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F 2.72 n1 Proof Of Corpus Delicti: Prior Offenses.
There is authority for the proposition that the commission of a prior crime may not be proved by evidence of the defendant’s extrajudicial admission without independent proof that such a crime was committed. (People v. Williams (88) 44 C3d 883, 910-11 [245 CR 336]; People v. Robertson (82) 33 C3d 21, 41 [188 CR 77].) Under this authority it may be argued that a prior offense may not be admitted without independent proof of that offense. Moreover, even if the evidence is admitted, pursuant to EC 403(c)(1) the defendant would have the right to an instruction, upon request, requiring the jury to find the corpus delicti of the offense independent of an admission or a confession before it may consider the evidence.
However, the applicability of this rule to situations where the uncharged conduct is offered for a limited purpose under EC 1101(b) has been questioned in People v. Denis (90) 224 CA3d 563, 567 [273 CR 724]. In Denis, the court concluded that Williams and Robertson proclaimed the rule but did not apply it. Therefore, the court refused to expand the corpus rule to cover uncharged conduct offered for a limited purpose. (Denis 224 CA3d at 569.)
F 2.72 n2 Corpus Delicti: Error To Refuse CJ 2.72.
It is error to refuse a defense request for CJ 2.72. (People v. Daly (92) 8 CA4th 47, 59 [10 CR2d 21]; but see People v. Lopez (2005) 129 CA4th 1508, 1529 [failure to give CJ 2.72 held harmless].)
[Research Note: See Annotation, Sufficiency of corroboration of confession for purpose of establishing corpus delicti as question of law or fact, 33 ALR 5th 571 and Later Case Service.]
F 2.72 n3 Failure To Require Corroborating Evidence Of Corpus Reversible Error.
See FORECITE PG X(C)(9).
F 2.72 n4 Applicability of Corpus Rule to Felony Which Underlies a Felony Murder Charge.
California adheres to the majority rule that does not require independent corroboration of the corpus for a felony which is used as the predicate for first degree felony murder under PC 189. (See People v. Cantrell (73) 8 C3d 672, 679-81 [105 CR 792].) However, a person is just as likely to confess to a non-existing felony as he is to a non-existing murder. Therefore, logically the corpus delicti rule should apply with equal force to compound crimes – where one crime has occurred, but, absent the confession from the defendant, there is no evidence indicating that the underlying crime, in fact, has taken place. (See DeJesus v. State (95) 655 A2d 1180.)
F 2.72 n5 Corpus Delicti: Impact Of Proposition 8.
The question of whether the corpus delicti rule has been abrogated by Proposition 8 (Cal. Const. Art. I, § 28(d)) has been recognized but not resolved in People v. Jones (98) 17 C4th 279, 319 [70 CR2d 793] [issue recognized but not resolved, but see opinion of Mosk, J. which provides an in depth discussion in favor of retaining the rule]; People v. Riccio (96) 42 CA4th 995, 1001 [50 CR2d 52]; see also, People v. Culton (92) 11 CA4th 363, 373-77 [14 CR2d 189] (conc. opn. of Timlin, J.).
People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 C4th 1161, 1180 [119 CR2d 903] held that Proposition 8 (PC 28(d)) “did not eliminate the independent-proof rule insofar as the rule prohibits conviction where the only evidence that the crime was committed is the defendant’s own statements outside of court. Thus, section 28(d) did not affect the rule to the extent it (1) requires an instruction to the jury that no person may be convicted absent evidence of the crime independent of his or her out-of-court statements or (2) allows the defendant, on appeal, directly to attack the sufficiency of the prosecution’s independent showing.” [Emphasis in original.] (See also People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 C4th 1083 [124 CR2d 373] [identity of the perpetrator, as well as the knowledge and intent of the aider and abettor, “are not elements of the corpus delicti rule that must be proved independently of any extrajudicial admissions . . . .”]; People v. Jones (98) 17 C4th 279 [70 CR2d 793]; People v. Riccio (96) 42 CA4th 995, 1001 [50 CR2d 52]; People v. Culton (92) 11 CA4th 363, 373-77 [14 CR2d 189].)
F 2.72 n6 Corpus Rule Not Applicable To Administrative Proceeding.
Corrigan v. Zolin (96) 47 CA4th 230 [54 CR2d 634] held that the corpus delicti rule does not apply in an administrative proceeding to revoke a defendant’s drivers license. (But see, Creutz v. Superior Court (96) 49 CA4th 822 [56 CR2d 870] [reaffirming the corpus delicti rule and rejecting the prosecution’s argument that “all criminal statutes must be construed so as to permit the most efficacious prosecution of suspects.”] (Creutz, at 831.)
