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F 1.21 n1 Knowingly Defined: General Versus Specific Intent.
The bracketed clause of CJ 1.21 regarding specific intent should only be given when both general and specific intent offenses are charged. (People v. Lyons (91) 235 CA3d 1456, 1461, fn 5 [1 CR2d 763].) (See FORECITE F 4.21 n4re: negation of knowledge by intoxication.)
F 1.21 n2 Knowingly, As Included In Specific Intent.
People v. Booth (96) 48 CA4th 1247, 1253-54 [56 CR2d 202] held that the concept of “knowledge” is included within the concept of specific intent. Therefore, a specific intent to commit a particular crime necessarily includes knowledge of the factual circumstances underlying a crime. In other words, “the word ‘knowingly’ merely implies the person know of facts which bring the act or omission within the scope of the statute.” (Booth, at 1253.)
(See FORECITE F 1.21 n3.)
F 1.21 n3 Knowledge Is Not Identical To Intent.
See People v. Foster (71) 19 CA3d 649, 655 [97 CR 94] [knowledge is not identical with intent]; see also People v. Valenzuela (2001) 92 CA4th 768, 775, fn 2 [112 CR2d 209].
NOTE: As to the knowledge element of general intent see FORECITE F 3.30a. As to the knowledge element of willfulness see FORECITE F 1.20a.