing to the jury. In a close case or where the jury expressed confusion, it could be argued that the failure to enumerate the terms was prejudicial. (See CALJIC History CJ 4.00.)
F 4.00 n6 Insanity Defense: Availability To Juveniles.
Chatman v. Commonwealth (VA 1999) 518 SE2d 847, 850 [30 Va.App. 593] held that just as in the adult criminal system, due process and fair treatment demand that the insanity defense be made available to juveniles.
F 4.00 n7 Insanity: Improper To Dismiss Or Direct Verdict Against Defendant Without Trial.
As to an NGI plea, “sanity” determination requires a trial regardless of judicial inconvenience. The trial court may neither direct a verdict against defendant nor dismiss under PC 1385 after a hung jury. (See People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 C4th 512 [93 CR2d 509].)
F 4.00 n8 Defense Theory Of Genetic Brain Disorder: Frontal Lobe Brain Abnormalities As Defense Theory.
In a new study appearing in the February issue of the Archives of General Psychiatry, researchers report that 21 men with antisocial personality disorder, a psychiatric diagnosis often applied to people with a history of criminal behavior and a history of violence, had subtle abnormalities in the structure of the brain’s frontal lobe.
The abnormalities, the researchers found, distinguished the men with the disorder from healthy subjects, as well as from subjects who abused alcohol or drugs, or who suffered from other psychiatric disorders like schizophrenia.
When combined with the results of previous studies, write the researchers, led by Dr. Adrian Raine, Professor of Psychology at the University of Southern California, the findings suggest “that there is a significant brain basis to APD over and above contributions from the psychosocial environment, and that these neurobehavioral processes are relevant to understanding violence in everyday society.”
An analysis of MRI scans, the researchers said, revealed that the men with antisocial personality disorder had an 11 percent reduction in the gray matter of the frontal lobe, compared with normal subjects.
Similar reductions were found when the men’s brain scans were compared with those of subjects suffering from drug or alcohol abuse or other psychiatric disorders. (See “Reduced Prefrontal Gray Matter Volume and Reduced Autonomic Activity in Antisocial Personality Disorder,” Adrian Raine, et al., Archives of General Psychiatry (AMA), Vol. 57, Feb. 2000, pp. 119-127.) [For reprints of this article or for more information, contact Dr. Adrian Raine, DPhil, Department of Psychology, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089-1061 (e-mail: raine@rcf-fs.usc.edu).]
F 4.00 n9 Insanity: Proposed Instructions.
Michael Burt’s proposed instructions in People v. Stayner appear in Instruction Bank # I-870. This thorough and well supported instruction set should be reviewed any attorney who may be involved in a sanity trial.
F 4.00 n10 Insanity: Collateral Estoppel / Double Jeopardy – Issue Preclusion.
(See U.S. v. Carbullido (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F3d 957 [finding of insanity in prior prosecution precluded subsequent prosecution for other charges].)
F 4.00 n11 Insanity In Capital Case: Constitutional Right To Appointment Of Expert.
Under Ake v. Oklahoma (85) 470 US 68 [84 LEd2d 53;105 SCt 1087] , a defendant is entitled to the assistance of a mental health professional upon a showing that sanity at the time of the crime will be a significant issue at trial. (See Schultz v. Page (7th Cir. 2002) 313 F3d 1010.)
F 4.00 n12 Insanity Judge May Remove Issue From Jury.
Insanity is an affirmative defense where the defendant bears the burden of proving the condition by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, when there is no evidence supporting the defense, the court may remove the issue from the jury. Courts have inherent power to remove affirmative defenses from the jury where there is no evidence to support them. (See People v. Ceja (2003) 106 CA4th 1071 [131 CR2d 601].)
F 4.00a
Insanity: Must Be Defined In Legal and Moral Terms
(PC 1026, et seq.)
*Add at end of ¶ 4 of CJ 4.00:
The term wrong as used in this instruction refers both to legal wrong and moral wrong. ¶ If during the commission of a crime defendant was incapable of distinguishing either (1) legal right from wrong; or (2) moral right from wrong, [he] [she] is legally insane.
Points and Authorities
In People v. Stress (88) 205 CA3d 1259 [252 CR 913], the court observed that, “[i]t is clear that in California ‘wrong’ as the term is used in PC 25(d), refers both to legal wrong and moral wrong.” (People v. Stress 205 CA3d at 1272.) Hence, even though a person may know that the act is unlawful, that person is insane if incapable of understanding that the act is morally wrong. (People v. Skinner (85) 39 C3d 765, 783 [217 CR 685]; People v. Stress 205 CA3d at 1275.)
CJ 4.00 does not convey this principle because it merely refers to right and wrong without any differentiation between the lawful sense and the moral sense. Hence, the supplement to CJ 4.00 set forth above should be given.
Failure to adequately instruct upon a defense or defense theory implicates the defendant’s state (Art. I, § 15 and § 16) and federal (6th and 14th Amendments) constitutional rights to trial by jury, compulsory process and due process. [See generally, FORECITE PG VII(C).]
NOTES
The same considerations discussed above apply to definition of right and wrong in CJ 4.02 regarding insanity resulting from intoxication.
F 4.00b
Defense Of Insanity: Definition Of Mental Illness
(PC 1026, et seq.)
*After 4th ¶ of CJ 4.00, add the following:
The terms “mental disease” and “mental defect” include all mental conditions which produce the requisite effects.
Points and Authorities
In People v. Medina (90) 51 C3d 870 [274 CR 849], the court addressed the defendant’s concern that the standard insanity instruction may have limited the jury’s consideration to a specific mental illness. In response to this argument, the court observed that while the standard instructions should suffice, the court could have been more explicit in responding to the jury’s inquiry regarding the definition of mental illness. “For example, the court might have advised the jury that ‘mental illness’ includes all mental conditions which produce the requisite effects.” (Medina 51 C3d at 901.) Therefore, when appropriate the above modification to CJ 4.00 should be given. However, such a clarification must be requested by the defendant. (See People v. Kimble (88) 44 C3d 480, 503 [244 CR 148].)
Failure to adequately instruct upon a defense or defense theory implicates the defendant’s state (Art. I, § 15 and § 16) and federal (6th and 14th Amendments) constitutional rights to trial by jury, compulsory process and due process. [See generally, FORECITE PG VII(C).]
NOTES
The response suggested by the Supreme Court in Medina and the court’s further discussion of People v. Fields (83) 35 C3d 329, 368-70 [197 CR 803], support an argument (and instruction) that where a defendant’s alleged sociopathy is not essentially or exclusively manifested by a pattern of criminality, it can provide the basis of a mental state defense.
F 4.00c
Insanity: Consideration of Mental Disease And Mental Defect
(PC 1026, et seq.)
*Modify CJ 4.00, 2nd line of ¶ defining when a person is legally insane to provide as follows [added language is capitalized]:
… mental disease AND/OR mental defect …
Points and Authorities
CJ 4.00 refers to mental disease or mental defect. This may be misleading in cases where evidence has been presented of both mental disease and mental defect. In People v. Kelly (92) 1 C4th 495, 535-536 [3 CR2d 677], the court rejected an argument that the trial court was obligated to make the above modification of CJ 4.00 sua sponte. However, when the defense theory is grounded on both disease and defect, the defendant should have a right to pinpoint this theory upon request. (See FORECITE PG III(A).)
Failure to adequately instruct upon a defense or defense theory implicates the defendant’s state (Art. I, § 15 and § 16) and federal (6th and 14th Amendments) constitutional rights to trial by jury, compulsory process and due process. [See generally, FORECITE PG VII(C).]