F 2.72 n7 Corpus Delicti Requirement Inapplicable To Statements Which Constitute The Crime Itself.
People v. Carpenter (97) 15 C4th 312 [63 CR2d 1] concluded that, although the corpus rule applies to pre-offense statements of later intent as well as post-offense statements, it does not apply to a statement that is “part of the crime itself.” [Emphasis added.] (Id. at 394; see also People v. Chan (2005) 128 CA4th 408.) For example, a statement to the victim of current intent is part of the crime and does not have to be independently proved and, therefore, the court need not instruct with CJ 2.72 as to such a statement.
F 2..72 n8 Corpus Instruction: Inapplicable To Sentencing Enhancements.
Because an enhancement does not define a crime, but “merely” imposes additional punishment for a crime when certain circumstances are found to exist (People v. Best (83) 143 CA3d 232, 236 [191 CR 614]), the corpus delicti rule would not serve its purpose by application to an enhancement. (People v. Shoemake (93) 16 CA4th 243, 252-56 [20 CR2d 36].)
[Research Note: See FORECITE BIBLIO 2.92]
F 2.72a
Corpus Delicti: Modification To Avoid Confusion Regarding
Whether Identity And Degree Of Crime Are Elements
Which Must Be Proven By The Prosecution
*Modify CJ 2.72 ¶ 2, sentence 1 to provide as follows [deleted language is between << >>; added language is capitalized]:
<<The>> HOWEVER, THIS RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE identity of the person who is alleged to have committed a crime <<is not an element of the crime>> [nor <<is>> TO the degree of the crime].
*Add at end of CJ 2.72:
Even though identity [or degree of crime] are excepted from the independent corroboration rule stated above, it [they] must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
Points and Authorities
CJ 2.72 informs the jury that “The identity of the person who is alleged to have committed a crime is not an element of the crime [nor is the degree of the crime].” Taken out of context, this statement is incorrect and could mislead the jury. Although the Supreme Court in People v. Frye (98) 18 C4th 894, 960 [77 CR2d 25] concluded that the instruction did not mislead the jury, “[i]n light of the parties’ steadfast focus on the issue of identity at trial …,” implicit in this conclusion is the recognition that the instruction could be confusing in the absence of such “steadfast focus.” Accordingly, CJ 2.72 should be modified as set forth above to avoid the danger of potential confusion.
F 2.72b
Admissions And Corpus Delicti:
Jurors Are “Exclusive Judges” Of Whether Statement
Was Made And Whether It Was True
*Add to CJ 2.71.5 and CJ 2.72:
[See FORECITE F 2.71.5c.]
F 2.72c
Corpus Delicti: Applies To Specific Intent And Mental Elements
*Modify CJ 2.72, first paragraph as follows [added language is capitalized; deleted language is between << >>]:
No person may be convicted of a criminal offense unless there is some proof of each element, INCLUDING ANY SPECIFIC INTENT AND/OR MENTAL STATE ELEMENT of the crime, independent of any [confession] [or] [admission] made by [him] [her] outside of this trial.
Points and Authorities
It is sometimes said that the corpus delicti consists of all the elements of the crime. (See e.g.., Cal. Criminal Law: Procedure and Practice (CEB 7th Ed. 2004) § 30.22, p. 790.) However, this is not always true since some elements are not subject to the corpus delicti rule such as the identity of the perpetrator. (See People v. Hawkins (2004) 124 CA4th 675, 680.)
On the other hand, it is incorrect to suggest that the intent, purpose, or mental state of the perpetrator is generally not an element of the corpus delicti. (See e.g., 1 Witkin and Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d Ed. 2000) Elements § 46, p. 251.) For certain crimes it has been held that the corpus delicti includes evidence of the defendant’s mental state. (See e.g., People v. Lopez (67) 254 CA2d 185, 190 [corpus delicti of selling narcotics included knowledge that the substance sold was a narcotic]; People v. Lawrence (56) 141 CA2d 630, 633 [corpus delicti of child abuse shown by evidence that corporal injury was inflicted on child deliberately and intentionally].)
Accordingly, the intent, purpose, and/or mental state is an element of the corpus delicti which must be proven independent of the defendant’s admissions. (People v. Hawkins, supra, 124 CA 4th at 681.)
